Suchergebnisse

Pierard reviews 'American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists, & Others,' by John George and Laird Wilcox.

The quest for an army: the reality of militias -- From revolt to communal defeat 1936-1948 -- Serving others or themselves? Palestinians in Arab armies -- The PLO and the Palestine Liberation Army 1964-1993 -- The security forces under the Palestinian authority -- The security forces and the Al-Aqsa Intifada -- Politics, law, and security -- The Palestinian security forces under Abbas -- From one military to two: the triumph of Hamas -- Conclusion.

Intro -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Structure and Ideology of the Militia Movement -- 3 History of the Militia Movement in Michigan -- 4 Social Movement Theories and the Rise of the Militia Movement -- 5 Explaining Higher Levels of Militia Related Activities -- 6 Economic and Social Disorganization, Paramilitary Culture, and Militia Related Activities -- 7 Findings -- 8 Economics, Culture and Militias -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index.

This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.

From Syria to Sudan, governments have informal ties with militias that use violence against opposition groups and civilians. Building on research that suggests these groups offer governments logistical benefits in civil wars as well as political benefits in the form of reduced liability for violence, we provide the first systematic global analysis of the scale and patterns of these informal linkages. We find over 200 informal state–militia relationships across the globe, within but also outside of civil wars. We illustrate how informal delegation of violence to these groups can help some governments avoid accountability for violence and repression. Our empirical analysis finds that weak democracies as well as recipients of financial aid from democracies are particularly likely to form informal ties with militias. This relationship is strengthened as the monitoring costs of democratic donors increase. Out-of-sample predictions illustrate the usefulness of our approach that views informal ties to militias as deliberate government strategy to avoid accountability.

Dr. Williams looks in detail at major criminal activities, including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. He also considers the critical role played by corruption in facilitating and strengthening organized crime and shows how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. Dr. Williams identifies the roots of organized crime in post-Ba'athist Iraq in an authoritarian and corrupt state dominated by Saddam Hussein and subject to international sanctions. He also explains the rise of organized crime after the U.S. invasion in terms of two distinct waves: the first wave followed the collapse of the state and was accompanied by the breakdown of social control mechanisms and the development of anomie; the second wave was driven by anarchy, insecurity, political ambition, and the imperatives of resource generation for militias, insurgents, and other groups. He also identifies necessary responses to organized crime and corruption in Iraq, including efforts to reduce criminal opportunities, change incentive structures, and more directly target criminal organizations and activities. His analysis also emphasizes the vulnerability of conflict and post-conflict situations to organized crime and the requirement for a holistic or comprehensive strategy in which security, development, and the rule of law complement one another. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1623/thumbnail.jpg

The author identifies the roots of organized crime in Ba'athist Iraq and reports on major criminal activities including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. The author also reports on how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. ; "June 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction -- The rise of organized crime in Iraq -- The theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil -- Kidnapping in Iraq -- Extortion and other criminal activities -- Corruption and organized crime in Iraq -- Criminals, insurgents, terrorists, and militias -- Conclusions. ; The author identifies the roots of organized crime in Ba'athist Iraq and reports on major criminal activities including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. The author also reports on how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. ; Mode of access: Internet.