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Multilateralism and minilateralism are the main mechanisms of global governance. Multilateralism is characterized by membership inclusiveness, a low entry threshold for new members, and a focus on universality, while minilateralism is characterized by membership exclusivity, a high entry threshold for new members, and no focus on universality. Contemporary multilateral institutions emerged after World War II under the influence of American hegemony. The US commitment to multilateralism in global governance has been inconsistent, setting the stage for the current crisis of multilateral global governance. The aforementioned crisis can be explained by the problems of American leadership, the emergence of a polycentric power configuration of the world, as well as specific actions of both the hegemon and other great powers. The issue was fueled by the increasingly evident problems of ineffectiveness of the core global institutions in dealing with pressing problems, deadlocks in multilateral negotiations and the lack of representation of developing countries in global governance. The failure of the main actors to respond to these challenges has led to the proliferation of the minilateralist mechanism of global governance. Two types of minilateralism in global governance are distinguished - clubs of the most significant states (the first type) and communities of like-minded states (the second type). The main advantage of the first type of minilateralism is the ability to solve global problems with minimal effort. Minilateralism of the second type is positively distinguished by its homogeneous structure and cohesion of the ranks. The main advantages of minilateralism in general include flexibility, adaptability, plasticity, quick decision-making, free, open and effective negotiations and resource saving. The main disadvantages of minilateralism are low legitimacy, limited technical and financial capabilities, lack of transparency and accountability, vagueness of goals and lack of focus. The first type of minilateralism is able to somewhat increase the effectiveness of interaction within the global institutions by reducing the number of parties involved, but it is unlikely to be able to overcome the core source of ineffectiveness of global governance, which is the mistrust between the main actors. The main disadvantage of the second type of minilateralism is the fragmentation of international regimes. The emergence of the minilateral competitors can both motivate the established institutions to reform and demotivate states to participate in multilateral global governance. Minilateralism will continue to play a large role in global governance. The disadvantages of minilateralism can be mitigated by combining it with the multilateralist mechanism, using a more rigorous approach to the selection of participants, goal setting and the implementation of agreements, and introducing a system of indirect representation.

Visegrád, Weimarer Dreieck, nordische Staaten oder Eurozone: Regional wie funktional organisierte Gruppen von Mitgliedstaaten der EU haben in ihrer Politikformulierung klar an Bedeutung gewonnen. Für die Stabilität der Union jedoch ist dieser neue »Minilateralismus« ambivalent. Staatengruppen können Fragmentierung und Intransparenz begünstigen, etwa durch Ausgrenzung, Gegengewichtsbildung – gerade gegen Deutschland – und die Stärkung intergouvernementaler Verfahren. Sie tragen aber auch zum Funktionieren der EU bei, sei es durch Agendasetzung, Interessenausgleich oder als diplomatische Brücken. Deshalb sollte Berlin solche Gruppen nicht bloß als schädliche Fliehkräfte betrachten, welche die Einheit der Union gefährden. Vielmehr sollte Deutschland sich diesen Formaten gezielt zuwenden, denn damit ließe sich vor allem die Inklusion kleiner und mittelgroßer EU-Staaten verbessern.

Visegrád, Weimarer Dreieck, nordische Staaten oder Eurozone: Regional wie funktional organisierte Gruppen von Mitgliedstaaten der EU haben in ihrer Politikformulierung klar an Bedeutung gewonnen. Für die Stabilität der Union jedoch ist dieser neue »Minilateralismus« ambivalent. Staatengruppen können Fragmentierung und Intransparenz begünstigen, etwa durch Ausgrenzung, Gegengewichtsbildung – gerade gegen Deutschland – und die Stärkung intergouvernementaler Verfahren. Sie tragen aber auch zum Funktionieren der EU bei, sei es durch Agendasetzung, Interessenausgleich oder als diplomatische Brücken. Deshalb sollte Berlin solche Gruppen nicht bloß als schädliche Fliehkräfte betrachten, welche die Einheit der Union gefährden. Vielmehr sollte Deutschland sich diesen Formaten gezielt zuwenden, denn damit ließe sich vor allem die Inklusion kleiner und mittelgroßer EU-Staaten verbessern. (Autorenreferat)

The slow progress of the international climate negotiations has generated calls for a shift from large-n multilateralism (inclusive multilateralism) to more streamlined negotiations that are confined to the major emitters whose support is crucial for an effective climate treaty (exclusive minilateralism). This article pushes critical theory in an applied direction to explore under what circumstances, if any, minilateralism might help to advance the climate negotiations. I show that inclusive multilateralism is unlikely to produce a timely climate treaty, while exclusive minilateralism is elitist, procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving. Instead, I defend inclusive minilateralism, based on "common but differentiated representation," or representation by the most capable, the most responsible, and the most vulnerable. I also offer some practical suggestions as to how a minilateral climate council might be constituted, what its remit should be, and how it might be embedded in and answerable to the UNFCCC.

Japan under the first and second Abe administration in 2006–07 and 2012–20, respectively, played a pivotal leading role in creating and institutionalising the Quad. While Japan has taken on a more supportive role in the post-Abe administrations, there are unique roles that Japan could still play in coordinating and shaping the strategic role of the Quad, such as configuring its institutional relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Over the past five years there have been a series of significant international climate change agreements involving only elite state actors. The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration and US Major Economies Process all displayed a shift towards a model of international climate change governance involving a small group of economically powerful states, to the exclusion of less powerful states and environmental NGOs. The modest result from the UNFCCC COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009 and subsequent UNFCCC meetings has strengthened calls for international climate governance to be pared down to smaller decision making forums of key states only. This article argues that these developments evidence an emerging discourse of 'exclusive minilateralism' in international climate policy that is challenging the inclusive multilateral discourse that has formed the bedrock of international climate change governance since the inception of UN climate regime in the early 1990s. The exclusive minilateralism discourse offers a significant challenge to both the cosmopolitan and discursive democratic aspirations of international climate change governance. One response to the exclusive minilateral discourse is to reform the UNFCCC consensus-based decision making rule to provide the COP with greater ease of decision making on key issues relating to mitigation and adaptation. Another response is to more formally include the exclusive minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process. This could be achieved by forming a small peak body of states and key NGO groups to act as an influential advisor to the COP process on key issues requiring expedition and resolution.

To save the principle of ASEAN centrality, the regional body should transcend its unanimity/consensus-based decision-making and embrace minilateral arrangements on divisive issues.