The political and legal conditions of realization of the interests of the Polish minority in modern Ukraine are under analysis, the attention is drawn to the non compliance in the Ukrainian legislation in this sphere. The fundamental civil, cultural and political rights of national minorities are submitted, the deficiency of the providing of Poles collective rights in Ukraine is emphasized. The realization of the Polish minority interests in modern Ukraine, which derives from the opportunities of Ukrainian legislation is shown. ; The political and legal conditions of realization of the interests of the Polish minority in modern Ukraine are under analysis, the attention is drawn to the non compliance in the Ukrainian legislation in this sphere. The fundamental civil, cultural and political rights of national minorities are submitted, the deficiency of the providing of Poles collective rights in Ukraine is emphasized. The realization of the Polish minority interests in modern Ukraine, which derives from the opportunities of Ukrainian legislation is shown.
After 1989, the Hungarian minority in Romania could receive basic rights, the execution of which — without mayor conflict — is followed by the subsequent governments. This was the result of an over two decades long process. In the first period, between 1989 and 1996, Romanian nationalism did not allow for substantial changes in the approach to the Hungarian minority. Only after the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourship, the two countries started their cooperation, which gradually reduced the tension on the international level and allowed for the creation of a legal system guaranteeing basic right of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Surely, the actions and skilfully created programme of the largest Hungarian political party in Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian: Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR, Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövets ég, RMDSZ), a regional party, that was able to secure a place on the political scene as a co-ruling party or lend its support to the government in order to achieve its goals through participation in politics on the central level, contributed to the creation of a well-functioning legal system in 1996–2011. The UDMR tries to use its participation in the elections to the European Parliament, in which it has two representatives, to implement its own policy, i.e. the elaboration appropriate programs of regional cooperation in the name of the idea of a "Europe of the regions". Accession to the EU, adopting the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages served as a basis for adopting a range of acts sought by the UDMR. In 2001, Victor Orbán's government established the Hungarian's Card, which led to ethnic tensions. Its amendment normalised the tense situation between Budapest and Bucharest. Currently, the aspiration to obtain political and territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Transylvania, which is contrary to the provision of the constitution of Romania — is increasing and causing conflicts, which antagonises the Romanians, who are afraid that such demands may result in losing a part of Transylvania, towards the Hungarian minority. Nationalist Hungarian parties in Parliament support these demands. The government does not reject them either. UDMR, officially emphasising the development of infrastructure in Transylvania and the education of the Hungarian minority, aims at decentralisation of power a self-governance in order to take over some competences of the central authorities. ; After 1989, the Hungarian minority in Romania could receive basic rights, the execution of which — without mayor conflict — is followed by the subsequent governments. This was the result of an over two decades long process. In the first period, between 1989 and 1996, Romanian nationalism did not allow for substantial changes in the approach to the Hungarian minority. Only after the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourship, the two countries started their cooperation, which gradually reduced the tension on the international level and allowed for the creation of a legal system guaranteeing basic right of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Surely, the actions and skilfully created programme of the largest Hungarian political party in Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian: Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR, Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövets ég, RMDSZ), a regional party, that was able to secure a place on the political scene as a co-ruling party or lend its support to the government in order to achieve its goals through participation in politics on the central level, contributed to the creation of a well-functioning legal system in 1996–2011. The UDMR tries to use its participation in the elections to the European Parliament, in which it has two representatives, to implement its own policy, i.e. the elaboration appropriate programs of regional cooperation in the name of the idea of a "Europe of the regions". Accession to the EU, adopting the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages served as a basis for adopting a range of acts sought by the UDMR. In 2001, Victor Orbán's government established the Hungarian's Card, which led to ethnic tensions. Its amendment normalised the tense situation between Budapest and Bucharest. Currently, the aspiration to obtain political and territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Transylvania, which is contrary to the provision of the constitution of Romania — is increasing and causing conflicts, which antagonises the Romanians, who are afraid that such demands may result in losing a part of Transylvania, towards the Hungarian minority. Nationalist Hungarian parties in Parliament support these demands. The government does not reject them either. UDMR, officially emphasising the development of infrastructure in Transylvania and the education of the Hungarian minority, aims at decentralisation of power a self-governance in order to take over some competences of the central authorities.
In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner. ; In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner.
In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner. ; 3 ; 1 ; 103 ; 124 ; 6 ; Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
Akcesja do Unii Europejskiej dokonana na podstawie art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji RP była w sferze wartości zgodna z celem tego przepisu i spełniała warunki jego zastosowania. Także później, w okresie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, polska praktyka ustrojowa nie odbiegała od unijnych standardów aksjologicznych. Sposób rozumienia demokratycznego państwa prawnego, o którym mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji, był bowiem spójny z treścią wartości wspólnych państwom członkowskim, stanowiących zgodnie z art. 2 TUE ustrojową podstawę Unii. Istotą systemu tych wspólnych wartości jest to, by realizowanie przez organy władzy publicznej woli obywateli wyrażonej w wolnych wyborach następowało z poszanowaniem zasad państwa prawnego, na które składają się przede wszystkim: podział władzy, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem niezależności sądów i niezawisłości sędziów, pluralizm polityczny, ochrona praw jednostki, respektowanie praw mniejszości. Nieprzestrzeganie wartości, o których mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji oraz w art. 2 TUE, podważyłoby cel i treść art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji, a w świetle wiążącego RP prawa unijnego – mogłoby narazić Polskę na objęcie jej mechanizmem kontroli przewidzianym w art. 7 TUE. ; In the field of values, the accession to the European Union carried out pursuant to Article 90(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland was in line with the purpose of this article and met the conditions for its application. Also later, already during membership in the European Union, Polish political practice did not differ from EU axiological standards. The understanding of a democratic state governed by the rule of law as referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution was consistent with the content of values common to the Member States, which, in accordance with Article 2 of the TEU, constituted the political foundation of the Union. The essence of the system of these common values is that the fulfilment by public authorities of the citizens' will expressed in free elections is carried out with respect for the principles of the rule of law. These principles include mainly: the separation of powers, with particular regard to the independence of courts and the independence of judges, political pluralism, protection of individual rights and respect for minority rights. Failure to observe the values referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the TEU would undermine the purpose and content of Article 90(1) of the Constitution. According to the Constitution, and in the light of EU law binding for Poland, it could expose Poland to the control mechanism provided for in Article 7 TEU.
Lithuania's striving towards independence in 1989–1991 provoked fears of the national minorities living in Lithuania, including Poles, regarding the approach of an independent Lithuania towards the protection of their rights. In the case of Poles, maintaining Polish schools and unity of the regions inhabited mostly by the Polish minority, their protection against uncontrolled Lithuanian colonisation, and confirming their right to the land were crucial. The fears regarding the intentions of new Lithuanian authorities inspired the concept of creating a Polish autonomous district. Its creation was a grass roots process undertaken on the self-governmental level. The Lithuanians considered these actions a manifestation of anti- Lithuanian attitude, reluctance towards Lithuanian independence, and disloyalty to the state. The Poles in Lithuania tried to gain the support of Poland. The issue has been discussed in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate several times. The senators (in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were against the territorial autonomy of the Vilnius region. They argued that the Poles in Lithuania should follow the OSCE provisions and strengthen the territorial self-government that would protect their right to autonomy better. The Polish position was due to the concerns regarding the status of the German and Lithuanian minorities and to huge support of Lithuanian independence in Poland. The conviction that good relations with Lithuania would result in its positive attitude towards the Polish minority was expressed several times in the Senate. Common discussions about the ways of preserving the identity of Poles in Lithuania did not result in a consensus. ; Lithuania's striving towards independence in 1989–1991 provoked fears of the national minorities living in Lithuania, including Poles, regarding the approach of an independent Lithuania towards the protection of their rights. In the case of Poles, maintaining Polish schools and unity of the regions inhabited mostly by the Polish minority, their protection against uncontrolled Lithuanian colonisation, and confirming their right to the land were crucial. The fears regarding the intentions of new Lithuanian authorities inspired the concept of creating a Polish autonomous district. Its creation was a grass roots process undertaken on the self-governmental level. The Lithuanians considered these actions a manifestation of anti- Lithuanian attitude, reluctance towards Lithuanian independence, and disloyalty to the state. The Poles in Lithuania tried to gain the support of Poland. The issue has been discussed in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate several times. The senators (in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were against the territorial autonomy of the Vilnius region. They argued that the Poles in Lithuania should follow the OSCE provisions and strengthen the territorial self-government that would protect their right to autonomy better. The Polish position was due to the concerns regarding the status of the German and Lithuanian minorities and to huge support of Lithuanian independence in Poland. The conviction that good relations with Lithuania would result in its positive attitude towards the Polish minority was expressed several times in the Senate. Common discussions about the ways of preserving the identity of Poles in Lithuania did not result in a consensus.
For over ten years Polish-Belarusian political relations have been characterized by a lack of opportunities for real collaboration, caused by the non-democratic nature of the Belarusian political system. The international isolation of its authoritarian regime also influences bilateral relations. In the period from 1996–2008 Poland adopted a principle of critical dialogue in its policy towards Belarus. This implied official criticism of the infringement of human rights and breaking of democratic rules while refraining from a total abandonment of dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, although the level and intensity of this dialogue was significantly diminished. It was assumed that the complete isolation of the Belarusian authorities was not in Polish interests and preferential treatment would help to ensure the fundamental rights of the Polish minority in Belarus. This policy turned out to be ineffective, though, in relation to a state that does not acknowledge the basic principles and laws of international relations. To a large extent, the specific character of the Belarusian political system has been, and will remain, the greatest obstacle in the further development of Polish-Belarusian relations, and will significantly restrict the possibility of building good relations in the future. ; For over ten years Polish-Belarusian political relations have been characterized by a lack of opportunities for real collaboration, caused by the non-democratic nature of the Belarusian political system. The international isolation of its authoritarian regime also influences bilateral relations. In the period from 1996–2008 Poland adopted a principle of critical dialogue in its policy towards Belarus. This implied official criticism of the infringement of human rights and breaking of democratic rules while refraining from a total abandonment of dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, although the level and intensity of this dialogue was significantly diminished. It was assumed that the complete isolation of the Belarusian authorities was not in Polish interests and preferential treatment would help to ensure the fundamental rights of the Polish minority in Belarus. This policy turned out to be ineffective, though, in relation to a state that does not acknowledge the basic principles and laws of international relations. To a large extent, the specific character of the Belarusian political system has been, and will remain, the greatest obstacle in the further development of Polish-Belarusian relations, and will significantly restrict the possibility of building good relations in the future.
For over ten years Polish-Belarusian political relations have been characterized by a lack of opportunities for real collaboration, caused by the non-democratic nature of the Belarusian political system. The international isolation of its authoritarian regime also influences bilateral relations. In the period from 1996–2008 Poland adopted a principle of critical dialogue in its policy towards Belarus. This implied official criticism of the infringement of human rights and breaking of democratic rules while refraining from a total abandonment of dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, although the level and intensity of this dialogue was significantly diminished. It was assumed that the complete isolation of the Belarusian authorities was not in Polish interests and preferential treatment would help to ensure the fundamental rights of the Polish minority in Belarus. This policy turned out to be ineffective, though, in relation to a state that does not acknowledge the basic principles and laws of international relations. To a large extent, the specific character of the Belarusian political system has been, and will remain, the greatest obstacle in the further development of Polish-Belarusian relations, and will significantly restrict the possibility of building good relations in the future.
The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.
The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.
It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial. ; It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial.
During the Cold War, the term "captive nations" should be regarded as a figure of speech, but also as a practical expression of the ideological declaration – anti‑communism. Using it, the government and the Congress of the United States expressed their support for the cause of freedom of the countries behind the Iron Curtain, and the American society, including minority groups from Eastern Europe, expressed its solidarity with the people who were deprived the right to decide about their own fate. Was the promotion of the concept of "captive nations" a deliberate action of the U.S. government calculated to emphasize their interest in the fate of the regions from which many citizens of that country originated (response to bottom‑up pressure)? Or maybe it was a way to gain support for their foreign policy and its promotion at home and abroad (a propaganda tool)? What role did the refugees themselves play in these activities? This text is an attempt to assess the impact that they could have on the Congress, and thereby influence the processes shaping American foreign policy (both in terms of public debate, as well as concrete policy proposals). Undoubtedly, the activity of a number of business organizations, associating both U.S. citizens and immigrants from Eastern Europe, contributed to a significant popularization of the concept of "the captive" and the role of the United States as their spokesperson. However, the analysis suggests that the myth of captivity is not linked only to the American anti‑communism. It has been present in the American tradition since colonial times, and since its redefinition after World War II. Until today it is used by the U.S. authorities in order to justify global involvement.
Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.
