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Introduction: A new politics for a new century -- Part 1: Raw material for a politics and policy of moral conflict -- Status anxiety and political ideology -- Cultural theory and warring cultures -- Part 2: Morality politics by unconventional means -- Breaking into or breaking apart the political system -- Politicians strike back: legislative restraints on morality policy -- The juridicization of the morality policy process -- Bypassing elites: morality policy by Plebiscite -- Part 3: Uncompromising ends of morality policy -- Building political consensus and the public peace -- Conclusion: morality policy and Democratic governance.

This paper examines the concept of self-identity as a factor that influences agents' choices in moral conflicts. The main questions it concerns itself with are whether there is a connection between self-identity & reasoning in moral dilemmas &, given the strong reasons to believe that such a connection exists, how we should most properly understand self-identity. I examine some of the most notable recent contributions on the topic of personal identity, those of Sandel & Taylor, & find them wanting because of their one-sided interpretation of identity. I follow Rorty & Wong in arguing for a more heterogeneous concept of self-identity, which would respect the various diverse sources of personal identification. After discussing briefly the types & sources of moral conflict, the paper examines two widely accepted accounts of reasoning in moral dilemmas, the position of particularist rationality & the quasi-existentialist position. This is done with reference to the two main issues of interest here, the extent to which these accounts acknowledge the importance of self-identity for moral conflict reasoning, & the plausibility of their conceptions of personal identity. The Aristotelian position of contextual reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory because it does not include considerations of self-identity among the resources for resolving the hard choices, & because it suffers from certain conceptual flaws. The quasi-existentialist approach to reasoning in moral conflicts pays more attention to agents' self-identifications. However, it is found unconvincing because it focuses solely on one aspect of the agent's heterogeneous identity, arguing that adopting a holistic view of one's life requires choosing in line with the kind of person one wants to become. Conversely, this paper argues that agents can maintain the feeling that their choices are connected to one another by consistently choosing in line with any of their diverse identifications. 23 References. Adapted from the source document.