Suchergebnisse

Alone in the cosmos -- The case for abduction -- The problem of evil, freedom, and moral responsibility -- Moral value -- Moral obligations -- Moral knowledge -- Moral transformation -- Moral rationality -- A moral argument

Introduction -- The religion and science advocates in the academic debate -- The academic analysts of the relationship between religion and science -- Recent transformation of elite academic and public debates -- Existing research on the public -- Empirical tests of knowledge and belief conflict for the religious public -- Empirical tests of moral conflict for the religious public -- Conclusion

The issue of whether historians should make moral judgments is always controversial. In recent years, there has been a division between those who argue that the primary aim of historians should be to understand the past & that moral judgments should be avoided, & those who maintain that moral judgments are still in a certain sense appropriate. The overall thrust of this article is to argue that these two tendencies in reality coincide: understanding & judgment cannot be abstractly separated. The article also explores the related, but further point that many historians are moral realists: they believe that certain moral facts are natural facts independently of whether people believe them to be true or not. This moral realism is rooted in a variety of worldviews, religious & secular. With particular reference to Nazism & Stalinism, & to such figures as Adolf Eichmann, Albert Speer, Nikolai Bukharin, & Richard Nixon, this article argues that there is a widespread assumption among historians that the moral state of societies & individuals is a legitimate aspect of historical enquiry. Herbert Butterfield & Hannah Arendt are among the many scholars whose work is discussed. The article concludes by saying that history is in a certain sense a moral discipline in that it requires of historians a high level of self-knowledge & self-discipline, if they are to write good history. Adapted from the source document.

Introduction: Soft American empire versus playing the U.N.-E.U. card / Clark Butler -- Breaking the tradition : the case for the 640 detainees in Guantanamo / David Rudenstine -- American treatment of detainees and the Hamdi and Padilla cases / William Durland -- Security, civil liberties, and human rights : finding a balance / Jennifer Casseldine-Bracht -- Terrorism, a new challenge for international humanitarian law / Anisseh Van Engleland-Nourai -- A commentary on the judicial treatment of Guantanamo detainees within the context of international law / Saby Goshray -- Ghandi's alternative to the alien other / Richard Johnson -- The closed society versus the rights to emigrate and immigrate / William McBride -- Just and favorable remuneration : a neglected human right / Milton Fisk -- Moral rights, moral responsibility, and the failure of moral knowledge / Dallas Willard

Politicians often appeal to moral principles as a least-cost method of enforcing their policy demands. To do so effectively, they must understand how such principles fit into ordinary people's decision functions. Distinguished are three ways for formally representing moral principles. One reduces morality to enlightened self-interest, denying that morality has any special place in the decision calculus. Another, while acknowledging that people do internalize moral principles per se, enters them into utility functions as just another consumption good. Truly strong moral principles, however, are best represented by a third model of seriously held moral principles, which must be kept formally apart from mundane considerations. Such principles are as precarious as they are powerful. Policymakers who want to tap them must respect the formalisms that make them strong, most typically by shielding moral principles from contamination by egoistic impulses. HA.