Suchergebnisse

In the preceding sections of this essay, I have outlined a dialectical procedure whereby a doubting mind might be led to the recognition of moral truth. What has been given is the bare plot of a conversation between teacher and student. The student was, at the beginning, a skeptic about moral matters, denying the objectivity of moral knowledge, supposing that all moral judgments were a matter of opinion, entirely relative to the individual or to his cultural location at a given time and place. The teacher, by asking him to explain the undeniable fact that men exercise preference, gradually made him realize that his own criteria for preference — pleasure and quantity of pleasure — had a certain universal validity; and then, as a result of seeing the inadequacy of these criteria, the student began to understand that happiness, rather than pleasure, was the ultimate principle of moral judgments. The crucial steps in the argument were: (1) the distinction between pleasure as one among many objects of desire and pleasure as the satisfaction of any desire; (2) the enumeration of the variety of goods which are objects of human desire; (3) the point that only the totality of goods could completely satisfy desire; (4) the realization that this totality of goods, leaving nothing to be desired, is the end of all our seeking, and that everything else is sought for the sake of its attainment; (5) the conception of happiness as "all good things," a whole constituted by every type of good, the complete good being the end, the incomplete good its parts or constitutive means; (6) the conclusion that the end, as the first principle in the practical order, is the ultimate criterion of preference, for preferor choice is exercised only with respect to means, and hence we should, in every case, prefer whatever is more conducive to the attainment of happiness.

In St. Thomas and the Gentiles I tried to define the obligations of perennial philosophy in the twentieth century. Philosophy may be perennial, but its work changes according to the cultural conditions in which the philosopher lives and thinks. In its Greek beginnings, philosophy arose out of the dialectical efforts of Plato and Aristotle to clarify and order the welter of opinion. They struggled not only with the sophists to divide the line between knowledge and opinion; but they also moved in the realm of opinion to distinguish the true from the false; and, in their patient consideration of pre-Socratic thought, they both tried, though differently, to convert right opinion into knowledge by making it evident to reason. Although the result of their work was the establishment of philosophy as a body of knowledge, founded on principles and developed by demonstrations, we must not forget that, in their day, the mode of their work was primarily dialectical. In saying this I do not overlook the demonstrative or scientific achievements of Plato and Aristotle; but those must be regarded a secondary, for the first work of pioneers is to stake out the land, to clear away the brush, to prepare the soil, and to dig for firm foundations Only thereafter can a city be planned, buildings raised, and interiors decorated The Platonic dialogues certainly reveal an intellectual pioneer at work; but no less do the so-called "scientific" works of Aristotle, for they are primarily records of exploration and discovery. Rather than orderly expositions of accomplished knowledge, they are, not only in their opening chapters but throughout, dialectical engagement with adversaries, wrestlings with the half-truths of error and opinion in order to set the whole truth forth.

Classification is regarded by some as a very elementary and a very barren scientific device or method. For those who attach most importance to applied science, and to the achievement of practical ends, classification seems a dry and futile procedure. For those likewise who insist upon the importance of moral standards and purposes, the brutally empirical inductive process of classification seems inhuman, possibly even anti-social.That classification is an elementary task of science, in the sense of occurring early in the whole scientific process, no one could deny, albeit only some one who has had immediate and serious experience in classification can appreciate the advanced problems, both of theory and of application, which can be encountered therein. From the point of view of human interest, something would depend upon what is being classified, whether pearls or potatoes, for example, although it would seem to be an implied tenet of pure science that no knowledge of the universe is without value and that we are not able to say beforehand how important a given piece of knowledge will turn out to be.

The world today is appallingly interesting. It is interesting, because it is changing so fast. It is appalling, because almost every change we have witnessed in the course of the last years has been a change for the worse. As mankind is ever proceeding from the past, through the present, toward the future, all change may, in the purely dynamic sense of the term, be called progress. If, however, we seek to estimate the value of change in terms of human welfare, as also if we consider it in the light of the goals pursued, the most significant recent changes in the political and economic spheres are clearly reactionary.For generations, and in some cases for centuries, ail nations within the orbit of our Western civilization have, through wars and revolutions, been striving to secure for all their members greater physical and moral security, greater political equality, greater individual freedom. Greater security—that is, more assured protection against the violence of their fellow-citizens and against the arbitrary oppression of their governments. Greater equality—that is, less discrimination on grounds of race, of sex, of religious and philosophical creed and of social position. Greater freedom—that is, more latitude for the self-expression and self-assertion of the individual in the face of the authority of tradition and of the state. Guarantees for the protection of the fundamental rights of man, the abolition of arrest without trial and of imprisonment for debt, the suppression of slavery, the extension of the suffrage to all and thereby the subordination of the government to the will of the people (that is, of the majority of all the people), parliamentary control of the budget (that is, no taxation without representation), the recognition of freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly, of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the university—such are some of the ideals for which our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers fought, bled, and died. Such are some of the conquests of human dignity over barbarism, of knowledge over ignorance, of right over might, which they triumphantly achieved and which they proudly bequeathed to us.