Suchergebnisse

Le souci de transmettre des connaissances moralement et existentiellement bien fondées, fidèles à l'expérience de la vie de tous les jours, est sous‐jacent aux écrits "ethnographiques"de James Agee. Les thèmes évoqués sont la traduction de la réalité sociale, la sociologie de la description, la création et la découverte de la signification, la dialectique entre le chercheur et le répondant, et la portée de l'anthropologie "d'action."Underlying the "ethnographic" writings of James Agee is the production of morally and existentially reliable knowledge, true to experience of the everyday world. Some themes evoked are the translation of social reality, the sociology of description, the creation and discovery of meaning, the dialectic between researcher and respondent, and the import of "action" anthropology.

Section I / The Physician as Moral Arbiter -- The Physician as a Moral Force in American History -- The Physician as Moral Arbiter -- Section II / The Costs of New Knowledge -- Moral Issues Relating to the Economics of New Knowledge in the Biomedical Sciences -- Only the Best is Good Enough? -- Section III / Costs, Benefits, and the Responsibilities of Medical Science -- Morality and the Social Control of Biomedical Technology -- Rights and Responsibilities in Medical Science -- Health, Justice, and Responsibility -- Section IV / Biomedical Knowledge: Libertarian vs. Socialist Models -- The Need to Know: Utilitarian and Esthetic Values of Biomedical Science -- Medical Knowledge as a Social Product: Rights, Risks, and Responsibilities -- Biomedical Knowledge: Progress and Priorities -- Section V / Biomedical Ethics and Advances in Biomedical Science -- Applying Morality to Advances in Biomedicine: Can and Should This be Done? -- Biomedicine, Health Care Policy, and the Adequacy of Ethical Theory -- Section VI / Conclusions and Reflections: Present and Future Problems -- Why New Technology is More Problematic than Old Technology -- The Uses of Biomedical Knowledge: The End of the Era of Optimism? -- The Best is Yet to Come -- Scientific Advance, Technological Development, and Society -- The Life-World and the Patient's Expectations of New Knowledge -- Epilogue -- Notes on Contributors.

I. What is Justice? -- II. The Idea of Natural Law -- III. God and the State -- IV. Law and Morality -- 1. Moral Norms as Social Norms -- 2. Morality as the Regulation of Internal Behaviour -- 3. Morality as a Primitive Order without Coercive Character -- 4. Law as a Part of Morality -- 5. Relativity of Moral Value -- 6. Separation of Law and Morality -- 7. Justification of Law by Morality -- V. State-Form and World-Outlook -- VI. The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law -- VII. Causality and Accounting -- VIII. The Emergence of the Causal Law From the Principle of Retribution -- IX. On the Concept of Norm -- X. Law and Logic -- 1. Contradiction of Natural Law -- 2. Morality and Law -- 3. The Issue Clouded by Roman Law -- 4. No Imperative without an 'Imperator' -- 5. The Analogy is Misleading -- 6. Statement and Norm -- 7. Law is an Act of Will -- 8. Statement and Truth -- 9. Legislator and Judge -- 10. Robber and Judge -- 11. Statute Book and Textbook -- 12. Natural and Legal Science -- 13. Of the Spirit of the Laws -- 14. Logic and Psychology -- 15. 'Juridical Logic' -- XI. Law and Logic Again. On the Applicability of Logical Principles to Legal Norms -- XII. On the Practical Syllogism -- XIII. Derogation -- XIV. Norm and Value -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

The seemingly inexhaustible debate over the proper role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication concerns an issue of enormous practical importance: whether the Court has or should have the power to overturn the decision of a democratically elected legislature to, say, prohibit abortions, affects not only the allocation of significant political power, but also the moral lives and indeed the very bodies of millions of citizens. For this reason, many contributions to that debate, from academics as well as from practicing politicians, have burned with the passion of political commitment, seeking to influence events directly by persuading judges (or those who might have power to constrain them) to adopt particular policies. Michael Perry's The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights is not such a book. I don't mean that Perry lacks political commitment, or does not sincerely wish that the courts would adopt the program he proposes. But both his substantive conclusions and his writing style suggest not only that the book is not directly addressed to an audience of judges and legislators, but also that his project is fundamentally detached from what political institutions actually do. Perry brings to his book a thoughtful intelligence and a comprehensive knowledge of the academic literature on the questions he addresses, and he has much to say that is interesting and valuable. But I think that few will find his conclusions satisfying as a program for the Supreme Court to follow.

Continuing Education and Moralization : The Social Function of the Social Psychology of Business.
The aim of the present study is to grasp the relationship between the introduction of techniques inspired by social psychology and the change -or at least the beginning of a change- in the ways of exercizing power in business. The author's observations derive from Personal participation in a program of continuing education or so-called "permanent training". The various stages of this type of training have multiplied since the adoption of the law of 1971, which, it seems, has benefited chiefly managerial and lower-level staff. The study is based on the hypothesis that these stages would be utilized, in a number of cases, as instruments of moralization, designed not so much to provide technical knowledge as to impose a new System of values, itself tied to a new style of command ("non-directiveness", "openess", "creativity", "participation", etc.).
The study focuses, in particular, on a group of lower-level staff who have in common the characteristic of being ill-suited to the posts they hold. The group includes the daughter of a military officer, judged to be too "authoritarian" in her position as head of the typing service, and a programmer of working-class origins who is uncomfortable in his dealings with both his superiors and his subordinates. The author's analysis shows that the social psychology of business probably does not have the power to transform the habitus of the people involved, and thereby to "reform" their behavior in a permanent fashion. All the same, it does possess, at the least, the power of altering their scale of values. As a result, it leads them to recognize the excellence of the new values that "modern" managers of "modern" business concerns have arrogated to themselves. This, perhaps, is the subject's main function.

"Throughout most of the 19th century the most important course in the college curriculum was moral philosophy, taught usually by the college president and required of all senior students. The moral philosophy course was regarded as the capstone of the curriculum. It aimed to pull together, to integrate, and to give meaning and purpose to the student's entire college experience and course of study. In so doing it even more importantly sought to equip the graduating seniors with the ethical sensitivity and insight needed in order to put their newly acquired knowledge to use in ways that would benefit not only themselves and their own personal achievement, but the larger society as well." Douglas Sloan

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Texts and References -- Introduction -- PART I: TOWARDS THE METHODS OF ETHICS -- 1. The Development of Sidgwick's Thought -- i. Sidgwick's Life -- ii. Religion in the 1860s -- iii. Sidgwick's Religious Development -- iv. Sidgwick's Writings on Religion -- v. Sidgwick's Early Ethical Views -- vi. Sidgwick on Knowledge and Philosophy -- 2. Intuitionism and Common Sense -- i. Reid's Ethics -- ii. The Scottish School -- iii. Thomas Brown -- iv. Alexander Smith -- 3. The Cambridge Moralists -- i. Coleridge -- ii. The Coleridgeans -- iii. Whewell's Ethics: The System -- iv. Whewell's Ethics: The Difficulties -- v. John Grote -- 4. The Early Utilitarians -- i. Utility and Religion -- ii. Bentham -- iii. Godwin -- iv. Early Criticism -- 5. The Reworking of Utilitarianism -- i. Utilitarians and Rules -- ii. J. S. Mill: Philosophy and Society -- iii. Some Further Criticisms of Utilitarianism -- iv. The Other Utilitarians -- v. Mill's Utilitarianism and its Reception -- PART II: THE METHODS OF ETHICS -- 6. The Aims and Scope of The Methods of Ethics -- i. The Focus on Common Sense -- ii. The Relation of Method to Principle -- iii. The Basic Methods -- iv. Ethics, Epistemology, and Psychology -- v. Ethics and Free Will -- vi. The Limits to Synthesis -- 7. Reason and Action -- i. The Basic Notion -- ii. Reason, Right, Ought, and Good -- iii. The Neutrality of Practical Concepts -- iv. Scepticism -- Appendix: The Development of I, iii and I, ix -- 8. Acts and Agents -- i. Martineau's Theory -- ii. The Religious Context of Martineau's Theory -- iii. Sidgwick's Criticisms: The Data -- iv. Sidgwick's Criticisms: The Theory -- v. The Outcome of the Controversy -- 9. The Examination of Common-Sense Morality -- i. The Role of the Examination -- ii. The Principles of the Examination -- iii. Common Sense Examined.

I. Introduction -- II. Scientific Knowledge and the Intuition of Duration -- The Intuition of Duration -- Critique of Intellect -- III. The New Philosophy -- Philosophy: The Whole of Experience -- Spirit: Subject Matter of Philosophy -- Intuition: Method of Philosophy -- IV. The Evolutionary Background of Morality -- The Elan Vital and Creative Evolution -- Intellect and Intuition in Evolution -- The Goal of Evolution — A Divine Humanity -- V. The Biological Origin of Moral Obligation -- Obligation and Social Pressure -- Morality and Freedom -- VI. Static and Dynamic Morality -- Moral Obligation and the Closed Society -- Moral Progress and the Open Society -- VII. The Rationality of Morality -- Reason and the Morality of Obligation -- Reason and the Morality of Aspiration -- VIII. The Evolution of Morality -- Moral Progress -- IX. Conclusion -- Select Bibliography.

John Rawls considers hisTheory of Justiceto be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethicsand Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a "morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem" (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.