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Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable because they do not express genuine propositions.' The second half of the twentieth century brought a revival of interest among philosophers in moral and political questions. Whether or not ethics can be founded upon a rational basis continues to preoccupy the philosophical community even now

In the area of moral epistemology, there is an interesting problem facing the person in my area, ancient philosophy, who hopes to write a historical paper which will engage with our current philosophical concerns. Not only are ancient ethical theories very different in structure and concerns from modern ones (though with the rapid growth of virtue ethics this is becoming less true), but the concerns and emphases of ancient epistemology are very different from those of modern theories of knowledge. Some may think that they are so different that they are useful to our own discussions only by way of contrast. I am more sanguine, but I am quite aware that this essay's contribution to modern debates does not fall within the established modern traditions of discussing moral epistemology.

A unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi which present a wide-ranging position in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on the justification of moral judgments and the structure of moral character

Cultural pluralism is both a fact and a norm. It is a fact that our world, and indeed our society, are marked by a large diversity of cultures delineated in terms of race, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and other partly interpenetrating variables. This fact raises the normative question of whether, or to what extent, such diversities should be recognized or even encouraged in policies concerning government, law, education, employment, the family, immigration, and other important areas of social concern.

The question addressed in this article is how people come to know the foundational axioms of their moral systems as true and correct. Drawing on my fieldwork among the Himba of northwestern Namibia, I argue that the most potent form of intellectual conviction is not generated through the external manipulations of ritual, but through a deeply internal experience in which moral knowledge coalesces with a subjectively perceived experience of timeless universality.

Background: This paper describes a Bosnian refugee, a survivor of war and ethnic cleansing, during a 3-year follow-up in a psychiatry clinic. Discussion: This case throws light on the tension between medicotherapeutic and sociomoral ways of understanding the effects of such experiences, and of the limitations of morally and politically neutral psychiatric categories and technologies. Suffering always invokes questions of values: in this case the clinical picture represented a moral protest at what had been done with such impunity, and a refusal to accommodate to a world which now seemed unintelligible. The clinical picture also embodied the collective outrage, and sense of unfinished business, which many back in Bosnia itself were carrying in the wake of the 1995 Dayton peace accords which effectively legitimised the lines of ethnic cleansing. Conclusions: DSM or ICD diagnoses of depressive disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder turned out to lack validity and explanatory power. Claims that victims of war and atrocity typically have an unmet need for mental health services are overstated. Recovery from the effects of war may depend on reestablishing a sense of intelligibility, a task that must primarily go on in social space rather than mental space.

Feminists, especially radical feminists, have reason to be dissatisfied with contemporary moral theory, but they are understandably reluctant to abandon the theoretical project until it is seen as unsalvageable. The problem is not, however, as Margaret Urban Walker claims, that theory is abstract, that it seeks to guide conduct, or that it postulates moral knowledge. The problem is that contemporary moral theory is foundational.

This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics

Work on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral "epistemology," identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.