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Abstract
MacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of subjectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically examines some aspects of MacIntyre's account of how knowledge is related to tradition, and suggests ways in which the formation of moral subjectivity involves the ability to experience the world.

In the past five years, Thailand has been beset by coup d'état, street violence, and most recently the devastating floods of 2011. Looming in the background is the failing health of the Thai monarch, that person who has been the most potent symbol of 20th century development for Thais. With these events has come increasing political paranoia. Since 2006, accusations of lèse-majesté have leapt nearly a thousand-fold, and royalist conspiracy theories draw links between all of Thailand's ills and the plots of sources of power. and see conspiracy theorizing as the questioning of hegemonic sources of knowledge rather than as alternative cosmologies. I draw connections between the problematizing of "truth" via conspiracy theory and Thai ideas of moral knowledge in the idiom of baaramii . Specifically, I see how conspiracy theories about the Thai monarch serve to question the idea of a truth which is self-evident. Many of the conspiracy theories which I discuss here are highly charged in Thailand. Such conspiracy theories have in the past been used to justify the killing or imprisonment of political dissidents and others simply caught in the middle. Yet here, I seek to stand aside from issues of social justice for the moment and focus instead upon how notions of conspiracy become constructed and what function they serve at present in Thai society.

Violence associated with gangs known as maras in Honduras is an impetus for why people flee and migrate out of the country. Based on fieldwork with youth between the ages of 10 and 18 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, I discuss (a) that prevailing views of violence in developmental research need further elaboration in understanding the illicit and legal forms and functions of violence in a society that children and adolescents grow up in and (b) that a domain model of social-moral thinking offers more insight about violence and morality than a current model informing violence prevention in Honduras. Lastly, I conclude with a few implications for violence prevention efforts and future directions for developmental research.

AbstractAn external evaluation documented what occurred in an inaugural summer camp to teach high school students how to preserve religious freedom by learning about and acting on the history and current state of church–state separation and other first amendment issues. Camp designers hoped to promote religious diversity values and civic engagement in youth. An analytic vignette grounded in an inductive analysis of observations, interviews, and document collection represents the competing demands of responsive and critical approaches to evaluation. Balancing obligations to promote the social well‐being of society with responsibilities to clients and other stakeholders presents challenges that can be met only by identifying priorities with clients in ongoing dialogue. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc., and the American Evaluation Association.

This article has two aims. First, to offer a critical review of the literatures on two well-known single-component solutions to the problem of a gap between moral knowledge and moral action: <i>moral identity</i> and <i>moral emotions</i>. Second, to take seriously the rising interest in Aristotle-inspired virtue ethics and character development within the social sciences: approaches that seem to assume that the development of <i>phronesis</i> (practical wisdom) bridges the gap in question. Since phronesis is a multicomponent construct, the latter part of this article offers an overview of what those different components would be, as a necessary precursor to operationalising them if the phronesis hypothesis were to be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The idea of a neo-Aristotelian multicomponent solution to the "gappiness problem" invites comparisons with another multicomponent candidate, the neo-Kohlbergian <i>four-component model</i>, with which it shares at least surface similarities. Some space is thus devoted to the proposed theoretical uniqueness of a phronesis-based multicomponent model vis-à-vis the neo-Kohlbergian one. Our main conclusion is that – weaknesses in its developmental psychological grounding notwithstanding – operationalising the phronesis model for the purposes of instrument design and empirical inquiry would be a feasible and potentially productive enterprise.

A review of Theodor Adorno's 1963 lectures on Problems of Moral Philosophy highlights how he points out antinomies that invariably snare Kant's moral philosophy. Adorno believed moral action could only emerge from virtue but modern society has made virtue obsolete. The dilemma occurs because social conditions that make a type of moral reflection necessary also make moral action impossible. Both Adorno's moral-epistemological argument that applies to the formal characterization of moral knowledge that enables moral practice & his social-theoretical argument aimed at the formal characterization of moral knowledge are detailed. Special attention is given to common misunderstandings related to Adorno's conclusion about the social obsolescence of virtue. Other issues discussed include the reflective transformation of morality into the political brought about by the individual's loss of social power or freedom & Adorno's notion of an individualization of virtue & a radicalization of politics as the only two possible but incomplete solutions to the contradictions of moral philosophy. Adapted from the source document.