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In the area of moral epistemology, there is an interesting problem facing the person in my area, ancient philosophy, who hopes to write a historical paper which will engage with our current philosophical concerns. Not only are ancient ethical theories very different in structure and concerns from modern ones (though with the rapid growth of virtue ethics this is becoming less true), but the concerns and emphases of ancient epistemology are very different from those of modern theories of knowledge. Some may think that they are so different that they are useful to our own discussions only by way of contrast. I am more sanguine, but I am quite aware that this essay's contribution to modern debates does not fall within the established modern traditions of discussing moral epistemology.

Cultural pluralism is both a fact and a norm. It is a fact that our world, and indeed our society, are marked by a large diversity of cultures delineated in terms of race, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and other partly interpenetrating variables. This fact raises the normative question of whether, or to what extent, such diversities should be recognized or even encouraged in policies concerning government, law, education, employment, the family, immigration, and other important areas of social concern.

Abstract
MacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of subjectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically examines some aspects of MacIntyre's account of how knowledge is related to tradition, and suggests ways in which the formation of moral subjectivity involves the ability to experience the world.

In the past five years, Thailand has been beset by coup d'état, street violence, and most recently the devastating floods of 2011. Looming in the background is the failing health of the Thai monarch, that person who has been the most potent symbol of 20th century development for Thais. With these events has come increasing political paranoia. Since 2006, accusations of lèse-majesté have leapt nearly a thousand-fold, and royalist conspiracy theories draw links between all of Thailand's ills and the plots of sources of power. and see conspiracy theorizing as the questioning of hegemonic sources of knowledge rather than as alternative cosmologies. I draw connections between the problematizing of "truth" via conspiracy theory and Thai ideas of moral knowledge in the idiom of baaramii . Specifically, I see how conspiracy theories about the Thai monarch serve to question the idea of a truth which is self-evident. Many of the conspiracy theories which I discuss here are highly charged in Thailand. Such conspiracy theories have in the past been used to justify the killing or imprisonment of political dissidents and others simply caught in the middle. Yet here, I seek to stand aside from issues of social justice for the moment and focus instead upon how notions of conspiracy become constructed and what function they serve at present in Thai society.

The question addressed in this article is how people come to know the foundational axioms of their moral systems as true and correct. Drawing on my fieldwork among the Himba of northwestern Namibia, I argue that the most potent form of intellectual conviction is not generated through the external manipulations of ritual, but through a deeply internal experience in which moral knowledge coalesces with a subjectively perceived experience of timeless universality.

Violence associated with gangs known as maras in Honduras is an impetus for why people flee and migrate out of the country. Based on fieldwork with youth between the ages of 10 and 18 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, I discuss (a) that prevailing views of violence in developmental research need further elaboration in understanding the illicit and legal forms and functions of violence in a society that children and adolescents grow up in and (b) that a domain model of social-moral thinking offers more insight about violence and morality than a current model informing violence prevention in Honduras. Lastly, I conclude with a few implications for violence prevention efforts and future directions for developmental research.

AbstractAn external evaluation documented what occurred in an inaugural summer camp to teach high school students how to preserve religious freedom by learning about and acting on the history and current state of church–state separation and other first amendment issues. Camp designers hoped to promote religious diversity values and civic engagement in youth. An analytic vignette grounded in an inductive analysis of observations, interviews, and document collection represents the competing demands of responsive and critical approaches to evaluation. Balancing obligations to promote the social well‐being of society with responsibilities to clients and other stakeholders presents challenges that can be met only by identifying priorities with clients in ongoing dialogue. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc., and the American Evaluation Association.