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Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.

In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

Hannah Arendt pondered the meaning of the concept of the faculty of judgment from the philosophical angle in relation to a concrete historical phenomenon, the epoch she characterized as the "bankruptcy of human sanity," ie, the epoch of national socialism. That bankruptcy was primarily manifested as a failure of the so-called faculty of judgment, in an age that was witnessing some radical changes in the historical & social conditions of the totality of the practice of life. That is why Arendt is searching for a way out in the so-called reflective faculty of judgments, an alternative for the deficiencies & difficulties of the determining faculty of judgment that it manifests at the time of sweeping crises. In Kant, Hannah Arendt finds the elements of political philosophy that could explain the problematics of the political. However, she does not find these elements in his political philosophy, as might be expected, but in his philosophy of the faculty of judgment. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

Hannah Arendt pondered the meaning of the concept of the faculty of judgment from the philosophical angle in relation to a concrete historical phenomenon, the epoch she characterized as the "bankruptcy of human sanity," ie, the epoch of national socialism. That bankruptcy was primarily manifested as a failure of the so-called faculty of judgment, in an age that was witnessing some radical changes in the historical & social conditions of the totality of the practice of life. That is why Arendt is searching for a way out in the so-called reflective faculty of judgments, an alternative for the deficiencies & difficulties of the determining faculty of judgment that it manifests at the time of sweeping crises. In Kant, Hannah Arendt finds the elements of political philosophy that could explain the problematics of the political. However, she does not find these elements in his political philosophy, as might be expected, but in his philosophy of the faculty of judgment. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

According to the author, the difference between Hegel & Kant regarding the definition of the idea of perpetual peace is indicative of their radically different concepts of philosophy. The first philosophy strives, through the sober acceptance of what really is, to point out where improvements are needed. The second talks about the reconciliation of reason & reality & is consequently frequently dubbed despondent. Nevertheless, according to the author, this difference between Hegel & Kant (which in certain postulates looks incompatible) is less principle-based than is usually thought, since Kant's moral & philosophical requirements regarding politics are meaningful only if there is an underlying confidence as to the historical efficacy of the reason. Adapted from the source document.

There have been a number of philosophical, legal, & political concepts dealing with the issue of peace. The most famous discourse on the topic of peace is undoubtedly Kant's writing on "perpetual peace," not only for the cogency of its ideas but also for the applicability of the majority of them in practice, particularly in terms of collective security. Kant's starting point was that peace is a rational & moral imperative of human nature, realized solely through human efforts. Though written 200 years ago, his ideas have found acolytes in the post-Cold War period since they are, to a large extent, considered as emancipatory. Kant finds the guarantees for the realization of peace in the moral doctrine & thus rejects the use of force in the creation of peace. Relations among states are based on cooperation, not competition, so that some elements of his project are reminiscent of the solutions applied in the system of collective security. The author looks into the viability of Kant's ideas in the post-Cold War period. Adapted from the source document.

The author shows that it is not possible to formulate a consistent theory of freedom, tying together the internal perspective of action & the external perspective of rational description & explanation of action. In the history of philosophical discussion about freedom as a fundamental concept of liberalism, Kant & Hegel represent two extremes. Each tried to formulate consistently a concept of freedom & its moral & political consequences, but both paid the price of one-sidedness. Kant postulates the primacy of the internal perspective of the moral subject, which is ideally expressed by his categorical imperative. However, the concept of freedom defined from the stance of autonomous morals loses contact with the historical world of traditional values, with the consequence of moralizing politics & unrealistically disregarding the nation as a characteristic framework of politics. Hegel points out the priority of the external perspective, which gives him an analytical advantage relative to liberal theories of natural law & Kant's moralist position. However, as warned by the German political theorist Hermann Heller, Hegel's position results in defining the sphere of collective morality as superior to individual action, disregarding the protection of individual liberties against the state & accepting national politics of power as the only criterion for international politics. The author concludes that liberal constitutions, unlike totalitarianism, must then be inconsistent. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into Scheler's philosophy of war as stated in his work The Genius of War. In the context of Germany during World War One, Scheler polemicized with various interpretations of the essence & the nature of war, particularly with those that reduce wars to economic or sociological roots, & claimed that the spiritual drive behind the "real" war was only to increase power. The war for him is part of the human nature, but not as a mere struggle for survival but as the struggle for power that maximally exalts, expands & deepens the common & indivisible values of our moral consciousness. The author argues that Scheler's intention is to glorify war, counter to Kant's universalism & rationalism. He is particularly dismissive of Kant's idea of "eternal peace" & all that is linked with cosmopolitanism & pacifism. The author concludes that Scheler's philosophy is self-delusional. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author writes about MacIntyre's usage of the concept of incommensurability in the sphere of the philosophy of politics. The concept was first used by Feyerabend who based it on his relativist attack on liberalism. MacIntyre also focuses on the criticism of liberalism, not from the anarchodadaist but from the neo-Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. The essay consists of four short sections: Section A gives a short review of MacIntyre's understanding of the concept of incommensurability in the books After Virtue & Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Section B compares MacIntyre's thinking about the incommensurability with Kuhn's & Fayerabend's solutions of the same problem. Section C describes the use of incommensurability in the book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry; section D tries to see how dangerous MacIntyre's criticism is when directed at nonuniversalistic liberals. If incommensurability is a fact, does that make it an insurmountable problem for liberals? This text is an attempt to answer that question. Adapted from the source document.

The author writes about MacIntyre's usage of the concept of incommensurability in the sphere of the philosophy of politics. The concept was first used by Feyerabend who based it on his relativist attack on liberalism. MacIntyre also focuses on the criticism of liberalism, not from the anarchodadaist but from the neo-Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. The essay consists of four short sections: Section A gives a short review of MacIntyre's understanding of the concept of incommensurability in the books After Virtue & Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Section B compares MacIntyre's thinking about the incommensurability with Kuhn's & Fayerabend's solutions of the same problem. Section C describes the use of incommensurability in the book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry; section D tries to see how dangerous MacIntyre's criticism is when directed at nonuniversalistic liberals. If incommensurability is a fact, does that make it an insurmountable problem for liberals? This text is an attempt to answer that question. Adapted from the source document.

In this article the author wants to prove that Hobbes' theory of the state cannot be reduced to a logical construction, which -- completely abstracted from the ethical content -- approaches the problem of overcoming destitution in the state of nature as a problem of mechanics of forces. The existence of a powerful sovereign, who guarantees peace by forcing his subjects to obey, is not sufficient for the reinstatement of a lasting civil state. The author believes that it is possible to differentiate two lines of argument in Leviathan. The first one begins from the basic value of self-preservation & natural law derived from it, which is both the cause of the conflict in the state of nature & also the basis for overcoming this conflict. However, Hobbes cannot derive the conditions of maintaining the civil state from the state of nature. What is necessary is the second line of argument which is based on the notion of natural law. The content of natural law is a moral doctrine, on whose acceptance rests the conditions for creating & maintaining common life. Its significance is derived from Hobbes' fundamental insight that power itself cannot ensure permanent guarantee of safety. The author concludes that Hobbes' Leviathan cannot sustain itself, if both subjects & the sovereign are not bound by a moral sense of the importance of natural laws. References. Adapted from the source document.

Examines liberal democracy in relation to the European tradition from whence it sprung & enumerates the biggest differences between the historical forms of democracy & its modern guise. According to the author, the authentic enemies of modern liberal democracy are fascism & bolshevism. He summarizes his analyses into three points. (1) In western countries the principles of democracy have mostly been realized in the course of a long genesis following the conflict with monarchist absolutism & more recently, with fascism. (2) In the philosophy of modern day politics, mostly formal & quantitative aspects of democratic processes have been analyzed, which is the biggest shortcoming of these theories. That is why the author proposes an analysis of meaningful aspects of liberal democracy. (3) Focus is on the analysis of freedom & democracy as forms of the organization of political life of major human groups characteristic for the industrial age & modern capitalism. At the end of his study the author puts some light on the relationship between liberalism & democracy by describing the hermeneutical functions of morality in the modern age. The political culture & moral consciousness represent the base for the functioning of mediatory democracy. The hermeneutical nature of moral consciousness allows modern democracy to develop a practical relationship with its tradition without which it cannot function, as has been the case with those states in which democracy is being introduced today. Adapted from the source document.

There have been a number of philosophical, legal, & political concepts dealing with the issue of peace. The most famous discourse on the topic of peace is undoubtedly Kant's writing on "perpetual peace," not only for the cogency of its ideas but also for the applicability of the majority of them in practice, particularly in terms of collective security. Kant's starting point was that peace is a rational & moral imperative of human nature, realized solely through human efforts. Though written 200 years ago, his ideas have found acolytes in the post-Cold War period since they are, to a large extent, considered as emancipatory. Kant finds the guarantees for the realization of peace in the moral doctrine & thus rejects the use of force in the creation of peace. Relations among states are based on cooperation, not competition, so that some elements of his project are reminiscent of the solutions applied in the system of collective security. The author looks into the viability of Kant's ideas in the post-Cold War period. Adapted from the source document.

At a few places in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel directly addresses the discussion with his famous predecessor, Immanual Kant. These places indicate very clearly the distinction between the two philosophical standpoints. This article focuses on Hegel's criticism of Kant's views on peace & international law. For two reasons however, it starts with Hegel's rejection of Kant's moral point of view. First, this criticism is presupposed in Hegel's rejection of Kant's view on politics. Second, at least a partial return to Kantian morality is implied in Hegel's statement that war, although not to be condemned categorically, must be limited both quantitatively & qualitatively. Adapted from the source document.

Democracy, as the government of the people by the people, is an inadequately defined notion, giving room for rival concepts of democracy: liberal, socialist, & Christian. The distinguishing features of the Christian outlook are respect for other human beings, the demand for individual involvement in politics, & the government's duty to look after everyone's well-being. The author points to the fact that Christian democracy, with its highlighted moral component of politics, was particularly attractive for the countries that went through fascist totalitarianism. Although the standards of the grand Christian precept of altruism have not been met in social & political life, the author concludes that today's global challenges reemphasize the relevance of the gospel message. Adapted from the source document.