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This paper aims to examine the assumptions of Moral Twin Earth, an argument formulated by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons with the intention of refuting the realistic naturalistic proposal of moral known as Cornell's realism. The Moral Twin Earth provides some intuitive evidence that terms naming moral kinds are not rigid designators of natural properties and, therefore, it is not possible to offer a naturalistic definition for them, which is supposed to be a Cornell's realism claim. However, in this paper, I try to demonstrate that Cornell's realism does not assume rigid designation relations between terms for moral kinds and natural properties to support its naturalistic thesis. Instead of the identity relation between moral and natural kinds that would be brought about by the rigid designation, Cornell's realism maintains only the metaphysical thesis that moral kinds are constituted or realized by natural properties which leaves it open the possibility of multiple realization of moral kinds. As Cornell's realism does not commit itself with the semantic thesis that Horgan and Timmons criticize, then the Moral Twin Earth does not seem to offer an objection to this moral realism.

This paper discusses care ethics from the perspective of the practical extent of its scope. Carol Gilligan and especially Nel Noddings are presented as proponents of the thesis that care requires a kind of personal connection or encounter between the persons involved, thus being inherently "personal" and "partial". Claudia Card's position is presented as a critique of these theses, especially for the gap of such a model in relation to the people who will never be directly linked to us, but who nevertheless don't cease to request our moral engagement - therefore, demanding from ethics a salient space for justice and impersonal principles. Some ideas from Abraham Maslow and Betty Friedan are presented as a means of reinterpret this problem, especially from the conception of the so-called "meta-motivations" or "metaneeds", characterized as the opening of the possibility, in the moral personality, of feeling "connected" (in a similar sense to that demanded by Noddings) with certain "abstract" and distant goods, such as those encompassed by the ethics of principles (in the terms outlined by Card).

The objective this article is to investigate the problem of the formalism in moral giving emphasis to G. W. F. Hegel and its Philosophy of Right as proposal of objectivation of the normative contents of acting. The intention is to present the version of Hegel for the problem of the formalism in relation the determination of acting in the sphere ethical, politics and legal. For the concretion of such task it is necessary to investigate the consideration concerning the 'Moralität and Sittlichkeit', estimated basic to build a project stuffed for a 'Philosophy of Right' and the figure of the State politician. The contributions of Hegel to effectuate the proposal of overcoming of the formalism if find in 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: Über die wissenscaftischen Behandlungsarten der Naturrechts and Phänomenologie des Geistes'. The author apresents a clarification some of the main aspects in such a way of the objections how much of the attempts of reply to the problem.

The present text has as objective not only to define the concepts of "moral", "ethics" and "aesthetics of existence", in the periods studied by Michel Foucault, but also to capture their significant differences, in view of the orientation towards the possibility of an ethical-political in and of the present time. Such arche-genealogical studies of Classical Greece (4th century BC), of the Greco-Roman period (1st and 2nd century AD) and of Christianity (3rd and 4th centuries AD), show that these concepts maintain their mark, by the use of techniques aimed at achieving temperance and an increasing and detailed care of itself. The stylization of life gained forms of the most varied in this historical process, based on practices that sometimes approached the moral attitude of the ethical attitude. This flexibility of the uses of concepts, consequently of historical and cultural practices, brings in Foucault the opening of thought in the search for a political attitude towards acts, thoughts and freedom.

The mainstream view of the twentieth century suggests that the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith made a tout court defense of individualism and the pure rational calculation of economics. However, we consider this to be a biased interpretation that ignores an integrated reading of his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Wealth of Nations (1776), which hinder a global view of his thinking. In opposition to this dominant view, we propose, as the central objective of this article, the conciliation between Smith's classical liberalism and his sentimental ethics, based on the notion of human dignity, present in the recognition of the other as an equal. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend the thesis of sympathetic liberalism in Adam Smith's philosophical system. For this, we will analyze the feeling of Smithian sympathy and its interference in interpersonal relationships, then, the device of moral justification of impartiality as a promoter of fairness behavior. Finally, we will argue that the intertwining of these two elements of Smithian sentimental ethics in public space engenders a notion of human dignity compatible with his liberalism, insofar as it respects individual freedoms while fostering the progress of commercial societies. For such, we will make use of the work Theory of Moral Sentimentalism by Adam Smith and the article Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith by Stephen Darwall.

In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant's works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.

Through Nietzsche's criticism of morality, he has in Christianity a messianic movement of Jesus an antidote against nihilism. Promoter of a Christian ethos, the Christianity, which, in fidelity to his Christic spirit, makes his teachings consist not only of a doctrinal law or dogma, but mainly of a life practice in assuming his destiny with love. He accepts destiny in a non-resigned or conformist way, but with an active disposition. The Christian spirit of Jesus consists in his practice, from which the deconstruction of the moral subject takes place. It is a practice that, instead of being passively resigned to fate as was the Christian tradition, assumes it until its last consequences in which life reaches its climaxes.

After seating the objective foundation of the moral law in the practical pure reason, Immanuel Kant investigates the subjective foundation and it introduces the feeling. Of product of the reason the moral law will be examined as effect on the vitality, in a dialectics of displeasing and pleasure, of which the moral feeling appears. The presente article seeks to problematize this aspecto f the ethics of the philosopher to the light of the Critic of judgement end of the relationship between beginning of the pleasure beginning of the reality in of Sigmund Freud. When putting in subject the relationship among pleasure feeling and moral in the thinkers, it is investigated in the philosopher would not be in subject the discovery of the interns of the moral law.

Sartre, in the work Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948), presents notes on the dimension of history that begins to develop initially within his moral reflection. Sartre, however, does not have a finalized version of his theory of history, linking his reflection to a comparison and critique of Hegel's philosophy of history and Marxian historical materialism. The aim of this article is to analyze Sartre's critique of Hegel in the Notebooks for an Ethics about history, showing an outline of Sartre's initial views on history. Sartre makes extensive use of a critique of the possibility of Hegelian dialectics, questioning the dimension of this movement of the real as true. It analyzes the idealization of this movement in the dialectic of the master and the slave in works such as Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807) and discusses the notion of the totality of history. Sartre suggests, based on this critique, his own notion of history linked to a de-totalized totality and a historical becoming centered on freedom.

Due to the importance of the theory of values, elaborated by Max Scheler, this article aims to describe the essence and originality of the moral foundation, showing the absolute nature inherent to it, to erect an ethics of absolute moral values. This done, we will find, in fact, axiological foundations capable of showing the principles that permeate and make the basis of people's ethical and moral life full of value and meaning, within the responsive and responsible causality of their actions and decisions that emanate from this human capacity and, that is latent in its essence.

The object of this research is Immanuel Kant's philosophy of law, more specifically, the controversy over the nature of Kant's concept of law. Thus, the central concepts of Kant's moral philosophy, which are in connection with his idea of law, and, secondly, the most important aspects of Kant's thought regarding legal philosophy, are analyzed. It aims a definition of the most appropriate way to understand Kant's philosophy of law, whether it represents a radical positivism or a super-inclusive non-positivism.

This article addresses the issue discussed on the third section of the book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, more precisely the question regarding the a priorisynthetic validity of the categorical imperative in determining the human will. Although the moral law is universally recognized by all rational beings, Kant needs to demonstrate its effectiveness with regard to the human will, which is empirically affected. Thus, the Kantian argumentative strategy revolves around an attempt to deduce the moral autonomy of the notion of transcendental freedom, which is impossible, because, in this context, there is still no way to prove the objective validity of such a concept. Despite the effort made by Kant, all the arguments raised here come up against the impossibility of knowing the scope of intelligibility, so that this question will only be carried out in the Critique of Practical Reason.

The following reflection focuses on the reading and interpretation of the moral booklet entitled Regra da Vida Virtuosa, by São Martinho de Dume. In this sense, we present the four cardinal virtues as a moral reflection, since it is about giving advice that aims at a concern about practical action, we point out, even though São Martinho, in the 6th century, marked the beginning of Portuguese culture.