This article examines long-standing debates in moral philosophy that are relevant to international human rights law. It discusses the political conception of human rights and the four challenges to moral philosophy which include the notion that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human rights and the belief that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the scope of human rights. This article also highlights the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of contemporary human rights and explains that the traditions of natural rights theories still influence contemporary human rights language in profound ways
Abstract We raise throe issues for Kitcher's Ethical Project: First, we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them, which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive normative conclusions from positive ones 'ought' from 'is'. Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's mctacthical opponents could respond to his arguments against them.
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.
FAR WORSE THAN CALLING A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER'S CONCLUSIONS WRONG IS ACCUSING HIS METHOD OF BEING MISCONCEIVED SINCE THIS ACCUSATION IS INTENDED TO UNDERCUT THE VERY ENTERPRISE IN WHICH A PHILOSOPHER IS ENGAGED, IT PRECLUDES CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS PARTICULAR ARGUMENTS. THUS, THIS ARTICLE PURSUES SERVERAL SUCH UNDERCUTTING CRITICISMS DIRECTED AGAINST THE METHOD OF CONTEMPORARY ANGLO-A POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILISOPHY.
The seemingly inexhaustible debate over the proper role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication concerns an issue of enormous practical importance: whether the Court has or should have the power to overturn the decision of a democratically elected legislature to, say, prohibit abortions, affects not only the allocation of significant political power, but also the moral lives and indeed the very bodies of millions of citizens. For this reason, many contributions to that debate, from academics as well as from practicing politicians, have burned with the passion of political commitment, seeking to influence events directly by persuading judges (or those who might have power to constrain them) to adopt particular policies. Michael Perry's The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights is not such a book. I don't mean that Perry lacks political commitment, or does not sincerely wish that the courts would adopt the program he proposes. But both his substantive conclusions and his writing style suggest not only that the book is not directly addressed to an audience of judges and legislators, but also that his project is fundamentally detached from what political institutions actually do. Perry brings to his book a thoughtful intelligence and a comprehensive knowledge of the academic literature on the questions he addresses, and he has much to say that is interesting and valuable. But I think that few will find his conclusions satisfying as a program for the Supreme Court to follow.
