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Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 80-115
ISSN: 1471-6437
In any society influenced by a plurality of cultures, there will be widespread, systematic differences about at least some important values, including moral values. Many of these differences look like deep disagreements, difficult to resolve objectively if that is possible at all. One common response to the suspicion that these disagreementsareunsettleable has always been moral relativism. In the flurry of sympathetic treatments of this doctrine in the last two decades, attention has understandably focused on the simpler case in which one fairly self-contained and culturally homogeneous society confronts, at least in thought, the values of another; but most have taken relativism to have implications within a single pluralistic society as well. I am not among the sympathizers. That is partly because I am more optimistic than many about how many moral disagreements can be settled, but I shall say little about that here. For, even on the assumption that many disputes are unsettleable, I continue to find relativism a theoretically puzzling reaction to the problem of moral disagreement, and a troubling one in practice, especially when the practice involves regular interaction among those who disagree. This essay attempts to explain why.
A coherent moral relativism
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 166, Heft 2, S. 413-430
ISSN: 1573-0964
The Incoherence of Moral Relativism
In: Cultura: international journal of philosophy of culture and axiology, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 19-38
ISSN: 2065-5002
Abstract: This paper is a response to Park Seungbae's article, "Defence of Cultural Relativism". Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal
principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to multiple cultures at once, the concept
of moral relativism is vague. Park argues that such contentions do not affect moral relativism and that the moral relativist may respond that the value of tolerance, Hitler's actions, and the concept of culture are themselves relative. In what follows, I show that Park's adroit
strategy is unsuccessful. Consequently, moral relativism is incoherent.
Military Values and Moral Relativism
In: In: Michael Skerker, David Whetham & Don Carrick (eds.) Military Virtues (2019), Howgate Publishing
SSRN
Moral relativism and evolutionary psychology
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 166, Heft 2, S. 431-447
ISSN: 1573-0964
Moral relativism and deontic logic
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 85, Heft 1, S. 139-152
ISSN: 1573-0964
Corporate Governance Convergence and Moral Relativism
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 107-119
ISSN: 1467-8683
ABSTRACTManuscript Type: ConceptualResearch Question/Issue: This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur.Research Findings/Results: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of descriptive and meta‐ethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested.Theoretical Implications: The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual.Practical Implications: The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analyzing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally "appropriate" model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries that have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.
Moral Relativism: Arguments For and Against
In: The New Apologetics: Defending the Faith in a Post-Christian Era.. Edited by Matthew Nelson. Park Ridge, IL: Word on Fire, 2022. Pp. 25-30
SSRN
Moral Relativism, Cognitivism and Defeasible Rules
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 116-138
ISSN: 1471-6437
Naturalism rejects a sui generis and fundamental realm of the evaluative or normative. Thought and talk about the good and the right must hence be understood without appeal to any such evaluative or normative concepts or properties. In Sections I and II, we see noncognitivism step forward with its account of evaluative and normative language as fundamentally optative (that is, expressive of wishes or desires) or prescriptive. Prescriptivism falls afoul of several problems. Prominent among them below is the "problem of prima facie reasons": the problem, namely that prescriptions do not properly capture the character of defeasibility of the prima facie, featured by nearly all our moral convictions. We find in Section II that, ironically, emotivism, with its emphasis on optative rather than prescriptive language, though historically more primitive, is yet better attuned to that crucial prima facie aspect of the normative and the evaluative. But even emotivism still faces serious difficulties that beset noncognitivism generally, such as the problem of embedding in subordinate clauses, and the problem of normative fallibility. That takes us up to Section III.
The Discourse of Universalism, Moral Relativism & Utilitarianism
SSRN
Moral Relativism and the Concept of Culture
In: Theoria: a journal of social and political theory, Band 59, Heft 133, S. 50-69
ISSN: 1558-5816
Moral relativism - By Steven Lukes: Book reviews
In: The journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 442-442
ISSN: 1467-9655
Moral Relativism and the Argument from Disagreement
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 377-386
ISSN: 1467-9833
JUSTICE AS EQUALITY? POLITICAL THEORY IN FACE OF MORAL RELATIVISM
In: Political Science (RU), Heft 4