Suchergebnisse

The relationship between the notion of collective responsibility & Thomas Nagel's (1979) concept of moral luck is explored to determine how these concepts can contribute to the realization of reconciliation in cases of collective wrongdoing. After demonstrating the existence of collective responsibility that is not reducible to individual culpability within contemporary thought, Nagel's notion of moral luck is discussed, emphasizing its applicability to determining accountability for wartime atrocities. It is asserted that the highly irrational nature of moral luck ultimately vindicates collective responsibility's capacity to hold all individuals responsible without necessarily placing direct blame on any single person. The extent to which collective responsibility can genuinely resolve relations between offending & victimized groups is then contemplated. Rather than seek punishment against every member of the offending group, it is stated that collective responsibility demands a reconciliatory act (eg, an apology or plea for forgiveness) from the criminal group. It is concluded that acknowledging collective responsibility & remorse for war crimes provides a moral approach to achieving reconciliation. J. W. Parker

This paper extends Claudia Card's account of agency in the face of moral luck in order to theoretically ground the activities of feminist mothers who endeavor to raise responsible human beings. The paper addresses those who mother in gray areas—areas where mothers are victims of the evils of the institution of motherhood while having authority and influence over their children.

Shows precisely how a Rousseauean argument for collective autonomy in spite of itself requires a Weberian argument for a political ethic of consequences, an ethic that takes account of the inseparability of politics from moral luck. Then shows how recent arguments for radical democracy have accepted Rousseau's arguments without acknowledging his strategies for warding off the influence of fortuitous consequences on political decisions. Suggests a concept of direct participant democracy that takes moral luck and political irony into account. (JLN)

THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO VINDICATE RADICAL DEMOCRACY FROM ITS INSTRUMENTALIST CRITICS. IT DOES SO BY ENLISTING THE INSTRUMENTALIST'S EMPHASIS ON IRONIC OUTCOMES IN POLITICAL ACTION TO THE CAUSE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY. MAX WEBER'S ARGUMENT FOR A POLITICAL ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY AND JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S ARGUMENT FOR POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY ARE BOTH DISCUSSED. THE INTENT IS TO SHOW PRECISELY HOW A ROUSSEAUEAN ARGUMENT FOR COLLECTIVE AUTONOMY IN SPITE OF ITSELF REQUIRES A WEBERIAN ARGUMENT FOR A POLITICAL ETHIC OF CONSEQUENCES. THIS ETHIC TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE INSEPARABILITY OF POLITICS FROM MORAL LUCK. MORAL LUCK IS DEFINED AND DISCUSSED IN DETAIL.

Can men who dominate women nevertheless be happy or lead flourishing lives? Building on Claudia Card's exploration of moral luck, this paper considers the belief that male dominators cannot be happy. The discussion ranges over both virtue theory and empirical research into the "belief in a just world." I conclude that there are reasons to avoid believing that male dominators cannot be happy or flourish, and that feminism does not need that belief.