Suchergebnisse

Historiography under communism, influenced and often motivated by anti-religious and anti-Catholic presuppositions, has held that the opposition of the Catholic Church to legislation and ideology inspired by liberalism in Croatia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was not only conservative, but insisted on the identification of Catholicism and Croathood. Historiography termed this supposed trend derogatively as "clericalism". Strecha argues that the term was a bit too strong, and pleads for the term "political catholicism", which in the Croatian context could be named "Catholic Croathood". The author argues that Strecha's terminological suggestion is not only even more confusing, but that he continues the anti-Catholic prejudices of the established historiography. He shows how Strecha simply repeats previously reached conclusions, which were simply repetitions of the anti-Catholic stances of the time. (SOI : CSP: S. 186)

The article explores the process that led to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and argues that the willingness of many countries to contribute to the creation of Kosovo as cannot be explained solely by humanitarian concerns, and the remedial understanding of the right to self-determination. What seems to have motivated the Western powers was also the recent memory of the UN's failure to stop the internecine wars which characterised the SFRY's dissolution (particularly the war in Bosnia), as well as the rejection on the part of the international community with the way in which Kosovan autonomy, previously entrenched in the SFRY constitution of 1974, had been emasculated from 1989 onwards by both Serbia and the FRY in a process which served to deny Kosovo Albanians both the minority rights and the right of internal self-determination. Finally, the article speculates on the long-term implications of the Kosovo intervention. Instead of being seen as a 'unique case', the intervention in Kosovo may be seen as the consolidation of a growing European commitment to the rights of internal minorities, including the right to territorial autonomy for national minorities. Adapted from the source document.

The Republic of Serbia has introduced special circumstances for the determination of sentence for hate crime in the Criminal Code amended in December 2012. If a criminal offence is committed through hate based on race or religion, national or ethnic affiliation, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity of another, the court shall consider any aggravating factors except when it is not stipulated as a feature of the criminal offence. However, the State still neglects to consider mitigating factors. Moreover, it does not pay sufficient attention to eliminating verbal expressions of hatred and discrimination that often precede crimes motivated by hate. The paper discusses the possibility of improving education and coordinated activities of the State, particularly of courts, prosecutors, police and local self-governments, to combat hate speech and hate crimes. The aim of the paper is to present mechanisms of improving institutional capacities to prevent these phenomena that have been implemented within the project "Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policies in Serbia" financed by the European Union. The paper concludes that central to the success of this process are the education of state actors, and the development of a value system based on equality and acceptance of diversity.

In this article, which is based primarily on unpublished Swiss diplomatic sources, the development of relations between the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and the Swiss Confederation is brieflv described, especially with regard to the question of diplomatic recognition of the NDW. Available archival Sources do not support the conclusion that Berlin or Rome was advocating recognition of NDH by any means possible. but that Croatian authorities were seeking dejure recognition for a variety of reasons. Officially, Bern rebuffed these requests, partly due to its traditional policy of neutralit,, and partly because the British embassy pressured the Swiss by warning them that recognition of NDH could be construed as open allegiance with the Axis. Consequently, the result of Croatian-Swiss discussions, in which the Swiss consulate in Zagreb played an important part, was an oral agreement extending informal relations between the two states. especially economic and financial relations. Nevertheless, Croatia was allowed, through the auspices of the permanent trade delegation in Zurich, to carry out limited consular activities. In this regard, it is impo[tant to mention that Croatian interest in Switzerland was motivated by a desire to form a possible bridge to the western allies. (SOI : CSP: S. 278)

NATO's political and - above all - military participation in secession-motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia (1990-1995), will be remembered as a clear example of demonstration of power, intentions and (in)capability of the Victor in a decades-long global "cold war" between the "freedom-loving" West and "totalitarian East". Regardless of the expectations of liberal theoreticians and the majority of public opinion, it was soon revealed that the victory was no "triumph of freedom" and even less "the end of history". On the contrary, as historically typical, it was only an unstable resultant of relations between major actors in the modern global theater, who strive to legitimize their need for domination with varying success and vocabulary. Hence the lessons to be learned from the final act of destruction of Yugoslavia (several months of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999) have the expected tone of banality: absolute might strives for absolute power (which remains unattainable in principle); "the mighty oppress" is true always and in any place (but with a time limit); and, finally, what everyone knows but does not (or is unable or refuses) to say aloud: the only true alternative to military threat and/or aggression of a single political actor is an equally valid (military) threat/aggression by another one. We are tempted to conclude that, despite the ideological ardor of NGO activists, the political correctness of theoreticians and the rhetorical figures of speech of politicians, the "banalities" remain valid as the only certainties, i.e., regularities in the unpredictable currents of relations between states.

The Vrhbosnian Archbishop dr. Josip Stadler was one of the ecclesiastical prelates who was most vigorously disputed and attacked. One group, which was particularly bitter toward Archbishop Stadler, was the Progressive youth. Trough their weekly and later daily Hrvatski pokret, published in Zagreb, they constantly attacked the archbishop, sometimes approaching the limit of insult. Upon a closer analysis of their writing, however, it is clear their attack was motivated primarily, almost exclusively, by the fact that the archbishop of Sarajevo espoused a diametrically opposite political vision of the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Furthermore, due to the fact that the Progressives, as they were called, adhered to an ideology impregnated with anti-Catholicism, the Archbishop, who was an ardent protector of the interests of his Catholic flock in a land where they were a minority, their bitterness toward archbishop can also be understood from that standpoint. Politically, Stadler agreed with the ideas of dr. Josip Frank, the head of the Pure Party of the State Right, who supported first the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and then her incorporation to Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, so that all Croatian lands can be unified in a single body within the confines of the Habsburg domain. The Progressives, on the other hand, who were members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition in Croatia, advocated a complete independence of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Since the Serbs were majority population in that region, their opponents accused them of promoting and advocating Serbian interests. In any event, the accusations against Archbishop Stadler by the Progressives should be looked upon with the awareness of their ideological and political presuppositions, and, in that sense, considerably modified. The same applies to the former Yugoslav historiography, for it uncritically appropriated both the ideology and political assessments of the Progressives and other "liberal", anti-Catholic groups. (SOI : CSP: S. 49f.)

This dissertation treats the competence of Constitutional courts in settling the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, both in theoretical and historical as well as practical, sense. It is common knowledge that the Constitutional court is the most efficient mechanism for protecting the constitutionally determined separation of power. The role of the Constitutional Court is especially significant with regard to the fact that the separation of power does not exclude the possibility of interweaving jurisdiction of different levels of state power. By settling disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, the Constitutional Court gains competence for the determination of clear boundaries of state power organs in terms of their constitutional authorisation. Given the fact that the jurisdictional conflict is mainly motivated by political agenda, the Constitutional Court must settle an originally political dispute by implementing the constitutional norms. The jurisdictional conflicts are a common competence of Constitutional courts. They are a direct representation of the government, or the constitutionally determined separation of power. A distinction between horizontal and vertical disputes can consequently be made. Various factors cause these disputes, including the following: state power, government, political parties system, level of democratic development, the level of precision of constitutional norms determining the boundaries of state power, etc. The constitutional disputes of jurisdictional conflicts should, however, be thought of in a broader sense as well. The Constitution commonly views these disputes as a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. If the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts are regarded as a factual violation of constitutionally proclaimed separation of power, then the other constitutional disputes can be seen as an infringement of the power separation principle as well. In that way the Constitutional court indirectly settles a competence dispute while simultaneously carrying out normative control, its basic duty. Assuming that the separation of power is based on the idea of preventing the abuse of state power by guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms, one can say that, while deciding on the protection of rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Constitution, the Constitutional court indirectly protects the power separation principle. The matter of jurisdictional conflicts can decided upon by the court when the court is asked to give an interpretation of the constitutional provisions. If the fact that this jurisdiction is a necessary consequence of federal division of the state is exempted, one can say that in the countries without federal division the settling of competence disputes, also represents a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. The guiding principle for all the countries was the fact that the abuse of power or the realisation of its separation (or balance) can only be reached through the operating system of an independent and unbiased institution, as the Constitutional court itself is. An analysis of various countries' Constitutions and the practice of Constitutional courts in settling competence disputes has shown that Constitutional courts have made a significant contribution to the realisation of power separation, especially in the transitional processes of non-democratic regimes to democratic ones. Naturally the real effects of the constitutional jurisprudence depend on the political climate-the relationship between the political institutions and the one these have with the Constitutional court, as well as their willingness to abide by its decisions-and this is a fact one should not neglect.

Muzičke institucije u Beogradu i Srbiji u drugoj polovini 19. veka u velikoj su meri zavisile od inostranih kadrova, najčešće građana Austrougarske, usled nedostatka adekvatno obrazovanih domaćih muzičkih stručnjaka. Ovakva situacija doprinela je dolasku značajnog broja Čeha, Austrijanaca, Nemaca, kao i Mađara u srpske gradove gde su radili na muzičkom opismenjavanju kako imućnijih, tako i širih slojeva, a po tom i na utemeljenju i ekspanziji visoko umetničke i popularne muzičke prakse. Iz istih razloga se polovinom 60-ih godina u Beogradu našao i Slovenac Davorin Jenko koji će zahvaljujući svom angažmanu u Beogradskom pevačkom društvu i u Narodnom pozorištu steći značajan ugled u srpskoj sredini, kao i u među srpskom obrazovanom populacijom iz Austrougarske. Budući da se Jenkovo delanje u Beogradu poklapalo sa intenzivnim širenjem panslavističkog diskursa i diskursa kulturnog nacionalizma u okviru političkog, kulturnog, naučnog i umetničkog polja uspeh njegovih muzičkih ostvarenja i prestiž koji je vremenom sticao među publikom različitog društvenog profila nailazili su na podeljene reakcije među pripadnicima intelektualne elite. Činjenica da je kompozitor slovenačkog porekla stvarao muziku uglavnom proisteklu iz elemenata šire shvaćenog srpskog muzičkog foklora koju je publika prihvatala i prepoznavala kao srpsku muziku otvorila je prostor za polemike hroničara i komentatora beogradskog muzičkog života u srpskim, vojvođanskim i bosanskim listovima i časopisima. Pokušavajući da objasne fenomen srpske muzike "stranog" porekla autori su izvodili interpretacije koncepa srpstva otkrivajući u njemu izvesne epistemološke rupture. Rasprave oko statusa Jenkove muzike u vidu njenog poimanja kao srpske ili ne-baš-sasvim srpske, ukazivale su na različitost ideoloških pozicija koje su se pojavile u okviru srpske elite iz Kraljevine Srbije i Austrougarske. Cilj rada je da se ukaže na izdiferenciranost etničkog koncepta nacionalnog identiteta proisteklog kao rezultat nepoklapanja u viđenjima elite kada je reč o daljem razvoju srpske kulture. Važan segment predstavljaće predočavanje značaja te pojave u teorijskom i kulturno-istorijskom pogledu. ; In the second half of the 19th century music institutions in Belgrade and Serbia depended a lot on the work of foreign musicians, most of them citizens of Austria-Hungary, because of the continual lack of local educated professionals. Th ese circumstances contributed to the large-scale migration of Czech, Austrian, German and Hungarian musicians to Serbian towns where they helped with the expansion of the musical literacy of both the upper and middle-class parts of society, as well as the establishment of the high-art and popular music practices. Th e same type of "missionary work" motivated Slovenian musician Davorin Jenko to settle in Belgrade during the 1860s where he was active for several decades fi rst in the Belgrade's singing society and later in the National theater gaining public appraisal from the Serbian theatergoers, intellectuals and music experts both from Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Since Jenko's arrival to Belgrade coincided with the growing popularity of the Pan-Slavic ideas and the discourse of cultural nationalism in the fields of politics, culture, science and arts the success of his works among the theatre spectators and music consumers created divergent response in the parts of the Serbian elite. Th e fact that the composer of Slovenian origin created music on the basis of largely defi ned Serbian music folklore that was well accepted and perceived as Serbian among the consumers inspired the debates of music critics, chroniclers and experts in journals published in Serbia, Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Trying to explain the phenomenon of the Serbian music of "foreign" origin commentators performed diff erent interpretations of the concept of Serbian identity showing throughout the process its epistemological ruptures. Th e confl icting views on the status of Jenko's music as Serbian or not-completely-Serbian was a result of divergent ideological positions that appeared among the elites from Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Our aim is to point to the diversity of the defi nitions of the ethnic concept of nation and national identity among the Serbian elites at that time as a consequence of the diff erent understanding of the progress of Serbian culture. Th e special emphasis will be put on the theoretical and cultural-historical implications of that phenomenon.

У теорији постоји сагласност да тероризам представља политички мотивисано насиље и да у том смислу представља један од облика насилне политичке борбе. Специфична разлика тероризма у односу на друге облике политичког насиља је примарна усмереност ка стварању, одржавању и експлоатацији страха ради застрашивања противника и јачања подршке међу присталицама. Суштинска одступања од теоријских и правних критеријума при одређивању тероризма постоје у пракси Савета безбедности. Општа оцена деловања Савета безбедности приликом доношења резолуција о тероризму јесте да прати владајући политички дискурс у коме су најпре државе биле одговорне за тероризам, да би потом "слабе", "неодговорне" и "репресивне" државе биле одговорне за омогућавање деловања међународних терористичких организација на својој територији. Савет безбедности усвајао је резолуције у којима је терористичке акте одређивао спрам природе акта, али и спрам извршиоца чиме су сви акти претходно одређене терористичке организације квалификовани као терористички акти. Истраживањем је утврђено и да је приликом усвајања појединих резолуција политичка сврсисходност утицала да се истоврсна понашања не квалификују увек као терористички акти. На основу изведених закључака утврђено је да сложеност борбе против тероризма представља последицу првенства политичке сврсисходности при квалификовању акта насиља као терористичког акта, а не због тешкоћа у дефинисању тероризма. Промене у концепцији тероризма у резолуцијама Савета безбедности и њихова усклађеност са владајућим јавним дискурсом одвијају се истовремено са настојањем САД и других западних држава да преобликују међународну заједницу и успоставе нови светски поредак. У таквим околностима тероризам почиње да егзистира као офанзивно политичко средство хибридног ратовања, при чему се негативна конотација тероризма експлоатише на два начина. Прво, тероризам постаје политичка оцена нечијег деловања без обзира на природу тако означене активности. Друго, тероризам се употребљава као насилно политичко средство које, у зависности од интереса онога ко цени одређено понашање, неће у свакој ситуацији бити означено као тероризам, већ понекад и као легитиман облик политичке акције. Офанзивни карактер одлуке истовремено води занемаривању научних критеријума у корист политичке сврсисходности при квалификацији неког понашања као терористичког акта. Доминација политичког критеријума при квалификовању терористичког акта утиче на инструментализацију тероризма и његово претварање у ефикасно средство хибридног ратовања. Садржај хибридног ратовања није последица неограниченог избора средстава односно оружја нити њихове софистицираности, већ способности безбедносног менаџмента да у свакој конкретној ситуацији независно од организационог нивоа примени такву комбинацију различитих, али међусобно компатибилних појединачних начина ратовања којом се остварује синергијски ефекат ради реализације претходно постављеног циља. Управо због тога тероризам као облик сложеног политичког насиља постаје предмет експлоатације у сврху хибридног ратовања. На основу резултата истраживања описана су три модела експлотације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања. Први модел експлоатације тероризма изведен је из политичке праксе САД да државе за које САД сматрају да користе тероризам као политичко средство ставе на Листу спонзора тероризма. Имајући у виду политички и сваки други утицај који САД имају, овакава пракса и њене последице формално или неформално су прихваћене широм света. Основне последице стављања на Листу спонзора тероризма су санкције, дискредитација у међународној јавности и легитимисање мера против таквих држава, док се у исто време таквом праксом врши притисак на државе које нису на Листи да ускладе своју политику са интересима великих сила. Други модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања манифестује се кроз организовање, финансирање, опремање, обуку и усмеравање сурогат снага против влада држава са којима није остварена компатибилност интереса, при чему су сурогат снаге представљене у јавном дискурсу као борци за слободу. Предмет експлоатације у Другом моделу јесте насиље које испуњава теоријске критеријуме да буде означено као тероризам, али је због политичке сврсисходности квалификовано као борба за слободу, отпор против угњетавања и сл. Експлоатација насиља у Другом моделу врши се у циљу промене носилаца политичке власти, стварање аутономних регија односно држава које би биле кооперативне са политиком државе која примењује Други модел или као део шире стратегије управљања безбедносним процесима. Трећи модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања подразумева организовање и управљање сурогат снагама које су квалификоване као терористичке организације или се врши инфилтрација појединаца у изворне и самосталне народне побуне ради преузимања руководећих места и управљања њиховим деловањем у складу са интересима државе која предузима Трећи модел. Предмет експлоатације у Трећем моделу јесте насиље које је квалификовано као тероризам, при чему је циљ експлоатације вишеструк: 1. Путем насиља и страха који настаје као последица вршења терористичких аката управља се безбедносном ситуацијом у држави која је мета агресије или у региону који је потребно политички и територијално контролисати, са или без физичког присуства оружаних снага државе која примењује Трећи модел; 2. Стварање страха код одређеног или унапред неодређеног броја држава од потенцијалних напада терористичких организација ради вршења латентног политичког притиска на државе да буде кооперативне, и 3. Стварање разлога за војну интервенцију ради присуства и политичке контроле одређене државе или региона. На основу претходно изнетих резултата истраживања изведен је закључак да први корак у спречавању експлоатације тероризма против наше државе представља отклањање или смањивање потенцијала за друштвене сукобе који настаје услед стварања или продубљивања друштвених противречности. Из тог разлога извршена је анализа нормативно – политичког и институционалног оквира у релевантним областима друштвеног живота. Истраживањем је утврђено да у Републици Србији постоји добар основ за ангажовање и интегрисање свих ресурса друштвене моћи на плану остваривања националне безбедности, али и да постоји потреба да се актуелни политички и безбедносни институционални оквир усклади са таквим могућностима. Као резултат истраживања предложене су три групе мера чија примена треба за резултат да има: отклањање и смањивање опасности од стварања потенцијала за друштвене сукобе; успостављање ефикасног и интегрисаног институционалног оквира за супротстављање политичком насиљу које евентуално проистекне из постојећих противречности и отклањање и смањивање штетних последица таквог политичког насиља. ; U teoriji postoji saglasnost da terorizam predstavlja politički motivisano nasilje i da u tom smislu predstavlja jedan od oblika nasilne političke borbe. Specifična razlika terorizma u odnosu na druge oblike političkog nasilja je primarna usmerenost ka stvaranju, održavanju i eksploataciji straha radi zastrašivanja protivnika i jačanja podrške među pristalicama. Suštinska odstupanja od teorijskih i pravnih kriterijuma pri određivanju terorizma postoje u praksi Saveta bezbednosti. Opšta ocena delovanja Saveta bezbednosti prilikom donošenja rezolucija o terorizmu jeste da prati vladajući politički diskurs u kome su najpre države bile odgovorne za terorizam, da bi potom "slabe", "neodgovorne" i "represivne" države bile odgovorne za omogućavanje delovanja međunarodnih terorističkih organizacija na svojoj teritoriji. Savet bezbednosti usvajao je rezolucije u kojima je terorističke akte određivao spram prirode akta, ali i spram izvršioca čime su svi akti prethodno određene terorističke organizacije kvalifikovani kao teroristički akti. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno i da je prilikom usvajanja pojedinih rezolucija politička svrsishodnost uticala da se istovrsna ponašanja ne kvalifikuju uvek kao teroristički akti. Na osnovu izvedenih zaključaka utvrđeno je da složenost borbe protiv terorizma predstavlja posledicu prvenstva političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikovanju akta nasilja kao terorističkog akta, a ne zbog teškoća u definisanju terorizma. Promene u koncepciji terorizma u rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti i njihova usklađenost sa vladajućim javnim diskursom odvijaju se istovremeno sa nastojanjem SAD i drugih zapadnih država da preoblikuju međunarodnu zajednicu i uspostave novi svetski poredak. U takvim okolnostima terorizam počinje da egzistira kao ofanzivno političko sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja, pri čemu se negativna konotacija terorizma eksploatiše na dva načina. Prvo, terorizam postaje politička ocena nečijeg delovanja bez obzira na prirodu tako označene aktivnosti. Drugo, terorizam se upotrebljava kao nasilno političko sredstvo koje, u zavisnosti od interesa onoga ko ceni određeno ponašanje, neće u svakoj situaciji biti označeno kao terorizam, već ponekad i kao legitiman oblik političke akcije. Ofanzivni karakter odluke istovremeno vodi zanemarivanju naučnih kriterijuma u korist političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikaciji nekog ponašanja kao terorističkog akta. Dominacija političkog kriterijuma pri kvalifikovanju terorističkog akta utiče na instrumentalizaciju terorizma i njegovo pretvaranje u efikasno sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja. Sadržaj hibridnog ratovanja nije posledica neograničenog izbora sredstava odnosno oružja niti njihove sofisticiranosti, već sposobnosti bezbednosnog menadžmenta da u svakoj konkretnoj situaciji nezavisno od organizacionog nivoa primeni takvu kombinaciju različitih, ali međusobno kompatibilnih pojedinačnih načina ratovanja kojom se ostvaruje sinergijski efekat radi realizacije prethodno postavljenog cilja. Upravo zbog toga terorizam kao oblik složenog političkog nasilja postaje predmet eksploatacije u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Na osnovu rezultata istraživanja opisana su tri modela eksplotacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Prvi model eksploatacije terorizma izveden je iz političke prakse SAD da države za koje SAD smatraju da koriste terorizam kao političko sredstvo stave na Listu sponzora terorizma. Imajući u vidu politički i svaki drugi uticaj koji SAD imaju, ovakava praksa i njene posledice formalno ili neformalno su prihvaćene širom sveta. Osnovne posledice stavljanja na Listu sponzora terorizma su sankcije, diskreditacija u međunarodnoj javnosti i legitimisanje mera protiv takvih država, dok se u isto vreme takvom praksom vrši pritisak na države koje nisu na Listi da usklade svoju politiku sa interesima velikih sila. Drugi model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja manifestuje se kroz organizovanje, finansiranje, opremanje, obuku i usmeravanje surogat snaga protiv vlada država sa kojima nije ostvarena kompatibilnost interesa, pri čemu su surogat snage predstavljene u javnom diskursu kao borci za slobodu. Predmet eksploatacije u Drugom modelu jeste nasilje koje ispunjava teorijske kriterijume da bude označeno kao terorizam, ali je zbog političke svrsishodnosti kvalifikovano kao borba za slobodu, otpor protiv ugnjetavanja i sl. Eksploatacija nasilja u Drugom modelu vrši se u cilju promene nosilaca političke vlasti, stvaranje autonomnih regija odnosno država koje bi bile kooperativne sa politikom države koja primenjuje Drugi model ili kao deo šire strategije upravljanja bezbednosnim procesima. Treći model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja podrazumeva organizovanje i upravljanje surogat snagama koje su kvalifikovane kao terorističke organizacije ili se vrši infiltracija pojedinaca u izvorne i samostalne narodne pobune radi preuzimanja rukovodećih mesta i upravljanja njihovim delovanjem u skladu sa interesima države koja preduzima Treći model. Predmet eksploatacije u Trećem modelu jeste nasilje koje je kvalifikovano kao terorizam, pri čemu je cilj eksploatacije višestruk: 1. Putem nasilja i straha koji nastaje kao posledica vršenja terorističkih akata upravlja se bezbednosnom situacijom u državi koja je meta agresije ili u regionu koji je potrebno politički i teritorijalno kontrolisati, sa ili bez fizičkog prisustva oružanih snaga države koja primenjuje Treći model; 2. Stvaranje straha kod određenog ili unapred neodređenog broja država od potencijalnih napada terorističkih organizacija radi vršenja latentnog političkog pritiska na države da bude kooperativne, i 3. Stvaranje razloga za vojnu intervenciju radi prisustva i političke kontrole određene države ili regiona. Na osnovu prethodno iznetih rezultata istraživanja izveden je zaključak da prvi korak u sprečavanju eksploatacije terorizma protiv naše države predstavlja otklanjanje ili smanjivanje potencijala za društvene sukobe koji nastaje usled stvaranja ili produbljivanja društvenih protivrečnosti. Iz tog razloga izvršena je analiza normativno – političkog i institucionalnog okvira u relevantnim oblastima društvenog života. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u Republici Srbiji postoji dobar osnov za angažovanje i integrisanje svih resursa društvene moći na planu ostvarivanja nacionalne bezbednosti, ali i da postoji potreba da se aktuelni politički i bezbednosni institucionalni okvir uskladi sa takvim mogućnostima. Kao rezultat istraživanja predložene su tri grupe mera čija primena treba za rezultat da ima: otklanjanje i smanjivanje opasnosti od stvaranja potencijala za društvene sukobe; uspostavljanje efikasnog i integrisanog institucionalnog okvira za suprotstavljanje političkom nasilju koje eventualno proistekne iz postojećih protivrečnosti i otklanjanje i smanjivanje štetnih posledica takvog političkog nasilja. ; There is a consensus in security studies that terrorism is a politically motivated violence and, therefore, it represents one of the forms of violent political struggle. What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its primary focus on creating, maintaining and exploiting fear in order to intimidate opponents and strengthen support among allies. Fundamental deviations from theoretical and legal criteria in determination of terrorism are identified in the pratice of the Security Council. The general assessment of the Security Council's actions related to terrorism is that the Council has been following the prevailing political discourse in which, initially, states in their entirety were responsible for terrorism, and later the blame was put on "weak", "irresponsible" and "repressive" states for enabling international terrorist organizations to operate on their territories. The Security Council passed resolutions in which it classified terrorist acts according to the nature of the act but also to the nature of the perpetrator, which resulted in treating all acts of a previously designated terrorist organization as terrorist acts. The research also determined that during the adoption of certain resolutions, political expediency influenced the fact that similar behaviors do not always qualify as terrorist acts. Based on the previously derived conclusions, it could be said that the complexity of fight against terrorism is a consequence of the primacy of the political criterion in designation of an act of violence as a terrorist act, and not because of the difficulties in defining the notion of terrorism. Changes in the concept of terrorism in the Security Council Resolutions and their harmonization with the prevailing public discourse coincides with the efforts of the United States and other Western countries to reshape the international community and establish a new world order. In such circumstances, terrorism becomes an offensive political tool of hybrid warfare, with the negative connotation of terrorism being exploited in two ways. First, terrorism has become a political assessment of one's actions, regardless of the nature of the such activities. Second, terrorism has become a violent political tool which, depending on the interests of those in the position to evaluate certain behaviors, will not be labeled as terrorism in each situation, but rather as a legitimate form of political action at times. Offensive character of the decision leads to the neglect of scientific criteria in favor of political expediency in the process of terrorist act designation. Dominance of the political criterion in designation of a terrorist act influences the instrumentalisation of terrorism and its transformation into an effective means of hybrid warfare. Content of hybrid warfare is not a consequence of an unlimited variety of weapons used, nor their sophistication, but the ability of security management to apply such combinations of different, yet mutually compatible types of warfare in order to achieve a previously determined aim. These are reasons why terrorism, as a form of complex political violence, is exploited in hybrid warfare. Based on the results of the research, three models of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare are described. The First Model of exploitation is derived from the political practice of the United States to put countries on the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism. In accordance with the political and any other influence that the United States has, this practice and its consequences are formally or informally accepted around the world. The main consequences of being placed on the List are sanctions, discredit on the international level and legitimization of measures against such states, while at the same time putting pressure on countries that are not on the List to harmonize their policies with the interests of great powers. The Second Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purpose of hybrid warfare consists of organizing, financing, equipping, training and directing surrogate forces against the governments of countries with whom compatibility of interests has not been achieved, where surrogate forces are presented in the public discourse as freedom fighters. The subject of exploitation in the Second Model is violence that meets the theoretical criteria to be designated as terrorism. However, due to its political expediency it is qualified as a fight for freedom, resistance against oppression etc. The exploitation of violence used in the second model is done with the intention of shifting political power in order to create autonomous regions or states that would be cooperative with the policy of the state that applies the Second Model or as a part of a broader strategy for managing security processes. The Third Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare implies organization and managing of surrogate forces that are qualified as terrorist organizations or infiltrating individuals into original and independent popular uprisings in order to take leadership positions and manage their actions in accordance with the interests of the state which apply the Third Model. The subject of exploitation in the Third Model is violence that is qualified as terrorism, with multiple goals: 1. Violence and fear that arises as a result of terrorist acts allows crisis management in the country targeted by aggression or in the region in need of political and territorial control, with or without the physical presence of the armed forces of the State applying the Third Model; 2. Creating fear of potential terrorist attacks in order to exert latent political pressure on states to be cooperative, and 3. Creating reasons for a military intervention which results in physical presence and political control of a certain state or region. Based on the previously presented research results, it may be concluded that the first step to prevent terrorist exploitation against our country should be to eliminate or reduce the potential for social conflicts driven by social contradictions. For this reason, an analysis of the normative - political and institutional framework in the relevant areas of social life was conducted. The research has determined that in the Republic of Serbia there is a good basis for engaging and integrating all resources of national power in terms of achieving national security. In addition, there is a need to harmonize the current political and institutional framework for national security with such possibilities. As a result of the research, three groups of measures have been proposed: elimination or reduction of the potential for social conflicts; establishment of an effective and integrated institutional framework for countering political violence that may arise from the aforementioned contradictions, and elimination and reduction of harmful consequences of such political violence.