Suchergebnisse

While it is often presented as the referee of the political game, the Constitutional Council should rather be seen as an actor among others. It follows its own method of intervention according to its role of a "constitutional judge", but it also takes part, in its own particular way, to the political game and contributes to its regulation. However, its intervention is conditional. It supposes a decision taken by the other actors and therefore depends both on the persistence of the game, on the nature of its stakes, and on an assessment of its chances of success. Adapted from the source document.

On the one hand, drug is a private good that is designed, developed and commercialized by an industry: the pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, it has some characteristics of a public good because of its purpose: health. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the two dimensions of drug in order to deduce some public incentives that could reinforce the public dimension such as public health in the decision-making process of the private firms (externalities). First, we analyze the available tools used by public authorities that may have a direct or indirect role in inciting firms to innovate: intellectual property right, public research policy, Research and Development tax credit and some other different tools used to regulate the commercialization of drugs (mainly used in Europe). We show that public authorities do not play any direct role in the decision-making process of the firms. Secondly, we analyze the decision-making process of the pharmaceutical Research and Development strategy. Research and Development programs are highly risky and this is even more the case for innovating products. According to the strategy of a firm, Research and Development projects are competing each other for the internal resources, implying portfolio management. The least innovating projects act as securing the whole Research and Dévelopment portfolio. Third, we deduce from this two parts some theoretical public incentives in order to favor innovation in the specific context of drug. Then, we propose a model of the portfolio decision-making process, allowing us to simulate the potential impact of our theoretical public incentives. We show that a public participation in Research and Development costs, a public policy based on prices and/or on intellectual property rights could have a significant and positive effect on the decision-making-process of pharmaceutical firms. ; Le médicament participe de deux logiques: il est d'une part conçu, développé et commercialisé par une industrie privée, l'industrie pharmaceutique; d'autre ...

On the one hand, drug is a private good that is designed, developed and commercialized by an industry: the pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, it has some characteristics of a public good because of its purpose: health. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the two dimensions of drug in order to deduce some public incentives that could reinforce the public dimension such as public health in the decision-making process of the private firms (externalities). First, we analyze the available tools used by public authorities that may have a direct or indirect role in inciting firms to innovate: intellectual property right, public research policy, Research and Development tax credit and some other different tools used to regulate the commercialization of drugs (mainly used in Europe). We show that public authorities do not play any direct role in the decision-making process of the firms. Secondly, we analyze the decision-making process of the pharmaceutical Research and Development strategy. Research and Development programs are highly risky and this is even more the case for innovating products. According to the strategy of a firm, Research and Development projects are competing each other for the internal resources, implying portfolio management. The least innovating projects act as securing the whole Research and Dévelopment portfolio. Third, we deduce from this two parts some theoretical public incentives in order to favor innovation in the specific context of drug. Then, we propose a model of the portfolio decision-making process, allowing us to simulate the potential impact of our theoretical public incentives. We show that a public participation in Research and Development costs, a public policy based on prices and/or on intellectual property rights could have a significant and positive effect on the decision-making-process of pharmaceutical firms. ; Le médicament participe de deux logiques: il est d'une part conçu, développé et commercialisé par une industrie privée, l'industrie pharmaceutique; d'autre part, parce qu'il a une finalité de soin, il a des caractéristiques de bien public. L'objectif de la thèse est d'analyser chacune des deux sphères individuellement et de proposer des incitations publiques qui améliorent la prise en compte de la notion de santé publique dans les décisions des firmes, au bénéfice des deux parties. Nous analysons ainsi dans un premier temps les outils dont dispose la puissance publique, sous l'angle de l'incitation à l'innovation qu'elle représente: le brevet, la recherche publique, le crédit d'impôt recherche ainsi que ceux qui concernent la forte régulation de la commercialisation dans le secteur pharmaceutique. Nous faisons le diagnostic que les pouvoirs publics n'interviennent pas dans le processus de Recherche et Développement des firmes. Par ailleurs, les politiques de santé publique concernant le médicament sont aujourd'hui encore mal définies et imprécises. Dans deuxième temps nous analysons le processus de décision des firmes pharmaceutiques. Il est caractérisé par un risque important par rapport aux autres industries, en particulier pour les projets les plus innovants. Les projets de Recherche et Développement sont en concurrence entre eux pour les ressources de l'entreprises, selon une logique de portefeuille. Les projets peu innovants jouent ainsi un rôle de filet de sécurité. La troisième partie propose des incitations théoriques publiques. Elles sont testées par l'intermédiaire d'un modèle de simulation du choix de portefeuille de projets pharmaceutiques. Nous montrons qu'une participation étatique aux coûts de Recherche et Développement, une action sur les prix et/ou sur les brevets sont susceptibles d'influencer les choix des firmes de façon significative.