Suchergebnisse

At its founding in 1957, the European Union (EU) had no environmental policy, no environmental bureaucracy, and no environmental laws. When, in 1973, the EU began systematically to address environmental concerns there was little expectation that the environment would develop into one of the largest areas of common activity. Twenty-five years on, the EU has some of the most progressive environmental policies of any state in the world although it is not itself a state. At the same time, the preexisting environmental policies of the member states have undergone a progressive change through their involvement in EU environmental policymaking. In other words, the member states have created an institutional entity to perform certain tasks which has in turn deeply affected the way they themselves perceive and act against environmental problems. This theme issue of Government and Policy offers a retrospective analysis of these developments. The purpose of this introductory essay is to describe the historical evolution of EU environmental policy and to identify the most salient themes.

Recent studies of the role of lobby groups in European Union (EU) policymaking have drawn attention to the concept of 'multilevel governance' as a powerful explanatory tool in analysing how these organisations exert political influence on EU institutions. One of the longest standing of these groups is the Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (COPA). Until the mid-1980s, COPA was regarded as being remarkably successful in influencing the content and direction of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), More recently, however, commentators have noted a marked decline in COPA's influence, citing as evidence the organisation's abortive attempts to blunt the radical edge of the 1992 reform package of the Common Agricultural Policy. In this paper the authors use Grande's conception of multilevel governance to provide a thorough examination of why COPA carried little influence with the European Commission's Agriculture Directorate, Directorate-General VI (DGVI) during the 1992 reforms. An illustrative case study is presented of a minor though notable element of these reforms, the so-called 'agri-environment' regulation, EU 2078/92. In explaining COPA's slight effect on the final text of the regulation, Grande's notion of multilevel governance emphasises the eclectic positions adopted by COPA's constituent farming unions towards the regulation, and the complexities of a negotiating process transacted simultaneously with different EU institutions, each requiring the tailoring of specific lobbying strategies by COPA's secretariat. The authors conclude that the negative outcome of COPA's lobbying resulted not only from disarray among this organisation's national policy constituencies, but also from skillful counterlobbying mounted by DGVI to prevent COPA from derailing the delicate CAP reform process.

This article analyzes efforts to harmonize European Union export control policies on dual-use goods from the perspectives of neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist theories of European integration. The outcome of the Council negotiations on dual-use export controls can best be characterized as an intergovernmental bargain. Judicial policy making in this area, on the other hand, fits neofunctionalist expectations rather well, and on implementation issues central state executives may be losing their exclusive control. The article concludes by arguing that rather than investing great theoretical significance in differences among issue areas or policy types, it appears more fruitful to recognize the European Union as a system of multilevel governance. In this system, the relative weight and influence of different actors varies depending on whether we are concerned with policy initiation, legislative decision making, policy implementation, or judicial policy making.

THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES ON DUAL-USE GOODS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF NEOFUNCTIONALIST AND INTERGOVERNMENTALIST THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE OUTCOME OF THE COUNCIL NEGOTIATIONS ON DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS CAN BEST BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAIN. JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THIS AREA, ON THE OTHER HAND, FITS NEOFUNCTIONALIST EXPECTATIONS RATHER WELL, AND ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES CENTRAL STATE EXECUTIVES MAY BE LOSING THEIR EXCLUSIVE CONTROL. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY ARGUING THAT RATHER THAN INVESTING GREAT THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN DIFFERENCES AMONG ISSUE AREAS OR POLICY TYPES, IT APPEARS MORE FRUITFUL TO RECOGNIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SYSTEM OF MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE. IN THIS SYSTEM, THE RELATIVE WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT ACTORS VARIES DEPENDING ON WHETHER ONE IS CONCERNED WITH POLICY INITIATION, LEGISLATIVE DECISION MAKING, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, OR JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING.

In the 1980s, international banking regulation was considered a good example of successful regime activities. National regulators engaged in intergovernmental negotiations that led to an international standard of protection against financial risks. During the 1990s, a multilevel system of regulation developed that stresses the cooperation of public & private actors & the interplay between domestic & international levels. The article deals with the reasons for the transition from the first to the second institutional setting. It is argued that regulators choose different regulatory models depending on the type of regulatory problem they have to solve & on the strategic situation they face. In the 1980s, the strategic situation resembled a distributional conflict that could be solved by intergovernmental negotiations. In the 1990s, more complex types of financial risks have evolved that are turning regulation into a "game against nature." Negotiations are gradually being replaced by communication-based learning processes. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)