In: Political geography: an interdisciplinary journal for all students of political studies with an interest in the geographical and spatial aspects, Band 25, Heft 7, S. 735-751
An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual‐level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.
Theorists are becoming aware that social movements operate in both domestic & international environments, for which reason mutual benefits could be derived from exchanges of ideas between social movement & international relations studies & theories. While most writing about transnational opportunity views international institutions as presenting constraints rather than opportunities, this chapter, focusing on human rights issues, contends that certain forms of transnational contention can take advantage of opportunities available in international institutions in campaigns against states. For example, feminist groups & groups of indigenous peoples have often found the international arena more receptive to their demands than domestic political institutions. Specific cases of such cooperation around the world are presented. The framework for understanding the beneficial interaction of domestic & international politics presented in this chapter aims to provide a dynamic & interactive understanding of how the international & the domestic relate to influence the choices & outcomes of transnational networks activity; & to consider & explain the emergence of new forms of dynamic multilevel governance. Figures. J. Stanton
Research on governance has extensively explored the complex interactions of governmental, nongovernmental, & for-profit entities in the execution of public policy. It has consistently failed, however, to model empirically the joint effects of political & bureaucratic actors in governance systems. To address this issue, a theory of multilevel governance built upon the foundation of representative bureaucracy was developed & tested. Results from an analysis of Texas school districts suggest that Latinos at all levels of the governance system, political & managerial, influence representation at other levels. Findings also indicate that Latinos at each level of governance have positive effects, directly & indirectly, on outcomes for Latino students. The influence of both political & managerial actors at times extends beyond the immediately adjoining level; the effects of such actors cascade through the governance system. The results show that a priority for systematic research should be the identification of approaches & settings for examining the multilevel aspect of governance. 5 Tables, 46 References. [Copyright 2004 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.]
Abstract.This study addresses the question of how best to ensure that national immigration policies are appropriately adjusted to meet the disparate requirements of different communities. We argue that this is the core objective of multilevel governance, which, however, has become freighted with competing ideological objectives, objectives that are perhaps best expressed in Hooghe and Marks's distinction between type I and type II governance, the former oriented to collective decision making and the latter embodying market-oriented approaches to governance. Our argument is that these competing sets of ideologically driven objectives divert multilevel governance away from its core objective of appropriateness to community circumstances. An accompanying article (Leo and Enns, 2009) explores problems posed by ideologically driven, type II multilevel governance in Vancouver. The current article takes up a contrasting case, that of the Canada-Manitoba Agreement on Immigration and Settlement, focusing especially on Winnipeg. We find that in this case the provincial government chose an approach to multilevel governance that did not hew to either type I or type II governance templates, but drew on both to build an impressively successful system of immigration and settlement, carefully tailored to meet the requirements of disparate Manitoba communities. Success was built not on the application of a preconceived template for good governance but on resourcefulness and flexibility in working out ways of making national policies fit local circumstances.Résumé.La question que pose cette étude est la suivante : comment s'assurer que les politiques nationales concernant l'immigration et l'insertion sociale correspondent parfaitement aux besoins disparates des communautés différentes? Nous prétendons que c'est précisément la raison d'être de la gouvernance multipalier. Or, celle-ci est présentement surchargée de préoccupations idéologiques opposées et contradictoires qui trouvent leur meilleure expression dans la distinction que Hooghe et Marks ont faite entre le type I et le type II de gouvernance; l'un s'oriente vers la méthode collective de décision, l'autre incarne les approches de la gouvernance déterminées par les contraintes du marché. L'essentiel de notre argument est que ces approches idéologiques opposées entravent et contredisent l'objectif principal de la gouvernance multipalier, qui est de rendre les politiques gouvernementales sensibles aux circonstances particulières des communautés. Un article connexe (Leo et Enns, 2009) aborde les difficultés que pose, à Vancouver, la gouvernance multipalier de type II déterminée par des contraintes idéologiques. Le présent article aborde un cas tout à fait contraire, soit celui de l'Entente Canada-Manitoba sur l'immigration et l'insertion, centré sur Winnipeg. Nous constatons que, dans ce cas, le gouvernement provincial a opté pour une approche de la gouvernance multipalier qui ne cadrait pas avec les modèles de gouvernance de type I ou II, mais qui s'est inspirée des deux pour bâtir un modèle d'immigration et d'insertion qui est d'autant plus impressionnant et bien réussi qu'il est méthodiquement conçu en fonction des besoins disparates des communautés manitobaines. Ce succès provient non pas de l'application d'un modèle préconçu de bonne gouvernance, mais d'une quête ingénieuse et flexible des moyens qui permettent de concilier les politiques nationales et les circonstances régionales.