Canada has experienced two formal federal ministries dedicated to addressing urban issues. The first, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, encountered resistance from provincial governments and its fellow departments. Both worked to undermine it. The second, the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities, was created with a more conciliatory tone towards the provincial governments and its ministerial colleagues. This paper examines the establishment of both ministries and tracks their efforts using a policy learning and lesson-drawing framework, concluding that common institutional actors, such as the Privy Council, were responsible for the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities' change in tone and approach to multilevel governance. General lessons are drawn about inter-governmental relations and multi-level policy formation in federal systems.
This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition policy system, which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of institutions. In doing so, it targets to contribute bridging a gap in the current world economic order, i.e. the lack of supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition. Such governance can effectively be designed against the background of a combination of the well-known nondiscrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, competition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional antitrust regimes.
This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition policy system, which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of institutions. In doing so, it targets to contribute to bridge a gap in the current world economic order, i.e. the supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition. Such a governance can effectively be designed against the background of a combination of the well-known nondiscrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, competition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional-supranational antitrust regimes.
The historical evolution of free trade has been accompanied by a plethora of debates, concerning both its positive effects and social costs. During the last decade, the subject of these disputes has markedly changed. The main objective of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded 1947, was initially the reduction of tariffs introduced by states to protect their national economy. In this respect, the agreement has been markedly successful. Since the early 1970s, however, non-tariff barriers to free trade have moved to the centre of attention. This change of focus was fostered by more intensified domestic regulation especially in the fields of health and safety, consumer and environmental protection. These concerns are of such domestic significance that they cannot simply be abandoned for the sake of free trade; however, it also is common opinion that regulations in these areas cannot be accepted, if they merely mask protectionist interests. In 1994, the international trade system adapted to this situation by transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The most important reforms included an overhaul of its procedures of dispute settlement and the conclusion of special agreements concerning non-tariff barriers to free trade such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements aim at the balancing of their main economic objective, free trade, with domestic regulatory concerns of WTO members. This bundle of regulations has certainly furthered the emergence of transnational 'governance arrangements'. Such new forms of 'transnational governance' have lent renewed importance to 'old' legal issues: How can new forms of transnational governance be qualified legally? What can be said about their (social) acceptance and (normative) legitimacy? Can this form of governance be 'constitutionalized' in such a way that law can defend or even regain its function as guarantor of and yardstick for legitimate governing?
The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and fi rms, regardless of the ultimate origin - international, European or national - of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European 'government of governments' is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance - especially the rules of negative integration defi ned by politically non-accountable actors - may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply. ; Legitimität hat die Funktion, die freiwillige Befolgung unwillkommener Autoritätsakte zu sichern. Da das Europarecht fast vollständig von den Mitgliedstaaten und ihren Gerichten umgesetzt und durchgesetzt werden muss, kommt es nicht zu einer unmittelbaren Konfrontation der EU mit ihren Bürgern. Deshalb sollte auch die Legitimität des Regierens in Europa als Zweistufen-Konzept diskutiert werden. Auf der einen Ebene bestimmt die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten die Reaktion der Bürger auf unwillkommene Regeln oder Entscheidungen, ohne dass es dafür auf deren internationale, europäische oder nationale Herkunft ankäme. Dagegen entscheidet die Legitimität der EU als 'government of governments' darüber, ob die Mitgliedstaaten ihrerseits ihre europäischen Verpfl ichtungen freiwillig erfüllen. Anlass zu Besorgnis gibt allenfalls die Rückwirkung des europäischen Regierens - insbesondere der von politisch nicht verantwortlichen Instanzen defi nierten negativen Integration - auf die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten und letztlich auf deren Fähigkeit zur loyalen Umsetzung europäischer Regeln.
European Governance is more than just a policy instrument without legal significance. Its regulatory sub-divisions, such as Comitology, the Lamfalussy procedure, and the growing number of European administrative agencies, have colonized substantive parts of the law-shaping and law-making processes. This contribution argues that European Governance is a distinct phenomenon that cannot be easily reconciled with traditional notions of legislation and administration, but needs to be theorized differently. Accordingly, its legal shape has to be adjusted to this new situation, too. Neither a - still only vaguely defined - concept of 'accountability', nor a non-binding policy concept of 'good governance' can fill this gap. A re-definition of European Governance - as an 'integrating administration' – has to take the new developments of a distinct European administrative governance sphere seriously. At the same time, it has to address the specific legitimatory problématique of the new governance structures in a sufficient manner. The specific character of these structures calls for an institutionalization of participatory patterns within the governance structures: by ensuring the involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders and the public in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes of both European governance and European regulation, the odd position of European governance, which oscillates between legislative and administrative functions, can be targeted more adequately.
Legitimacy is regarded as one critical aspect of biodiversity management and nature conservation arrangements. Multi-level governance is claimed to pose several challenges to legitimacy. The aim of this paper is to review some legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance contexts, and to analyse empirically biodiversity governance in different EU countries in the light of these challenges. Four legitimacy criteria - legal compatibility, accountability, representation and inclusion, and transparency - serve as a framework for theoretical and empirical analysis. The analysis is based on twelve cases of multilevel biodiversity governance from different EU countries. The results show that several of the legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance can be observed in the cases, for example the poor inclusion of certain concerns at some time points of the decision process, difficulties in being accountable towards multiple levels simultaneously, or the weak visibility of the decision process either for the general public or for the immediate participants.
Compte rendu de l'ouvrage "Innovative Governance in the European Union. The Politics of Multilevel Policymaking" (Ingeborg Tömmel and Amy Verdun ed.), Lynne Rienner Pub. (2009).
Compte rendu de l'ouvrage "Innovative Governance in the European Union. The Politics of Multilevel Policymaking" (Ingeborg Tömmel and Amy Verdun ed.), Lynne Rienner Pub. (2009).
The unfolding of structures of governance in the European Union has taken place by means of formalising interactions--directly and indirectly-- among EU's twenty seven Member-States. These interactions mainly affect policy networks which had been traditionally confined to nation-state policy arenas. An emerging new layer of supranational government and an internal all-round political re-structuring are processes well under way. As a multilevel political and institutional framework, the European Union can be seen as a compound of policy processes. Europeanisation therefore implies that sub-state policies are also shaped by factors that lie beyond the Member-States. The anti-discrimination stance of the European Union can be regarded as a cornerstone of future institutional-building and policy-making. Indeed, non-discrimination is a fundamental principal of EU legal order. ; Peer reviewed
Spatial aspects of economic and social cohesion have become a major target in European policy in the last decades. By combining the structural funds with spatial development perspectives, the recently introduced concept of territorial cohesion obviously functions as link between EU regional policy and spatial development. In other terms, territorial cohesion should be considered as an umbrella concept complementing and reinforcing economic and social cohesion. The purpose of the paper thus is twofold. First, it is the aim to analyze briefly the socio-economic background and the changes in the regional economic structure of the EU, partly as a result of socio-economic changes, partly as a consequence of the enlargement from 15 predominantly wealthy mature marked economies with 12 transition economies and two small Mediterranean states. The first section also provides (1) a brief outline of the history and the political foundations of the emergence of the EU regional policy in the aftermath of the first attempts to create an Economic and Monetary Union; and (2) an analysis of the main trends in European economic convergence and disparities to provide empirical evidence why the issue has climbed upwards on the political agenda in the last decade. The second purpose is then to analyze the added value (if there is any) of the concept of territorial cohesion for economic and social convergence by providing an analytical overview of the changes in the spatial agenda from European spatial planning -starting in the 1970's with the establishment of the CEMAT by the European Council - to territorial cohesion and its implications for the EU regional policy. Furthermore, the paper discusses the recent attempts to integrate the issues of economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU cohesion policy 2007-13 and the Lisbon Treaty on the reform of European Union. This section also analyzes the altered balance between the European and the national level with regard to spatial and territorial issues. The final section of the paper summarizes the main findings with special attention on the North European context.
The UN Charter and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties require interpreting treaties and settling international disputes "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." This contribution discusses procedural and substantive principles of justice which the international judge may take into account in interpreting international economic agreements. The "sovereign equality of states" underlying the "international law of coexistence" as well as the "international law of intergovernmental cooperation" must be interpreted in conformity with the universal recognition of human dignity as a source of inalienable human rights. The universal recognition of economic and social human rights further requires taking into account solidarity principles, as proposed also by the sociological approach to international law. The constitutional structures and citizen-oriented functions of the law of international economic organizations liberalizing and regulating mutually beneficial market transactions among citizens require judges to engage in a careful balancing of state-centered and citizen-oriented principles of international law, including respect for the emerging human right to democratic decision-making. This modern "international integration law" and the increasing number of "international constitutional rules" promote the reconciliation of the various state-centered approaches, human rights approaches, sociological approaches and policy-approaches to international law as a system not only of international rules and "legal pluralism" but also of constitutionally limited decision-making processes and struggles for human rights.
Is the ineffective protection of international public goods (like an efficient world trading and financial system), and thereby also of interrelated national public goods (like a common market undistorted by anti-dumping laws and other border discrimination), the inevitable fate of humanity? The negative answer to this question in Section I argues that the ineffective protection of international public goods is mainly due to lack of adequate theories, rules and institutions for overcoming the 'collective action problems' in the multilevel governance of interdependent public goods. Section II reviews the competing conceptions of 'international economic law' (IEL) such as public international law approaches, multilevel economic law approaches, 'global administrative law' approaches, 'conflicts law approaches' and 'multilevel constitutional approaches'. Section III argues that - similar to the experience of all democracies that 'national public goods' can be supplied only in a framework of constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial rules and procedures supported by domestic citizens - the multilevel governance of 'international public goods' requires a multilevel constitutional framework for multilevel rule-making and judicial protection of rule of law and constitutional rights accepted and supported by domestic citizens as 'primary' legal subjects of IEL and of a citizen-driven, worldwide division of labour. Section IV concludes that multilevel governance for protecting the national self-interest in international public goods must no longer be designed only as 'foreign policy', but rather as an ever more important part of 'multilevel constitutionalism' for the protection of essential citizen interests. Rather than relying on hierarchical claims (e.g. regarding national primacy of state sovereignty, international primacy of international law over domestic law), the diverse national and international legal regimes must be coordinated with due respect for 'constitutional pluralism', 'deliberative democracy', 'balancing' of competing rights and values, and international duties of cooperation (e.g. among national and international courts of justice). 'Westphalian conceptions' of international law as an instrument for advancing national interests in an anarchic world remain important for protecting 'national public goods' (like national security). Yet, as illustrated by the diverse forms of European law (such as EC, EU, EEA law and the ECHR), more effective protection of interdependent (inter)national public goods requires new forms of multilevel governance and of multilevel constitutional restraints limiting the 'collective action problems' in transforming national into international public goods (e.g. protection of common markets and the environment).
The aim of this paper is to capture and explain the differential influences of non-binding agreements (i.e., soft law) launched by the European Union. More specifically, this piece proposes a theoretical framework to understand why and how the European Employment Strategy has affected domestic settings in Belgium, Spain, and Sweden in similar and different ways. To answer this question, I develop a theoretical toolbox to guide researchers who study and analyze policy areas ruled by non-binding agreements. More specifically, to develop my arguments, I focus on four types of internalization: 1) legal, 2) political, 3) intra-governmental, and 4) governmental-societal. The paper seeks to contribute to the literatures on Europeanisation and 'second image reversed' by developing theoretical propositions about the domestic factors that facilitate and hinder the internalization of supranational non-binding regulations on EU Member States. In addition, the paper seeks to make a contribution to the literature on welfare states in advanced industrial states as I argue that contemporary accounts of European welfare state reform ought to consider the articulation of rules outside the realm of nation-states, specifically those launched by the supranational level, given that these soft mandates have the capacity to subtly transform domestic policies and institutions.
Politische Steuerung und Governance sind zentrale Themen in der Arbeit von Renate Mayntz. Die hier versammelten, teilweise unveröffentlichten Aufsätze beleuchten die Entwicklung, die wesentlichen Merkmale und die Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Paradigmen. Es geht dabei sowohl um Probleme der Handlungsfähigkeit von Nationalstaaten als auch um Fragen von Governance in politischen Mehrebenensystemen. Renate Mayntz wendet die Governance-Theorie auf sehr unterschiedliche Politikfelder an, wie die pharmazeutische Industrie, die Elektrizitätsversorgung oder die Terrorismusbekämpfung. Damit gelingt ihr die schrittweise Unterscheidung eines analytischen Ansatzes, der an der Unbestimmtheit seiner zentralen Kategorie "Governance" leidet. ; Political steering and governance have been recurring themes in Renate Mayntz's research. This volume sheds light on each of these paradigms, showing how they developed, the features they share and where they differ. Some of the articles, five of which are in English and four in German, have never been published before. In them Mayntz examines challenges to nation-states' capacity to govern and multilevel political systems' ability to govern themselves. Applying governance theory to such markedly diverse policy arenas as the pharmaceutical industry, the electrical power industry and anti-terrorism, she clarifies an analytical approach that has been encumbered by the fuzziness of its key concept, "governance."
