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This dissertation is a descriptive study of a policy network designed for U.S. government and global cooperation to promote Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). It is aimed at exploring the historical and structural features of the ITS policy network, and evaluating its roles in the policy process. Until now, the network literature has barely examined the full arrays of networks, catching just part of their full pictures. First, this study draws attention to transnational networks and their organic or systematic relationships with lower levels of networks. Second, it examines the individual properties and synergy of three core elements of the ITS policy network: public-private partnerships, professional networks, and intergovernmental networks. Third, it takes a close look at the pattern of stability change and power relations of the policy network from within the net. Finally, this study discusses what difference networks make, compared to hierarchies and markets. This dissertation employed multiple sources of evidence: unstandardized elite interviews, government documents, and archival records. Through a networking strategy to find the best experts, face-to-face, telephone, and e-mail interviews were conducted with twenty-two public officials and ITS professionals. It was found that the U.S. ITS policy network was a well-designed strategic governance structure at the planning level, but an experimental learning-focused one at the implementation level. It was initially designed by a new, timely, cross-sectional coalition, which brought together field leaders from both the public and the private sectors under the slogan of global competitiveness. Yet, day-to-day managers within the net often experience much more complex power relationships and internal dynamics as well as legal obstacles; also, they confront external uncertainty in political support and market. For better results, policy networks should be designed in flexible ways that will handle their disadvantages such as ambiguous roles, exclusiveness, and increased staff time. In this respect, it is inevitable for the networks to include some components of a wide range of conventional structures, ranging from highly bureaucratic to highly entrepreneurial, on the one hand, and ranging between issue networks (grounded in American pluralism) and policy communities (based on European corporatism), on the other hand. ; Ph. D.

This article analyses the 'partnership principle'—which is of particular importance for multilevel governance interpretations of European integration—as it evolved in EU regional policy-making. After sketching the crucial analytical lines of the current debate on 'partnership' on the example of the implementation of the EU structural policy in Germany, I examine how it functions. A closer look at two important sub-fields of 'partnership'—'societal participation' and 'policy evaluation'—reveals that theoretical expectations regarding its transforming potential, in terms of pitting supranational and subnational actors against central state authority and thereby cir-cumventing the latter, have not materialised. On the contrary, recently rising resentment and out and out conflict between the European Commission and regional authorities so far point to theoretically unexpected limitations of 'partnership', calling into question whether it is an appro-priate and sustainable inter-administrative co-ordination device—at least when viewed from the perspective of the multilevel governance thesis. In the light of the reported insights into the prac-tice of 'partnership', this 'new mode of EU governance' thus needs to be reassessed.

In the context of what is generally referred to as a globalizing world, we have become accustomed to speak of new forms of multilevel governance. The paradigmatic shift from government to governance signals the presumable end of the modern Westphalian state system in which the governments of territorial nation-states held exclusive or sovereign governing powers (Hueglin 1999). Instead, we now detect that acts of governing are carried out by a plurality of governmental and nongovernmental actors below and above the nation-state. Since these acts, by international organizations as well as regional governments and civic movements, affect citizens directly, a growing democratic deficit of accountability has been recognized. Democratic political theory and practice therefore have begun a search for viable models of global democratic governance. By recognizing territorial group rights alongside with individual rights and freedoms, federalism, or, more precisely, the theory and practice of the modern federal state, provide such a model in principle. This is by no means undisputed. In his search for models of cosmopolitan democracy, David Held, perhaps the most prominent global democracy theorist at the moment, had to admit that he substituted "federal" for "cosmopolitan" because of the controversial meaning of federalism in Europe (1992), and especially so in Britain where federalism, with the American model in mind, was seen as synonymous with federal government and centralization. In newly federalizing polities, however, Spain, Belgium and South Africa among others, federalism is understood as a safeguard of local and regional autonomy, or, more generally, as a means to the organized recognition of territorial group rights and their democratic inclusion into the body politic. In the context of globalization, it would have to mean both, as it of course always does, the establishment of effective and democratic governance on a world scale, and at the same time the retention of significant levels of autonomy and self-government for states, regions, localities and other collective actors. In this presentation I want to address three questions: 1. What exactly is globalization and does it exist? 2. What exactly is federalism and why do we need it? 3. What kind of federal institutions can serve global governance? ; Departamento de Economía

Published in: Regional Studies 39 (7), 939-954, October 2005 ; There is simultaneous trend of regionalisation and decentralization in Europe, a trend that has also affected the science and technology policy domain, with an open debate on the functioning of the multilevel governance system. Regional authorities have become directly involved in the design and implementation of regional S&T policies, however the interventions of sub-national governments are much more diverse than the prevailing view about the convergence of regional policies towards innovation policies might imply. This article describes science, technology and innovation policies adopted by five Spanish Regional Governments between the mid-80s and the beginning of the 21st century from a comparative perspective. The paper firstly describes the policy approaches (academic v. industrial) adopted by the regional authorities. Secondly, we analyse the explanatory factors in order to reach certain conclusions about the circumstances under which regional governments are able to implement policies of one or the other approach. Despite the influence of some structural factors, especially as regards initial political preferences, the analysis highlights the relevance of the mobilised interests when they are concentrated in the region, showing that changes in policy orientation are particularly difficult when those interests play a role in the administration of such policies. Preferences towards a policy reorientation are more likely to succeed with the aid of appropriate administrative arrangements, especially along with significant budget increases. ; Funding from the Madrid Regional R&D Plan, the III National R&D Plan (SEC 1999-0829-C02-01) and the PRIME membership (EU Network of Excellence, CIT1-CT-2003-506596) ; Peer reviewed

Political power is being reallocated across territorial boundaries. Traditionally centralized polities are either decentralized or on their way to decentralization. In addition, European nations are engaged in the process of building a common set of rules both respectful to and compatible with their own peculiarities. As a result, the number of political entities in which several levels of government share a common economic space has increased. This paper analyzes how decentralization interacts with the politics of redistribution and inequality. The argument can be outlined as follows. Contrary to what is conventionally argued, decentralization per se does not necessarily lead towards higher (or lower) levels of income inequality. Whatever the impact of decentralization on the distribution of income may be, it is to a large extent a function of the internal structures of inequality within regions and their combination. Secondly, if decentralization indeed leads to different distributive outcomes, there are reasons to believe that, in the context of multilevel governance, contentions about the institutional design of redistribution are themselves contentions about who gets what. Such contentions make decentralization endogenous to the territorial structure of inequality by virtue of a political process linking the latter to the preferences about the institutional design of redistribution. The first part of the paper formalizes this argument. The second one tests its main implications against a data set of 15 OECD countries over the period 1980- 1997. ; Politische Macht wird über territoriale Grenzen hinaus neu verteilt. Traditionell zentralisierte Länder haben sich bereits dezentralisiert oder sind auf dem Wege der Dezentralisierung. Zusätzlich befinden sich die europäischen Nationen in einem Prozess des Aufbaus eines gemeinsamen Regelwerkes, das einerseits ihre eigenen Besonderheiten respektieren soll und andererseits mit diesen Besonderheiten vereinbar zu sein hat. Das Ergebnis ist eine Zunahme von politischen Gebilden, in denen sich mehrere Regierungsebenen einen gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraum teilen. Dieser Artikel analysiert die Interaktion dieses Prozesses mit Verteilungspolitik sowie Ungleichheit und argumentiert dabei wie folgt: Im Gegensatz zur üblichen Sichtweise führt Dezentralisierung nicht notwendigerweise zu höheren (oder niedrigeren) Einkommensungleichheiten. Was immer die Auswirkung von Dezentralisierung auf Einkommensverteilung auch sein mag, so ist letztere zu einem großen Teil das Ergebnis der internen Ungleichheitsstrukturen von Regionen und deren verschiedenen Kombinationen. Und zweitens, wenn Dezentralisierung zu verschiedenen Verteilungsergebnissen führt, dann wäre zu vermuten, dass Konflikte über die institutionelle Ausgestaltung von Verteilungspolitik innerhalb eines Mehrebenensystems eigentlich Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die Frage des "Wer-bekommt-was" sind. Auf Grund eines politischen Prozesses, der die territoriale Ungleichheit mit den Präferenzen bezüglich der institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Umverteilung zusammenschaltet, werden derartige Konflikte über die Dezentralisierung zu einem endogenen Problem der territorialen Struktur von Ungleichheit. Der erste Teil des Artikels befasst sich mit den eben genannten Argumenten. Der zweite Teil testet deren wesentlichen Implikationen anhand eines Datensatzes von 15 OECD-Ländern über den Zeitraum 1980 – 1997.

In den letzten Jahrzehnten sind nicht nur vielfältige internationale Institutionen zur Regelung von Problemen und Konflikten entstanden, die sich aus den Globalisierungsprozessen herleiten. Auch haben sich die Akteurskonstellationen erweitert und schließen nicht-staatliche Akteure ein. Dies alles hat in zahlreichen Politikfeldern Formen transnationaler Governance hervorgebracht. Doch trotz deren Heterogenität überwiegen in der politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung politikfeldunspezifische und häufig auch normativ und institutionell-fixierte Ansätze. Nach einer Skizze einiger Aporien der theoretischen Diskussion werden wir dieses Problem am Beispiel des Konfliktfelds internationaler Arbeitsregulierung behandeln. Empirischer Bezugspunkt ist die Wirkungsanalyse des 'North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation' - es ist dies ein junges Arbeitsregime, das 1994 als Nebenabkommen zum nordamerikanischen Freihandelsvertrag in Kraft trat. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass die strukturellen und institutionellen Eigensinnigkeiten der politischen Mehrebenenprozesse internationale Arbeitsregulierung als Konfliktfeld in spezifischer Weise strukturieren. Notwendig für eine umfassende Analyse internationaler Arbeitsregulierung, so die zentrale These, ist die Entwicklung eines politik- und konfliktfeldspezifischen Zugangs zu den transnationalen Governance-Prozessen, der es erst ermöglicht, komplexe innergesellschaftliche Widersprüche und Dynamiken und schließlich deren Widerspenstigkeit gegenüber internationalen Beziehungen zu erfassen. ; During the last decades, an ongoing process of international institution building has developed that responds to problems and conflicts generated by globalization. As, simultaneously, the spectrum of political actors has been extended including private actors, we perceive new complex forms and processes of transnational governance in many politicy areas. Despite of the obvious heterogeneity of these processes, the political-science debate is dominated by approaches that do not take account of the logics of the specific policy areas and are normative and institutionally-fixed. After sketching some crucial theoretical apories of the debate, we focus on international labor regulation as a specific policy area. Our argument is empirically based on the analysis of an international labor regime, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which in 1994 was signed by the USA, Canada and Mexico as a NAFTA side agreement. We argue that political multilevel processes specific to international labor regulation are stamped - and blocked - by the structural and institutional particularities of this policy area. An adequate and comprehensive analysis - so the main argument - needs a more policy- specific approach that permits to grasp contradictions and dynamics of domestic (labor) relations as well as their shielding from international relations.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect communities and individuals long after conflicts end and therefore have a profound effect on opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding. In the immediate post-conflict phase the presence, or simply the threat, of landmines can hamper refugee return and the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes. They pose a long-term social, economic and environmental threat that denies the use of fertile land and access to water and affects flows of people, goods and services. There is also an important security risk from abandoned explosive ordnance stockpiles or caches which, if not properly secured or destroyed following the end of hostilities, offer rich pickings for insurgents, rebel groups, criminals and other disaffected elements that mark the post-conflict landscape. This chapter assesses the complexities of governing mine action generally as well potential and actual linkages to other elements of post-conflict peacebuilding by analysing two interrelated governance issues. First, the multi-actor, multilevel nature of mine action creates barriers between different stakeholders, potential democratic deficits in decision-making processes and a knowledge gap between constituencies both at the strategic level and in the field. Second, in post-conflict peacebuilding, the involvement of the international community offers important opportunities, but also creates particular challenges.

Mit der ökonomischen Globalisierung geht auch eine Internationalisierung des Konfliktfelds der Arbeitsregulierung einher. Sie findet ihren Ausdruck in der Debatte um internationale Arbeits- und Sozialstandards, die sowohl Menschenrechtsverletzungen als auch den Deregulierungsdruck einer Abwärtsspirale, eines 'race to the bottom', Einhalt bieten sollen. In den Mittelpunkt der kontroversen Diskussion ist die Forderung nach Sozialklauseln gerückt - Klauseln in Handelsverträgen, die Handelsvorteile an die Einhaltung von Arbeitnehmerrechten binden. Befürworter sehen vor allem in ihrem Sanktionspotenzial ein wirksames Mittel der Durchsetzung internationaler Arbeits- und Sozialstandards. In unserem Artikel setzen wir uns kritisch mit den verbreiteten Wirkungsannahmen zu Sozialklauseln auseinander. Wir beziehen uns dabei auf die Ergebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsprojekts zum North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, einem der beiden NAFTA-Nebenabkommen. Es ist dies das erste multilaterale, zwischen Mexiko, den USA und Kanada - also höchst heterogenen Staaten - vereinbarte Abkommen dieser Art. Unsere Ergebnisse stärken letztlich Zweifel an den verbreiteten Begründungen für Sozialklauseln. Wir zeigen auf, dass diese überwiegend ökonomistisch verkürzt sind, die soziale und politische Logik nationaler Arbeitsbeziehungen und auch die Machtassymetrien auf internationaler Ebene vernachlässigen. Problematisch ist auch das einfache Ursache-Wirkungs-Modell internationaler Arbeitsregulierung, das der sozialen Dynamik in einem widersprüchlichen Mehrebenenprozess von transnational governance zwar zugrunde gelegt, letztlich aber nicht gerecht wird. Was somit als effektives Verfahren angesehen wird, könnte sich in der Praxis als Hemmschuh internationaler Arbeitsregulierung erweisen. Es bleibt die Aufgabe politologischer und auch soziologischer Forschung, Erfahrungen existierender Ansätze internationaler Arbeitsregulierung auszuwerten und differenziertere Modelle und Konzepte zu entwickeln. ; Along with economic globalisation there is a visible trend towards a internationalisation of labor regulation as indicated by the debate about international social and labor standards designed and implemented to prevent human rights abuses as well as a 'race to the bottom' of deregulation. One of the central issues in this debate is that of social clauses - clauses in trade agreements that link trade preferences to compliance with international labor standards. Advocates of the concept stress especially the importance of sanctions as an effective means of enforcement of labor standards. In our article, we discuss critically the assumptions regarding the effectiveness of social clauses. Our argument is supported by the results of an empirical research project on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, one of the two NAFTA-side agreements. It is the first multilateral agreement of that kind negotiated between the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico - i.e. between very heterogeneous states. Our findings further a sceptical view on the effectiveness of social clauses: The concept suffers from an economistic bias and ignores the social and political logic of domestic labor relations as well as power asymmetries in international relations. Most important, it assumes a simple cause-effect model of international labor regulation that does not takes into account the social dynamic of the contradictory and multilevel process of transnational governance. What is seen as a suitable instrument could, finally, turn out to be a bar for effective international labor regulation. Indeed, it remains a challenge for the political and sociological debate to evaluate the experience from existing forms of international labor regulation and to develop more differentiated models and concepts.