Myter eller realiteter? - Møter mellom innvandrere og barnevernet
In: Tidsskriftet Norges barnevern, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 152-155
ISSN: 1891-1838
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In: Tidsskriftet Norges barnevern, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 152-155
ISSN: 1891-1838
In: Tidsskrift for kjønnsforskning, Band 44, Heft 1, S. 53-67
ISSN: 1891-1781
In: Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 274-283
ISSN: 0801-1745
In: AMSAB Tijdingen, Band 3, Heft 4
In: Politica: tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 490-492
ISSN: 0105-0710
The paper's aim is to indicate the mutual relations between contemporary Swedish literature and the academic and political discourse on the welfare state's crisis. The article's first part discusses the genesis, evolution and meaning of the term "Swedish folkhem" as it is understood today, i.e. as a political vision underlying the Swedish welfare state which with time has become a metaphor and a myth. In its other part the presence of historical narratives on the Swedish folkhem in five autobiographically inspired novels on childhood and growing up is investigated (Jonas Gardell's "En komikers uppväxt" (1992), Lena Andersson's "Var det bra så?" (1999), Mikael Niemi's "Populärmusik i Vittula" (2000), Torbjörn Flygt's "Underdog" (2001) and Susanna Alakoski's "Svinalängorna" (2006). Analysing the chosen examples, the author of the paper focuses mainly on the issue of how the narratives known from political propaganda and debate are transformed, commented and used in a literary text to construct a collective identity.
BASE
In: University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences 361
In: Journalistik og samfund 1
In: Økonomi & politik: Kvartalsskrift, Band 82, Heft 3, S. 39-50
ISSN: 0030-1906
In: University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences 268
In: Lund political studies 68
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 80, Heft 4
ISSN: 1891-1757
Russlands invasjon av Ukraina kom som julekvelden på kjerringa. Blant hovedårsakene til mange observatørers måpende overraskelse var inngrodde forestillinger, faste forventninger og vante antagelser om interstatlige forhold. Mange av disse har lenge vært vedlikeholdt av en såkalt nyrealistisk tilnærming til internasjonal politikk. Denne artikkelen begynner med å identifisere nyrealismens betydelige blindsoner. Den belyser deretter et sentralt tema som nyrealismen systematisk overser: hvordan særegne styreformer og tankesett internt i stater som Russland og Ukraina har utviklet seg etter den kalde krigens slutt. Russlands særegne styreform – her betegnet som Putins nypatrimoniale regimetype – har formet den russiske beslutningen om å invadere Ukraina. Denne styreformen har også vært en årsak til overraskelser på russisk side: ikke minst Putin-regimets feilvurdringer om ukrainernes motstand, Vestens bistand og krigens generelle gang. Artikkelen avslutter med å drøfte forskjellige former for feilvurderinger. Den spekulerer også om hvorfor amerikanernes vurderinger var gode i forkant av krigen, mens land som Tyskland og Frankrike, som hadde samme empiri som USA, var uenige med amerikanerne og vurderte Putins intensjoner annerledes.
Abstract in EnglishSurprises Rarely Come Alone. On Misunderstandings, Myths and the Invasion of UkraineRussia's invasion of Ukraine was a bolt from the blue. Among the chief reasons for the surprise were simplistic preconceptions – entrenched beliefs and routine views that upheld easy assumptions about the behaviour of sovereign states. Some of those preconceptions have been cultivated by the so-called neorealist approach to international relations. This article begins by identifying significant blind spots in the neorealist approach. It proceeds by exploring phenomena that neorealism overlooks, such as systems of governance and thought. It argues that Russia's peculiar system of governance – here referred to as Putin's neo-patrimonial regime – exercised a formative influence on the foreign policy views of Russian decisionmakers and their decision to invade Ukraine. The article then refines the notion of surprise, showing surprises were unevenly distributed in the international system. It discusses how Russia was taken aback by Ukraine's resistance and by its own military failures. And it argues that the leading powers of the EU were shocked by the Russian invasion, whereas the Atlantic powers were not. In fact, the Biden administration had long warned its NATO allies about the likelihood of invasion. Why were these warnings not heeded by countries like Germany and France? The article concludes with some speculation on the strengths of US intelligence and on the sources of intelligence failure in Germany and France.