Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the concept of banal nationalism as often unconscious,
routine processes that nations reproduce on a daily basis. Banal nationalism is
recognisable in the use of national symbols but also in language and culture. The
purpose of this paper is to determine whether Slovenian folk-pop music is one of
these processes, and in which ways and strategies we can detect its reproductive
role in banal nationalism that on a daily basis reminds its listeners of their national
identities. Methodologically, the article is based on the content and a textual
analysis of compositions by three of the most often listened to folk-pop ensembles,
demonstrating that the national narrative can be identified in a smaller proportion
of all analysed compositions in three sections: the idea of nation as an imaginary
community or home(land), national (auto)stereotypes, and patriotic feelings.

The narrative hero Peter Klepec is known (and laid claim to) by the inhabitants of the Čabranka-Osilnica valley, the border area on the Croatian and Slovenian side of the border. There circulate a number of quite similar stories about him, in which a frail illegitimate child Peter becomes a strong man, whose supernatural powers help the needy and drive the enemies from these regions. This paper shows the changing role and diversity of interpretations of myth in time and space using the example of folk and literary hero Peter Klepec. It focuses on the historical changes in the perception of Peter Klepec: namely, on his (local) function at the time of the Hapsburg imperial policy, the process of his nationalisation and dilemmas that arose following the division of the Čabranka-Osilnica area, i.e., the originating area of the creation of the legend of the two countries (Croatia and Slovenia). It shows that Klepec was due to different historical circumstances and (interpretive) discourse used for different purposes. First, he served as a symbol of strength and survival in the Čabranka-Osilnica valley, and then as the Hapsburg myth that justified the existence of the monarchy facing the hostile Ottomans, and lastly as an allegory of a servile Slovene, who is always just a faithful bondsman to other masters (first under the Austro-Hungarians and then the European Union). ; Pripovednega junaka Petra Klepca poznajo (in si ga lastijo?) prebivalci Čabransko- osilniške doline, torej obmejnega območja na hrvaški in slovenski strani meje. O njem kroži več med seboj precej podobnih zgodb, v katerih šibek nezakonski otrok Peter postane silak, ki s svojo nadnaravno močjo pomaga pomoči potrebnim in iz krajev odganja sovražnike. Prispevek na primeru ljudskega in literarnega junaka Petra Klepca prikaže spreminjajočo se vlogo in različnost interpretacij mita v času in prostoru. Osredotoča se na zgodovinske spremembe v dojemanju Petra Klepca: na njegovo (lokalno) funkcijo v času imperialne politike Habsburžanov, na proces njegove nacionalizacije in dileme, ki so se pojavile ob delitvi Čabransko-osilniškega območja t.j. izvirnega območja nastanka legend med dve državi (Slovenijo in Hrvaško). Pokaže, da se je zaradi različnih zgodovinskih okoliščin in (interpretativnih) diskurzov Klepca uporabljalo v različne namene. Najprej je služil kot simbol moči in preživetja v Čabransko-osilniški dolini, nato kot habsburški mit, ki je opravičeval obstoj monarhije nasproti osmanskemu sovražniku in slednjič kot prispodoba hlapčevskega Slovenca, ki je vedno le vdan podložnik drugim gospodarjem (najprej Avstro-ogrski, nato Evropski uniji).

This paper analyzes the issue of nations without states in contemporary Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. The political map of the continent comprises forty-seven countries, most of which are nation-states. However, the cultural mosaic of Europe is far more complex; there are around fifty ethnic groups (in addition to historical, territorial, or indigenous ethnic minorities and an enormous number of immigrant ethnic communities) lacking a state-based organization. Together, these people add up to 78 million, or almost 15% of the European population. Twenty-seven groups can be considered nations without states; they are culturally and ethnically based and have various forms of territorial integrity and political organization. However, they did not create a state organization, despite many attempts by some through history. Without a state organization, those communities have poorer opportunities to protect their folk culture and to reproduce various elements of ethnic identity. This is why they seek territorial autonomy or independent statehood through nationalist movements. In many cases, these ambitions are encompassed in regional movements. These movements have been popular in Europe, particularly because the idea of a "Europe of regions" as part of the European Union has had broad political support and acceptance. However, it has not actually succeeded. The EU and Europe as a whole are still a Europe of (nation)-states. In general, regional movements have been successful and through this some nations without states have attained part of their political ambitions in the form of territorial autonomy. The regionalization of former centralist states (e.g., Spain and the United Kingdom) increased the chances of ethnic survival for the Catalans, Basques, Scots, and Welsh. On the other hand, the regionalization of nations without states represented territorial division, a kind of "divide and rule" strategy serving to reduce their ambitions towards national independence. The territorial and political reconstruction of nation-states has been successful, but it did not solve all ethnic problems. The European political map reveals another interesting phenomenon: a double state for some nations. These are particularly typical for the Balkans. Because of political and territorial development after the Second World War and during the transition period in the 1990s and beyond, the principle of immutable political borders (logically encompassing the creation of new nation-states as well) led to further political and territorial divisions and (in fact, paradoxically) fragmentation. Some of these "inner" autonomous territories are functioning as de facto states. The cases of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina are good examples of these processes. This development has not garnered much political support in most European countries or at the EU level. However, it is an undesirable reality and is certainly one of changes among the political and territorial (or even greater) challenges for the Europe of tomorrow. It forces a reexamination of the phenomenon and value of nations. The existence of nations without states represents a potential for the creation of new (nation) states.

Die Umbrüche des 20. Jahrhunderts hinterlassen tiefe Spuren in und zwischen den Ländern des Alpen-Adria-Raumes. Alte und neue Nationalismen führen vielerorts zu Auseinandersetzungen in Volksgruppenfragen – zwischen Kärnten und Slowenien zuletzt sichtbar in jahrzehntelangen Konflikten um zweisprachige Ortstafeln und andere Minderheitenrechte.Das Buch beleuchtet Einstellungen von Jugendlichen beider Länder zu Geschichte(n) der Region, Zwei- und Mehrsprachigkeit, Nationalismus und kultureller Vielfalt, neuen und alten Minderheiten, Nachbarländern und Europa. Aufbauend auf den Ergebnissen eines grenzübergreifenden Forschungsprojektes widmen sich Beiträge der Geschichte Kärntens und Sloweniens, ihren Narrativen und deren Folgen für Lebenswirklichkeiten. Berücksichtigung erfährt die Bedeutung von Minderheiten- und Nachbarsprachen in Grenzräumen und daraus erwachsende Implikationen für "moderne" Konzeptionen von Minderheitenschutz.Mit Beiträgen von:Danijel Grafenauer, Joseph Marko, Ludmila Novak Lukanovic, Rainer Pichler, Jürgen Pirker, Stefanie Vavti, Daniel Wutti

The monograph deals with identities in Slovenia at the time of current breaks and turbulences. The first part of the monograph addresses the majority identities; first, European identity at the time of the rise of nationalism, and then Slovenian national identity in the context of the economic crisis and new populist policies in Europe and beyond. In the second part, the authors deal with minority identities - from religious and ethnic to sexual - that place them in the time span from Slovenia's accession to the EU until the time of the economic crisis, the rise of populism and neoconservative policies. In the third section, minority identities are placed in the context of culture, which is one of the important elements of identity construction and preservation.--Publisher's website

Namen dela je predvsem proučiti oblikovanje, delovanje, vlogo in pomen Demosa kot instrumenta in akterja nacionalne emancipacije in demokratične tranzicije na Slovenskem. Pred osrednjim delom analize so opredeljeni ključni pojmi in koncepti: definicija nacionalizma ter glavni teoretični pristopi k nacionalizmu, opredelitev demokracije in demokratizacije. Za celovito razumevanje vloge in pomena posameznih političnih akterjev, kakršen je bil konec osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih Demos, je potrebno dobro poznati zgodovinske okoliščine. Najprej sem v poglavju o zgodovinskih mejnikih oblikovanja slovenske nacionalne identitete poskušala dokazati, da pomembni procesi v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih niso vznikli sami od sebe, ampak imajo dolgo zgodovinsko podlago. V nadaljevanju obravnavam širjenje političnega prostora, obdobje liberalizacije in razcveta civilne družbe ter ključne procese in dogodke na poti v pluralno družbo. Procesi liberalizacije so soustvarjali tudi politično okolje, v katerem je začela nastajati politična opozicija. Konec osemdesetih let, tik pred nastankom Demosa, sta se izoblikovala dva konsistentna in nekompatibilna narodno-politična programa, ki sta simbolizirala politično polarizacijo. Nove, alternativne 'zveze' so se začele povezovati v pričakovanju demokratičnih volitev in soočenja s skupino družbenopolitičnih organizacij z Zvezo komunistov na čelu. Osrednji del disertacije predstavlja obravnava Demosa, akterja demokratizacije. Znotraj tega obdobja namenjam posebno pozornost najvidnejši osebnosti združene demokratične opozicije Jožetu Pučniku, analiziram predvolilne programe, rezultate volitev, ter oblikovanje novih oblastnih organov. V tem kontekstu analiziram tudi njihovo sodelovanje s Predsedstvom republike Slovenije. V nadaljevanju orišem vlogo Demosa v osamosvojitvenih procesih. Demos je v svojih glavnih namerah uspel, kljub temu, da ga niso ustrezno podpirali mediji, ni imel ustrezne zaslombe v gospodarstvu, pa tudi ne v državni upravi in, razen slovenske vojske in do neke mere policije, v represivnih organih oblasti. Kljub temu je uresničil glavne cilje, za uspešno izpeljano tranzicijo oziroma bolj popolno in konsolidirano demokratizacijo pa mu je zmanjkalo tako časa kot politične moči. Proces uvedbe demokracije, kot drugi od Demosovih ciljev, je bil uresničen v institucionalnem smislu, z vzpostavitvijo temeljnih demokratičnih struktur. Istočasno pa je bil Demos ključni dejavnik ne le pri oblikovanju splošnega soglasja o nujnosti osamosvojitve slovenskega naroda, ki se izraža v visokem rezultatu slovenskega plebiscita 23. decembra 1990, ampak je bil tudi glavni akter in instrument nacionalne osamosvojitve, obrambe slovenske samostojnosti v vojni za Slovenijo ter mednarodnega priznanja. ; The purpose of the thesis is primarily to examine the creation, operations, role and importance of Demos – Democratic Opposition of Slovenia as an instrument and actor of national emancipation and democratic transition in Slovenia. Prior to the central part of the analysis key terms and concepts are identified: definition of nationalism and the main theoretical approaches to nationalism, definition of democracy and democratization. For comprehensive understanding of the role and importance of individual political actors, like Demos was in the late eighties and early nineties, we should also be familiar with historical circumstances. At first I tried to stress that the main events and processes in the eighties and nineties had not emerged by themselves but were results of long historical development. Next I discuss broadening of political space, a period of liberalization and flourishing of civil society and also key processes and events on the way to a pluralistic society. The liberalization processes co-created also the political environment, in which the political opposition started to take shape. At the end of the eighties, just before the establishment of Demos, two consistent and incompatible national-political programmes were formed which symbolized the political polarization. New, alternative 'unions' began to link pending democratic elections and confrontations with a group of the so-called socio-political organizations with the Communists Party at the head. The central part of the thesis is the analysis of Demos, the actor of democratization. Within this period I pay particular attention to Jože Pučnik, the most prominent personality of the united democratic opposition, I analyse election programs, results of elections and the creation of new public authorities. In this context, I analyse also their cooperation with the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia and outline the role of Demos in the independence processes. Demos succeeded in its main intentions, despite the fact that it had not adequate support of the media, no support of the economy nor in the public service and, with the exception of the Slovenian Army and to some extent police forces, the repressive authorities. Despite all these Demos accomplished its main objectives, however, for a successful transition or a more complete and consolidated democratization it ran out of time and political power. The process of introducing democracy was realized in a formal sense, with the establishment of basic democratic structures. At the same time Demos was a key factor in the creation of the general consensus on the necessity of the Slovenian independency which is shown in the high score of the plebiscite on 23rd Dec 1990. Demos was also the key actor and an instrument of the national independence process, the defence of the Slovenian territory in the war for Slovenia as well as in the process of the international recognition of the new Slovenian sovereign state.

This article provides an overview of censorship and book bans in Austria between 1751 and 1848. It is based on the catalogues and lists of banned manuscripts and books and the available censorship regulations and censors' protocols; moreover, the most important persons involved in censorship such as Gerard van Swieten, Count Sedlnitzky, and Metternich are introduced, and their impact on the book trade is shown. From an instrument encouraging Enlightenment and defending morality during the reign of Maria Teresa and Joseph II, censorship became a major factor of political repression after the French Revolution. The focus moved from the protection of Catholicism against Protestant "heresy" and superstition to the defense of monarchy against liberalism and nationalism. The aim of enlightening the citizens and promoting their happiness pursued during the second half of the eighteenth century was replaced by the will to maintain the "peace" of the state and suppress any ideas that confounded its interests. ; Razprava preučuje cenzuro in prepovedi knjig v Avstriji med letoma 1751 in 1848. Temelji na katalogih in seznamih prepovedanih rokopisov in knjig ter razpoložljivih predpisih o cenzuri in cenzorskih protokolih; poleg tega so predstavljene najpomembnejše osebe, vpletene v cenzuro, kot so Gerard van Swieten, grof Sedlnitzky in Metternich, in prikazan njihov vpliv na knjižni trg. Od instrumenta, ki je spodbujal razsvetljenske ideje in branil moralo, kar je bilo značilno za vladavino Marije Terezije in Jožefa II., je cenzura po francoski revoluciji postala glavni dejavnik politične represije. Težišče se je premaknilo z zaščite katolištva pred protestantsko herezijo« in vraževerjem k obrambi monarhije pred liberalizmom in nacionalizmom. Cilj razsvetljenja državljanov in spodbujanje njihove sreče, ki ga je zasledovala cenzura v drugi polovici 18. stoletja, sta nadomestila volja po ohranjanju »miru« države in za-tiranje vseh idej, ki so bile v navzkrižju z njenimi interesi.

Erasmus+ je program Evropske Unije (EU) na področju izobraževanja, usposabljanja, mladine in športa, ki omogoča mednarodno učno mobilnost. Tako Evropska komisija kot akademski strokovnjaki velikokrat navajajo Erasmus+ za uspešen primer evropske integracije in kot spodbujevalec evropske identitete. To magistrsko delo s pomočjo interpretativne paradigme poskuša osvetliti presečišče med teorijo evropskih integracij, vrednotenjem programa Erasmus+ in osmišljanjem evropske identitete. Analiza EU dokumentov je pokazala, da termin evropska identiteta izrazito nekonsistentno uporabljen znotraj upravljavskih organov EU. Poleg tega se je pomen evropske identitete, kakor jo je navzven predstavljala Skupnost, od sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja naprej izrazito spreminjal. Prvotni zunanje-politični pomen je zamenjalo vrednotenje evropske identitete v odnosu do nacionalne države. Raziskave na področju vplivov programa Erasmus+ (oziroma mednarodne mobilnosti) na izgradnjo evropske identitete sicer prinašajo zelo različne rezultate, skoraj vse pa pesti problem metodološkega nacionalizma. Učinki programa Erasmus+ so sicer pozitivni, vendar težko ovrednoteni, saj so se od začetkov programa leta 1987 do danes drastično spreminjali. Opazna je neoliberalna logika prostega pretoka delovne sile v smislu spodbujanja mednarodne mobilnosti in posledično izgrajevanja konkurenčnega trga delovne sile na katerem štejejo kompetence posameznika/ posameznice. ; Erasmus+ is the European Union's (the EU) programme in the fields of education, training, youth and sport, which enables international learning mobility. Both the European Commission and academic experts often cite Erasmus+ as a successful example of European integration and as a facilitator of a European identity. This thesis seeks to illuminate the intersection between the theory of European integration, the evaluation of the Erasmus + programme and European identity. This is done with interpretive paradigm. An analysis of the EU' documents has shown that the term European identity is used in a highly inconsistent way within the EU's bodies. In addition, the meaning of European identity, as initially represented by the Community, has changed markedly since the 1970s. The original meaning reflected the foreign policy aspirations of the Community ; later this was replaced with the emphasis of European identity in relation to the nation-state. Research in the field of measuring the impact of the Erasmus+ programme (or international mobility) on the construction of the European identity brings a variety of results. The common problem of such research is the one of methodological nationalism. The effects of the Erasmus+ programme are positive, but difficult to evaluate, as they have changed drastically since the beginning of the programme in 1987. The neoliberal logic behind the free movement of labour is noticeable, especially in the light of boosting international mobility to create a competitive labour market, where one's competencies are all that matters.

V pričujoči raziskavi smo preučili strukturo, dejavnike in posledice politične kulture in državljanske participacije v postjugoslovanskih družbah. Uporabljenih je bilo več virov kvantitativnih podatkov, med drugim raziskava 2.178 študentov družboslovja v osmih postjugoslovanskih entitetah (M starost = 19,8 leta, SD = 1,89) ; reprezentativni vzorci Evropske raziskave vrednot (2008) ; pretekli valovi Svetovne raziskave vrednot (1995/8) in podatki raziskave jugoslovanske mladine (Jupio, 1986). Analiza na agregatni ravni je pokazala, da so v socioekonomsko manj razvitih okoljih (Kosovo, BiH in NJR Makedonija) v večji meri prisotni elementi podložniške politične kulture (Almond in Verba, 1963), v okviru katere so se kot ključni elementi na individualni ravni izkazali avtoritarnost, splošni tradicionalizem, tradicionalni pogled na spolne vloge in nacionalizem. Medentitetne razlike na merah ekonomske kulture (ekonomski egalitarizem in državni paternalizem) so povečini majhne in statistično neznačilne, saj vse entitete na obeh indikatorjih dosegajo visoke povprečne vrednosti. V skladu s predvidevanji dopolnjene modernizacijske teorije je demokratična politična kultura bolj koherentna v socioekonomsko bolj razvitih postjugoslovanskih državah, v nasprotju s teorijo pa manj razvite države dosegajo višje povprečne ravni državljanske participacije. Starost in socioekonomski status sta se izkazala za najmočnejša sociodemografska dejavnika politične kulture in državljanske participacije. Višje stopnje učinkovite demokracije (Inglehart in Welzel, 2007) dosegajo socioekonomsko bolj razvite države, ki izkazujejo tudi najvišje stopnje demokratične politične kulture. Longitudinalna analiza ni pokazala enotne smeri političnokulturnih sprememb ; slednje so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih bile v smeri večanja tako demokratičnih kot tudi nekaterih podložniških orientacij (npr. avtoritarnosti). Avtorji sklenejo, da proces demokratične konsolidacije, tako političnokulturne kot tudi institucionalne, v večini postjugoslovanskih družb še ni končan. Na koncu so predstavljene implikacije raziskave. ; The present study examined structures, determinants and consequences of political culture and citizen participation in post-Yugoslav societies. Several empirical data sources were employed, among others a survey of 2,178 social science students in eight post-Yugoslav entities (M age = 19.8 years, SD = 1.89) ; representative samples from European Values Study (2008), earlier waves of World Values Survey (1995/8) and a study of Yugoslav youth Jupio carried out in 1985. The aggregate level results indicated that socio-economically less developed entities (Kosovo, BiH, and FYR Macedonia) scored higher on subject political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), which was at the individual level found to be characterized by its four core components: authoritarianism, general traditionalism, traditional gender roles attitudes, and nationalism. Between-country differences on measures of economic cultural orientations (economic egalitarianism and state paternalism) were largely minor or insignificant, since all entities scored high on both measures. As predicted by revised modernization theory democratic political culture was found to be more coherent in socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries. Inconsistent with modernization approach results demonstrated higher levels of citizen participation in less well-off countries. Age and socioeconomic status proved to be the most potent sociodemographic predictors of political culture and citizen participation. Finally, democracy was found to be more effective (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) in socioeconomically more developed countries, which also scored highest on measures of democratic political culture. Longitudinal analysis did not uniformly confirm substantive political culture changes with changes in the last two decades taking place in both democratic as well as authoritarian direction. Authors conclude that the process of democratic consolidation, both political-cultural as well as institutional, is far from over in the majority of post-Yugoslav entities. Implications of the results are discussed.