Suchergebnisse

The continuity with the former federal & republic nationality in the successor states of former SFRY confirms that it has kept on being regulated by their internal laws. However, not in all cases regulations of citizenship have been implemented in accordance with the provisions that are defined by international law. The basic nationality principles have not been applied to the citizens of different ethnic origin. For their own political interests the states did not take measures to duly grant citizenship to the persons that at the time of succession were nationals of the predecessor state. The delay in passing & implementing the laws, non-respect of the right of option, the exclusiveness of domestic citizenship & the absence of solutions for the protection of family unity had a negative reflection on the achievement of rights of citizens. The problems have gradually been overcome by introducing novelties in laws, by adopting administrative legislation & jurisprudence of the successor states, but as far as equality before the law is concerned some issues have remained unsolved. References. Adapted from the source document.

The revival of the nation has shocked German intellectuals who think that the nation-state is historically obsolete & that new models should be upheld: the united Europe, a world community of responsible states, globalization of markets, a universe of human rights. The contrary tendencies in today's world are marked by giving up on huge political entities, which have been replaced by smaller nationality-based states. It seems that political freedom leads to the formation of nation-states based on democratic constitution. This process requires looking into the relation between the nation-state & democracy. The key for the explanation of their relationship can be found in the notion of nation. Citizenship mediates between the people (in its real manifestation as a social group), & democracy as a constitutional principle. It gives to the state as a personal entity legal structure on which to build a democratic form of the state & guarantees legally applicable taxonomies & limitations. Adapted from the source document.

Recent historical developments in the relationship between Croats & Serbs are discussed, referring to an article by V. Vujacic (Theory & Society, No. 6, 1996). The idea of an Illyrian & later a Yugoslav commonwealth of all South Slavs, originating in Croatia in the 19th century, had its legitimating psychological foundation in a "illusion of centrality," developed at the time by a part of the Croatian political & intellectual elite, a view of the preeminent position of Croatia & the Croats among all the Slav ethnic groups in the region &, therefore, of a natural central role of Croatia in the future commonwealth. In a similar way, the armed struggle of the Serbs for independence from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century & for the expansion of the Serbian State in the 19th & 20th century has generated a Serbian belief in the dominant role of Serbia & the Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, & Slovenes established in 1918, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These incompatible illusions are believed to be the roots of a number of political positions & decisions taken by both Croats & Serbs in the 20th century. The views of Max Weber on nationality & nationalism are discussed in relation to the problem of cooperation & conflict between Croats & Serbs in the 20th century. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article attempts to show the beginnings of Croatian political science. The author considers the 16th-century practical philosophy & political work of Croatian political historians Ivan Polikarp Severitan, Franjo Petric, & Nikola Vitov Gucetic. In spite of the fact that Croatian political philosophy is considerably more diverse in this century, these authors were chosen because their work is representative of the whole, & is quite significant in the development of political science. All wrote about politics & discussed political themes -- especially the creation & function of the political community, government, & authority -- within the parameters long since established by Aristotle. Except for their nationality & ties to the region, the three authors were concerned with actual problems of their era, & were included in political discussions, ie, the identification of sovereignty & postulates upon which political communities are formed. They reaffirmed Greek principles of creation of the state on the basis of unity of ethics, policy, & other attributes. Through these authors, active in different times of the 16th century, we can see a progression in political philosophy -- from a close tie to scholastics to politics as a practical art that adapts to opportunities & conditions. Adapted from the source document.

Using the example of Vojvodina, the author looks into the connection between the "socialist ideology" & the anti-Western orientation. The survey, conducted in Subotica, focuses on the influence of ethnic origin, education, migratory history, & the participation of a respondent's family in the Partisan resistance movement on the latent configuration of certain political orientations (subdimension of "socialist ideology") & the anti-Western orientation. The author claims there are four relatively independent latent dimensions of "socialist ideology": (1) Yugo-nostalgia, (2) Collectivist/statist orientation, (3) Militarist/statist orientation, & (4) Egalitarianism. The study has shown that, basically, the anti-Western orientation is one of the components of the socialist ideological pattern. The "militarist anti-Western orientation" is demonstrated by the Serbs who moved to Subotica between WWI & the recent war on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia. Apart from these Serbs -- & unlike the other ethnic groups -- this "militarist anti-Western orientation" is also noticeable in a fraction of Croats from Backa (Bunjevci) who have stated as their nationality "only" -- Bunjevci (Backa Croats). Besides, the study has shown that lower social classes harbor a kind of "socialist anti-Western orientation." The anti-Western orientation, which the author labels as the "Yugo-nostalgic anti-Western orientation," is held by those respondents whose relatives were involved in the Partisan movement. 15 Tables, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

In a sample of 347 elementary school subject teachers from Slovenia (N = 176) and Croatia (N = 171), the authors investigated teachers' orientations to work (as a job, a career, and a calling) and their well-being with respect to different stages of teachers' professional development. Results have shown the presence of a calling orientation to work and its positive relationship to job satisfaction and life satisfaction. Although significant differences between Slovenian and Croatian teachers were not expected due to shared historical, cultural and political background, some interesting differences were observed. The results of MANOVA showed that teachers differed significantly in their work orientations regarding nationality and the length of their working experience. Results were discussed in the context of stages of professional development and the social status of teachers in both countries. ; Na uzorku od 347 nastavnika predmetne nastave iz Slovenije (N = 176) i Hrvatske (N = 171) autori su ispitivali odnos orijentacije nastavnika prema radu (kao posao, karijera i poziv) i njihove dobrobiti u različitim fazama profesionalnog razvoja. Prema dobivenim rezultatima izdvaja se orijentacija prema radu kao pozivu, koja je u pozitivnoj vezi s većim zadovoljstvom poslom i zadovoljstvom životom. Iako se, zbog zajedničke povijesne, kulturne i političke pozadine, nisu očekivale značajne razlike između slovenskih i hrvatskih nastavnika, ipak su uočene neke zanimljive razlike. Rezultati MANOVE pokazali su da su se nastavnici značajno razlikovali u svojim orijentacijama prema radu, ovisno o državljanstvu i duljini radnog iskustva. O rezultatima se raspravlja u kontekstu razumijevanja faza profesionalnog razvoja i socijalnog statusa nastavnika u obje zemlje.

Autori u ovom radu donose informacije o organiziranim prisilnim iseljavanjima Slovenaca s područja Štajerske i Dolenjske, na područje NDH, Njemačke i Srbije, na temelju sjećanja kazivača, članova sekcije izgnanaca Slovenskog doma u Zagrebu. Na temelju objavljene literature i polustrukturiranih dubinskih intervjua, autori donose podatke o prisilnom iseljavanju, odvođenju u logore i životu u progonstvu te povratku kućama. ; Based on the testimonies of individuals from the Zagreb Section of the Society of Slovenian Exiles, the authors record various data on the forced exile from Slovenia in 1941. Following the short military conflict in April 1941, Slovenia was divided between Hungary, Germany and Italy. The Germans had a plan wherein they would forcibly deport the local Slovenian population from Styria (and in part Lower Carniola), then resettle migrants of German nationality (primarily from Gottschee) into their homes. The storytellers, most of whom were at the time children, recount their preparations for this forced exile, leaving their homes, and being brought to the labour camp Brestanica/Rajhenburg (ger. Reichenburg) and to Maribor, after which they were deported to Germany, the Independent State of Croatia or Serbia. Life in camps in Germany was very hard for most storytellers, and only few of them were lucky enough to be placed in German homes as help. In German camps, the Slovenians underwent heavy Germanisation, which is recounted by most of the witnesses, who were children at the time. After being forcibly moved to the Independent State of Croatia and its camp in Slavonska Požega, the Slovenians were then reallocated to the estates of Serbs who were previously forcibly deported to Serbia. Research shows that the position of the izgnanci in Croatia was worse than that of the izgnanci in Germany, as they were, for the most part, left to their own devices in Croatia. After the end of the war, most of the exiled Slovenians returned to their original homes. Upon return, they largely found ruined and abandoned houses, and were forced to start their lives over with nothing. Today, there are almost no living izgnanci who were older than 15 at the time of the exile and deportation. Therefore, the statements given by the witnesses in 2019 and 2020 were mostly given by persons who were no older than 8 at the moment of the exile. Collecting their memories is a challenge and it is high time to record their statements about these events from those witnesses who are still alive.

Srpska demokratska stranka (akr. SDS) bila je radikalna, etnonacionalistička stranka srpskoga puka koja je osnovana 17. veljače 1990. na platou ispred Željezničkoga kolodvora u Kninu, a 6. ožujka 1990. upisana je u Registar društvenih organizacija SR Hrvatske. Osnivačkoj skupštini nazočilo je sedam tisuća građana srpske nacionalnosti koji su aklamacijom podržali pročitani programski dokument. SDS osnovao je akademik Jovan Rašković, šibenski psihijatar, pod "dirigentskom palicom" srbijanske Službe državne bezbednosti (akr. SDB), na čijem se čelu u to vrijeme nalazio haški optuženik Jovica Stanišić, vjerni Miloševićev sljedbenik. SDS je imao vodeću političku ulogu u ratnim događanjima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Njezini su članovi organizirali naoružavanje Srba, podržavali ubijanje, protjerivanje i druge ratne zločine protiv pripadnika nesrpskoga puka na području Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Općinski je odbor SDS-a za Općinu Podravska Slatina na čelu s Milunom Karadžićem na području Općine Podravska Slatina organizirao naoružavanje srpskoga puka, iskazao građanski neposluh i blokirao rad Općinske skupštine Podravska Slatina. Nakon SDS-ove blokade rada Izvršnoga vijeća Općinske skupštine Podravska Slatina reagirao je ministar pravosuđa i uprave Branko Babac. On je 24. srpnja 1991. donio Naredbu o poduzimanju posebnih mjera u općini Podravska Slatina kojom je raspuštena Skupština Općine Podravska Slatina, a istovremeno je imenovao povjerenika Vlade Republike Hrvatske. ; The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was a radical ethnic-nationalist Serbian party, founded on the platform in front of the railway station in Knin on February 17, 1990 and registered in the Register of Social Organizations of the Socialist Republic of Croatia on March 6, 1990. The Founding Assembly was attended by seven thousand citizens of Serbian nationality, who gave their support to the program document by acclamation. Academician Jovan Raskovic, a psychiatrist from Sibenik, founded SDS under control of the Serbian State Security Sevice ("SDB"), at that time led by the Hague indictee Jovica Stanisic, a faithful Milosevic follower. SDS had a leading political role in war events in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its members organized the arming of Serbs, supported killing, expelling and other war crimes against non-Serbs in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS Municipal Committee for the Municipality of Podravska Slatina headed by Milun Karadic organized the arming of Serbs in the area of the Municipality of Podravska Slatina, expressed civil disobedience and blocked the functioning of the Municipal Assembly of Podravska Slatina. After SDS had blocked the function of the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Podravska Slatina, a reaction came from the Justice and Administration Minister Branko Babac. On July 24, 1991 he issued the Order to take special measures in the Municipality of Podravska Slatina, whereupon the Assembly of the Municipality of Podravska Slatina was dissolved and a Commissioner of the Croatian Government was appointed at the same time.

Rad iznosi djelomične nalaze istraživanja hrvatskog narodnjaštva, tj. etnonacionalizma kao religije (u smislu ljudskog izmišljanja svetog).* Praktični su problemi sljedeći: narodnjaštvo kao religija, koja među ostalim uključuje to da narod ima mogućnost i/ili sposobnost da se razvije u nositelja države i da treba to i da postane; posljedice narodnjaštva, a to su nedostižnost narodne demokracije, narodne privrede i narodnog sazrijevanja; vjere u narod, i to prvenstveno Katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj kao uvjeta od 1961. do 1971. te prije i nakon toga, naročito nakon 1990. Teorijski su problemi, tj. neodgovarajuće znanstveno znanje o praktičnima, sljedeći: prvo, odluke Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske o etničkim i vjerskim zajednicama; drugo, sustavna historija prava i države Hrvatske i Jugoslavije 1945.-1990.; treće, preobrazba komunizma i katolicizma u narodnjaštvo; četvrto i peto, društvena struktura i predstavljanje/zastupanje. Da bi se postigla opća svrha istraživačkog projekta, a to je upotreba razuma u javnim poslovima, istraživanje je provedeno u teorijsko-metodologijskom okviru integralne teorije prava i države koji uključuje prilagođenu Lasswellovu i McDougalovu političku analizu proširenu historijskim institucionalizmom i kritičkom teorijom prava. Glavna je hipoteza da je vjera u narod kao nositelja države izražena i ustanovljena odredbama Ustava RH da je RH nastala samoodređenjem naroda i/ili da je nacionalna država jednog ili više naroda; da je narod suveren; da pravo na državljanstvo RH imaju pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda; da pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda imaju posebna politička prava itd. Dopunska je hipoteza da je puku RH ili, pravno određenije, da je stanovnicima RH s biračkim pravom u RH smanjena vlast, a time i moć u odlučivanju o članstvu RH u transnacionalnim organizacijama, naime NATO-u i EU, te su oni sami svedeni na pravno neprepoznatljiv sastojak time što se u RH ne zna tko čini bilo puk bilo ustav. ; The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjaštvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capacity to develop into, and ought to become, a substratum of the (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-1971, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. The theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include inter alia Croatian Constitutional law, esp. jurisprudence of the Croatian Constitutional Court, on powers of ethnicities and disabilities of the people. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological Framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The paper attempts to demonstrate that there is strong evidence to support the following two chiefly descriptive hypotheses, which are ideal types and as such cannot be supported by conclusive evidence. The main hypothesis is that the faith in a narod as a substratum of the state is expressed and established by the provisions of the Croatian Constitution stating that the Republic of Croatia was created by the self-determination of a narod and/or is a nation-state of a narod, or of two or several narodi; a narod is sovereign; adherents of a narod have the right to Croatian nationality; adherents of a narod have special political rights, etc. The auxiliary hypothesis is that the people (Croatian: puk) or, juridically more precise, inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia with the right to vote have lost a part of their power to decide on the membership of the Republic of Croatia in transnational organisations, namely, NATO and EU, and have been reduced to a legally unrecognizable entity by virtue of the fact that in the Republic of Croatia it is not known what makes either its people or its constitution.

"Kristalna noć" najčešće se povezuje s nacističkim uništavanjem židovske imovine 1938., ali u kontekstu rata u Hrvatskoj neki taj pojam koriste i za uništavanje srpske imovine u Zadru i njegovoj okolici 2. svibnja 1991. Dok se u većini hrvatske javnosti taj događaj ignorira, dio javnosti interpretira ga kao početak progona srpskoga stanovništva u organizaciji Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, zadarskih općinskih vlasti te hrvatske policije. Takav stav uglavnom je posljedica medijskih manipulacija i nema uporište u činjenicama. Premda se dio povjesničara u svojim znanstvenim radovima dotaknuo zbivanja u Zadru početkom svibnja 1991., zadarska "kristalna noć" uglavnom je ostala historiografski neistražena. Rad se temelji na neobjavljenim arhivskim izvorima Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, Jugoslavenske narodne armije, tisku i relevantnoj literaturi. ; On 2 May 1991, Serbian property in Zadar and its surrounding area came under attack. The attacks took place after months of tensions between Croats and Serbs, and later became known as the 'Night of Broken Glass'. These tensions were the direct consequence of the Serbian armed rebellion that erupted in northern Dalmatia, Lika, and the hinterland of Zadar in August 1991. The public security system that met the rebellion was created in January 1990, when the Secretariat of the Interior for the area of the Benkovac, Biograd na Moru, Obrovac, Pag, and Zadar municipalities was established in Zadar. In this area, Croats were an absolute majority in the Biograd na Moru and Zadar municipalities, and the Serbs in the Benkovac and Obrovac municipalities. The rebellion prompted divisions not only among the population, but also among the police. By January 1991, most policemen of Serbian nationality had left the Zadar police force and joined the rebels. Despite being weakened in terms of manpower, the Zadar police for the most part managed to successfully preserve public safety. The security situation worsened after a skirmish between Croatian police and rebel Serbs at the Plitvice Lakes on 31 March 1991. A significant increase in shootings, setting of bombs, road blockades, and other forms of criminal activity, mostly nationally motivated, was recorded. In addition to the rebel Serbs, the instability was caused by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which deployed its forces in Zadar's hinterland in early April 1991, causing alarm among the Croatian population. This deployment was part of a broader plan through which the YPA sought to set up a 'buffer zone' in order to close off the areas held by rebel Serbs and prevent the Croatian police from interfering. On 2 May 1991, the security situation throughout Croatia, and therefore in the area under the jurisdiction of the Zadar police, collapsed. Serb rebels killed 12 Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo near Vukovar, and severely wounded Zadar policeman Franko Lisica in Polača near Biograd na Moru; he soon died of his wounds. Despite the Croatian authorities' calls for peace, spontaneous unrest erupted throughout Croatia, and Serbian property and companies were attacked. Furthermore, there were incidents involving the YPA. The mood of the Croatian population in Zadar after the murder of the policeman Lisica was similar to that in other parts of Croatia. Despite the municipal authorities' calls for peace and their organising of a peaceful protest march, various uncoordinated groups demolished and plundered Serbian property on 2 May. The Zadar police failed to stop them because most of the policemen were engaged in the area affected by the Serb rebellion, while others were busy protecting the residential buildings in Zadar in which members of the YPA and their families resided. Soon, due to a feeling of insecurity, a mass exodus of Serbs from Zadar took place; these Serbs took refuge in the areas occupied by the rebels. Apart from the Zadar Serbs, Croats in the areas held by Serb rebels also began to leave their homes in early May 1991. On 1 May 1991, rebel Serbs drove many Croats from the areas around Knin. On the night of 6 to 7 May, as an act of revenge for the events in Zadar, the property of Croats, Albanians, and Croatian companies was attacked and plundered. Different sources give different data regarding the extent of the damage caused to Serbian property. Criminal charges raised by the Croatian police against unknown perpetrators on 2 May 1991 mention that 175 catering establishments, commercial premises, stands, kiosks, and automobiles were damaged. Apart from the property of Serbs, property belonging to Croats, Muslims, Roma, and Croatian companies was also damaged. There are numerous prejudices and controversies regarding the 'Night of Broken Glass', which mostly ignore the then security-political context. Certainly, there were those among the Croats who did not consider the attacks on Serbian property and their exodus from Zadar as anything controversial, but available sources clearly point towards the conclusion that the destruction of Serbian property was not organised and was not a part of the policy of the Croatian leadership.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.