Suchergebnisse

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per- spective immigrants, the political composition of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per- spective immigrants, the political composition of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, all are decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalization

Nothing is more important to the existence of a human community than the definition of its membership. Who is permitted to enter the community's territory and who is kept out? Who is entitled to the rights and benefits of membership and who is excluded? What are the differences in this respect between citizens and aliens? The answers to these questions are of vital importance in the making of nation-states since they shaped cultural as well as political character. For the United States, the country par excellence of immigration, these issues have been particularly salient. To be or to become an American has often been a matter of choice. Choice on the part of both the immigrant and the host society.