The article argues that economic measures of happiness are invalid and unreliable. The invalidity is implied by the subjective theory of value: happiness cannot be measured in the cardinal scales of measurement and it cannot be intersubjectively aggregated. The unreliability also follows from the subjective nature of happiness. The article concludes that the application of happiness economics to inform policy decisions should be seen as immoral. Adapted from the source document.
The article analyses the European studies in Lithuania since the reestablishment of independence in 1990. It discusses the main issues researched and their dynamics. First, what factors have been behind the changing subjects of European studies in Lithuania & how do they compare with the European studies in Western academia. Second, what have been the dominant subjects of European studies in Lithuania since 1990 & how do they relate to political developments between the EU and Lithuania as well as the nature of academic community in Lithuania. Third, taking into account the experience with European studies so far, to suggest possible future developments of this academic field in Lithuania, in such a way providing a map of potential subject of future research. Adapted from the source document.
Among the so-called post-industrial countries Japan is exceptional with regard to immigration policy. Despite the supply of foreigners who would like to live and work in Japan, as well as the demand for their labour, the government succeeds to maintain its restrictive policy and construct a discourse which conceals the nature of labour migration to Japan. Based on academic literature on migration to Japan, as well as on qualitative research in Tokyo, conducted during the two-month-long fieldwork, this paper argues that the patterns in which the official discourse and the legal framework conceals labour migration push foreigners to craft their identities accordingly, and engage in "performative" migration, which, in turn, is met with suspicion from the government. Adapted from the source document.
The paper disputes the thesis of Jokubaitis's article "Politics Without Values," that purely political understanding of things is impossible for there are no purely political values. Therefore no decision could be based on purely political values. Razma argues that values as well as politics are not things but phenomena, which together make up a system where the former make its elements & the latter constitute the process. For analytical purposes the system can be dissembled into component parts, but the conclusions of analysis must refer to the systematic nature of the relationship between the parts. The politics as an axiological process is impossible without values, & any value can only gain acknowledgement through the process of politics. Therefore, the politics is always axiological, & common values of any society are always political. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article is to identify & critically assess the key concepts, ideas & the epistemological principles of Thomas Hobbes, as a theorist of modern state who conceptually grasped the nature of the political. In light of the methodological concerns, the article attempts to provide an understanding of various conceptual connections in Hobbes' work Leviathan between the human passions, liberty, social contract, obligation, morality, & power. The paper also touches on the problem of the radical nominalism. Given the emphasis on the individual, Hobbes faces the dilemma between methodological individualism & methodological holism. Some of the corollaries of his political theory, including the organicistic metaphor of "society as mortal God," are inconsistent with the main body of Hobbes' theoretical thought. The article concludes by arguing that the controversial concepts of Hobbes' social theory force us to assess them in light of the different interpretative possibilities. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the issues of implementation & application of EU law can be defined as a complex processes aimed to ensure full respect of the requirements of EU legislation. Implementation often concerns various EU & national legal provisions, individual factual circumstances and, no doubt, differences in their interpretation. Consequently, infringements done by the Member States may take number of forms. To disclose present situation, find underpinning reasons & look for possible solutions for the improvement of the implementation of EU law, it is necessary to identify relevant infringements, establish common features & to proceed with evaluation. General analysis of infringement cases when Lithuania is accused, allegedly or correctly, for not fulfillment of its commitments related to the implementation of EU law is provided in the article. Experience of Lithuania is displayed in the context of ten new Member States of the EU and some comparison with the 'old' Member States is also provided occasionally. Analysis of the particular types of the infringements is focused to establish their nature & character as well as possible actions suitable to reduce their number. Adapted from the source document.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories -- all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political -- such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second -- drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination. Adapted from the source document.
In 2004 Lithuania implemented its two most important foreign policy goals -- became the member of the European Union & NATO. However, the country will now have to assert its status & position in the Euroatlantic community of liberal democracies. Lithuania faces an arguably more complex agenda, which has no clear end-goals or deadlines. The security challenges are difficult to identify & predict. The global & European strategic environment is best characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty: the transatlantic relations continue to be tense, Russia, paradoxically, is balancing between perspective of disintegration & re-emerging as an expansionist imperial power, & the European Union is under- going one of the most severe internal crisis in decades. At the same time, the major schools of international relations theory disagree on what to make out of the current world politics. Rationalist, neorealist authors tend to give alarmist, apocalyptic accounts of the future of the nation states if they despise the iron logic of geopolitics, whereas reflectivist, constructivist authors argue that the world is "what we make of it," & thus, can be changed. These two visions of international relations inevitably lead to different policy implications. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors address the current state of affairs in the two schools of international relations: rationalism (neorealism) & reflectivism (constructivism). In the second part, the authors interchangeably explore & compare the policy options that can be derived from the two different worldviews. The article concludes that international politics for a small state are more complex than either of the schools would suggest. Although the nature of the world politics is increasingly postmodern, a lot of actors still live in a modern world of geopolitics. Lithuanian decision makers will therefore have to "play" in accordance with postmodern rules when possible, but to remember geopolitics if necessary. Grounding their view on theoretical synthesis of constructivist & realist approaches to foreign policy, The authors asserts, that Lithuania's Euroatlantism should overshadow all other interests & problems of the society. The membership in the EU will have far reaching & long term consequences on Lithuanian society -- the same cannot be said about membership in NATO, or relations with the US. Lithuania must internalize the EU as a part of its corporate identity -- Lithuania is a part of Europe's collective identity. Therefore, Lithuanian political elite should cease to consider Europe as an object of Lithuanian foreign policy, rather it should become conscious itself as a subject of European policy contributing to its formation. Adapted from the source document.
Muslims have known & used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe & North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities.' Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity,' for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities -- during & after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian & Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it & indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power -- the fact that attests to its political nature. Da'wa as a truly missionary activity, albeit still within the Muslim Umma, appeared in the form of the Isma'ili da'wa of the 9th through 13th centuries. Isma'ilis, in many ways, can be seen as the pioneers of the organized Muslim missionary activities: their highly institutionalized & sophisticated da'wa structure has hardly been repeated until today. Moreover, for the Isma'ilis, da'wa was a state priority. The Isma'ili da'wa encompassed extra- & intra-ummaic forms & blended both theology & politics. The focal point of this article is the inter-relatedness of da'wa & politics on both theoretical & practical levels. On the one hand, the Quran nowhere directly implies da'wa to be a political activity. On the other hand, Muslims made it a part of their political theory (through relating da'wa to jihad) & life (using the concept of da'wa in their political agendas). Taken in general, the intertwining of da'wa & politics, then, has been a feature throughout the Muslim history, though practical implications of this have been different in different ages. [Abstract shortened by ProQuest.]. Adapted from the source document.
Anti-globalist riots in Seattle in 1999 & the global anti-war demonstrations in 2003 not only made their way to the news headlines, but also received renewed academic attention. This article seeks to outline the differences between the traditional social movements & the new social movements. The first part of the article addresses the definition & classification issues of social movements. It also presents a comparison of three theoretical approaches (rational choice, Marxism & social constructivism) towards the phenomenon of social movement. The author concludes, that advocates of all three approaches present certain valuable insights on the causes & effects of this phenomenon. The second chapter of the article outlines presents trends & problems in the research of the social movements. It is argued that researchers of this subject face basically the same problems as all social scientists, first of the problems of comparability & the limits of qualitative methods. On the other it is assessed that new tools of quantitative analysis, information technologies significantly enhance the possibilities of research. By combining different theoretical approaches the author then seeks to outline the criteria of what could be the constitutive elements of the new social movements as opposed to the traditional ones. It is concluded that the new social movements can only exist in the postmodern or post-materialist societies where the questions of physical survival or national liberation are replaced by the questions of quality of life & self-expression. The new movements are also transnational in nature & their goals are usually universal (ecology, peace, rights of animals) rather than national (independence) or individual (employment, salary etc.). The new movements mobilize around collective identity & common values while the traditional movements mobilize around common goals of social or economic changes. The organization mode of the new movements is usually horizontal & the role of the leaders is rather limited while in the case of traditional movements the organization structure is strictly hierarchical & the role of the leader is essential. Finally the new movements are less prone to violence & rely more on the new technologies of communication & information. Building on the criteria outlined in the second part of the article, the final chapter discusses the case of Lithuania. It is concluded that the number & activities of the new social movements in Lithuania are very scarce. The most significant among such movements is the feminist movement, which is indeed rather active, & even have established ties with international feminist network. Traditional movements (in particular farmers, nationalists & neo-nazists, are still abundant in Lithuania. The authors argues that such imbalance between traditional & new movements could be a cause for concern as the number & activity of the new social movements is a good indicator of the maturity of the civil society in a country. The conclusion of the article reiterates the importance to continue the research of the phenomenon of the social movements. The warning of Ortega Y Gaset voiced in 1932 about the danger of the masses that have the supreme power in their hands is still relevant. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
