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This article confronts two recent sets of thinking on slums and slum dwellers-the optimism that inadequate shelter can somehow be resolved in the near future and the opposing naysayer view warning of some kind of apocalypse. Neither line of thought is entirely wrong. Without the implementation of appropriate policies, the growth of festering slums continues to be an inevitable occurrence. The heart of this paper warns against over-generalization of the urban housing crisis: a phenomenon afflicting most journalists and increasingly academics too. To inject some objectivity into this pressing discussion, current lines of fashionable thinking about the proliferation of slums, access to land by the poor, infrastructure policies, social and residential segregation, privatization, property rights, and slumlords will be challenged and contested. The paper will also denounce the recent resuscitation of the word 'slum,' a pejorative term with all of its negative connotations, for the people who live in low-income areas. Adapted from the source document.

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Figures -- Tables -- Figures -- A. Introduction -- B. Recent Trends -- 1. Recent Trends in the Commodities Sector -- 1. Changes in Export Receipts -- 2. Export Destinations for Major Commodities -- C. Impact on Corporate Sector -- 2. Drivers of Revenues and Profits, 2008-13 -- 3. Exports, Revenues, and Profits by Sector -- 4. Debt Indicators for the Commodities Sectors -- D. Impact on Banking System -- 5. The Banking System and Commodities Sector -- E. Near- to Medium-Term Outlook for the Commodities Sector -- 6. Global Outlook -- The Impact of Major Commodities on the Corporate Sector and Banking System -- A. Introduction and Main Observations -- B. General Government Fiscal Position and Debt Sustainability -- 1. General Government Debt, 2008-2013 -- 1. Selected Emerging Market Economies: Public Debt Profile, 2014 -- 2. Contingent Liability Shock -- 3. Government Debt and Foreign Investors, 2009-14 -- 2. Central Government Operations, 2014-15 -- C. Nonfinancial State-Owned Enterprises -- 4. Assets of Nonfinancial SOEs, 2013 -- 5. Financial Indicators of Nonfinancial SOEs, 2009-13 -- D. Health and Pension Spending -- 6. Selected Emerging Market Economies: Public Health and Pension Spending, 2010-12 -- 7. Demographic Prospects and Public Health and Pension Spending, 2010-50 -- References -- Managing Fiscal Risks in Indonesia -- A. Introduction -- B. Characteristics of Banking System Liquidity in Indonesia -- 1. Banking System Liquid Assets and Concentration -- 2. Current and Saving Accounts, 2013 -- C. Recent Trends in Bank Liquidity Conditions -- 3. Loan Versus Deposit Growth -- 4. Contribution to Customer Deposit Growth -- 5. Selected ASEAN Countries: Loan-to-Deposit Ratios -- 6. Bank Indonesia's Liquidity Absorption by Instrument

A topical insider view of causes and consequences of financial crises since the Mexican collapse of 1995. The book includes a detailed exploration of recent and ongoing firestorms, including the near meltdown of the global financial system and the euro crisis, and suggests ways to save the international financial and monetary system

Millions have entered poverty as a result of the Great Recession's terrible toll of long-term unemployment. Kristin S. Seefeldt and John D. Graham examine recent trends in poverty and assess the performance of America's "safety net" programs. They consider likely scenarios for future developments and conclude that the well-being of low-income Americans, particularly the working poor, the near poor, and the new poor, is at substantial risk despite economic recovery.

Within the rarified world of technical intelligence, few have matched the extraordinary instincts of Arthur Lundahl, who, in 1961, founded and headed the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center -- and who, a year later, alerted Pres John F. Kennedy to his agency's images of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba, leading to the missile crisis. In late November 1984, the author had lunch with Lundahl at O'Donnell's, a bustling seafood restaurant near his home in Bethesda, MD; afterward, he asked him back to his place, where people could talk more privately. Nevertheless, Lundahl told him, he and a small group of associates were determined that a White Center be built. With it, imagery useful for everything from predicting humanitarian crises to directing rescue efforts during natural disasters could be sanitized and made available to the world. Thirty years later, long after the Cold War, Lundahl's White Center is once again worth considering. Adapted from the source document.

The proposals to develop the Western Economic Triangle (WET) region into the fourth growth pole in China are ambitious; realization will be problematic. Although the local governments are overwhelmingly optimistic regarding future development, it is very unlikely that this region can become as powerful and vibrant as the eastern growth engines in the near future. Implementation of the proposals faces at least two serious challenges. First, the WET region has historically suffered from poor accessibility due to backward interregional transportation facilities. Second, the WET region is governed by three different administrative municipalities. The inherent lack of regional integration and coordination will restrict industrial cooperation within this region. Adapted from the source document.

As with the rest of the world, Belarus has been affected by the global economic crisis. However, the main consequences for the country were less economic, but rather political in nature. Although closely connected with Russia, it was not the spill-over of the crisis, such as the reduction in its hitherto "miraculous" levels of economic growth to almost nothing in one year, that hit Belarus hard. Instead, it was Russia's deliberate politics of "pragmatization", directed at its "near abroad" to facilitate compliance of and interdependence with its neighbours, which dramatically altered Belarus's foreign policy landscape. The two principal corollaries of the global crisis for Belarus therefore included the new and irreversible search (successful or otherwise) for diversification away from Russia, and the reinvigorated sense of sovereignty with which Belarus now attempts to rebuild itself domestically and internationally. Adapted from the source document.

The financial crisis had significant implications for the fiscal positions of OECD. As nations seek to cope with the economic contraction, budget deficits and debt have risen to near record postwar levels. As the crisis in Europe and other advanced economies has deepened, fiscal consolidation will have to be coupled, and even preceded, by actions to jump-start crippled economies. Nonetheless, when fiscal consolidation becomes necessary, nations that procrastinate by waiting for a crisis to provide cover for the politically hard choices will pay a steep price indeed both economically and politically. Many in the academic and policy community have raised questions about whether advanced democracies have the political wherewithal to respond to gathering fiscal pressures through early and timely action. Recent fiscal actions in advanced nations suggest that democracies are not doomed to wait for market shocks and crises. Rather, leaders have shown that fiscal sacrifice can be achieved in ways that promote electability. In this article, we discuss the impetus for democratic fiscal actions and the strategies used to gain public support. Adapted from the source document.

For the first time since Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004, it will assume the Presidency of the EU Council on July 1. This tiny country, long described as the 'Switzerland of the Near East', is being increasingly hard hit by the economic crisis. But the island is not bereft of assets. For instance, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off its coast-worth at least 100 billion euros-would seem to justify the government's optimism in terms of cleaning up public finances. Interviewed by Jean Catsiapis, Ms. Kozakou-Marcoullis, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, reviews the main issues to be dealt with during her country's term at the head of the EU. Adapted from the source document.

International audience ; "I order the suspension of the parliamentary, administrative and supervisory functions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The Constitution. and legislation. will remain in force to the extent that they do not conflict with this Decree". Moscow, Kremlin, 21 September 1993, 8pm, Presidential Decree (Ukaz) n° 1400.Presented by some as a way out of the intractable conflict which had opposed the President and Parliament for months, denounced by others as a coup, Boris Yeltsin's decree provoked a crisis which would last fourteen days, during which political conflict turned into violent confrontation. From 21 September to 4 October 1993, Russia experienced a major political crisis. In response to Yeltsin's Ukaz, Members of Parliament supported by General Rutskoi, Russian Vice-President, met in extraordinary session, refused to comply with the presidential decision, occupied Parliament (the White House) and held out against the security forces. Protests were organised in the city: Yeltsin's supporters gathered near the Moscow Soviet (Mossovet), those supporting the deputies assembled near the White House. The political confrontation ended with the storming of Parliament by the army on 4 October, under the orders of the President, and the arrests of the rebel deputies and their supporters. The toll: more than 150 dead and 400 injured.Twenty years after October 1993, this Conference aims to propose a sociological analysis of this crucial but neglected political crisis. To this end, it seeks to question the official version of the event, which was principally the work of the victors, who imposed their vision of the confrontation and its consequences, in particular concerning the institutional outcomes. The Conference also restores the place of alternative accounts and memories. It analyses the diverse individual and collective trajectories of actors of the period. Focussing on the period prior to the conflict, its development and its consequences, the Conference explores both the winners and the losers of the conflict, its active participants and its observers. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the explosion of violence, its effects on the crisis and its outcome. ; « Je décrète la suspension des fonctions législatives, administratives et de contrôle du Congrès des députés du peuple et du Soviet suprême de la Fédération de Russie. (…) La Constitution (…) et la législation (…) restent en vigueur dans la mesure où elles ne contredisent pas le présent Décret ». Moscou, Kremlin, 21 septembre 1993, 20 heures, Ukaz du Président n° 1400.Présenté par les uns comme un moyen de sortir du conflit insoluble qui oppose le Président au Parlement depuis des mois, dénoncé par les autres comme un coup de force, ce décret de B. Eltsine ouvre la voie à une crise qui durera quatorze jours au cours desquels le conflit politique basculera dans l'affrontement violent. Du 21 septembre au 4 octobre 1993, la Russie connaît une crise politique majeure. En réponse à l'ukaz de B. Eltsine, les députés soutenus par le général Routskoï, Vice-président de la Russie, se réunissent en session extraordinaire, refusent de se soumettre à la décision présidentielle, s'enferment au Parlement (Maison Blanche) et tiennent le siège contre les forces de l'ordre. Des manifestations sont organisées dans la ville : les partisans d'Eltsine se réunissent près du Soviet de Moscou (Mossovet), ceux des députés près de la Maison Blanche. L'affrontement politique se conclut par le bombardement du Parlement par l'armée le 4 octobre sur ordre du Président et par l'arrestation des députés insoumis et de leurs partisans. Bilan : plus de 150 morts et 400 blessés.Vingt ans après octobre 1993, le colloque a pour objectif de proposer une sociologie de cette crise politique cruciale mais aujourd'hui négligée. Dans cette perspective, il vise à interroger le récit officiel de l'événement, œuvre avant tout des vainqueurs dont la vision de l'affrontement et de ses conséquences, notamment institutionnelles, s'est imposée. Le colloque souhaite redonner place à des récits et des souvenirs alternatifs. Il entend analyser dans leur diversité les trajectoires individuelles et collectives des acteurs de l'époque. Portant sur la période précédant le conflit, sur son déroulement puis sur ses conséquences, il s'intéresse tant aux vainqueurs qu'aux perdants du conflit, à ses participants engagés et à ses observateurs. Une attention particulière est accordée à la question du surgissement de la violence et de ses effets sur la crise et son dénouement. ; «… Постановляю прервать осуществление законодательной, распорядительной и контрольной функций Съездом народных депутатов Российской Федерации и Верховным Советом Российской Федерации. (…) Конституция (…), законодательство (…) продолжают действовать в части, не противоречащей настоящему Указу». Москва, Кремль, 21 сентября 1993 г., 20.00, Указ Президента, № 1400.Этот указ Бориса Ельцина, который одни представляют как единственный способ выйти из многомесячного неразрешимого конфликта между президентом и парламентом, а другие обличают как акт насилия, спровоцировал продлившийся 14 дней кризис, в ходе которого политическое противостояние переросло в вооруженный конфликт. С 21 сентября по 4 октября 1993 г. Россия пребывала в состоянии острейшего политического кризиса. В ответ на указ Ельцина депутаты, поддержанные вице-президентом России генералом Руцким, собрались на экстренное заседание, отказались подчиняться президентскому решению, забаррикадировались в Белом Доме и оказались в осаде. В городе начались демонстрации: сторонники Ельцина стали собираться у Моссовета, сторонники Парламента – у Белого Дома. Политическое противостояние закончилось 4 октября обстрелом Парламента силами армии, действовавшей по приказу президента, и арестом мятежных депутатов и их сторонников. Итоги: более 150 погибших и 400 раненых. Спустя двадцать лет после октября 1993 г. организаторы конференции предлагают провести социологический анализ этого важнейшего политического кризиса, о котором сегодня вспоминают так редко. Цель встречи – рассмотреть официальную версию событий, созданную победителями, которые смогли утвердить свое видение сути и последствий (прежде всего, в институциональной сфере) октябрьских событий. Поэтому на конференции прозвучали также и альтернативные воспоминания и интерпретации. Ее участники анализируют все разнообразие личных и коллективных траекторий политических акторов эпохи, рассматривают период, предшествовавший конфликту, сам его ход и последствия. В центре внимания стоят как победители, так и побежденные, как вовлеченные участники, так и наблюдатели. Особое внимание уделяется переходу к насилию и его влиянию на развертывание кризиса, а потом на его разрешение.

Recent years have seen near constant reports on the failures of governance and the crisis of democracy. The critical nexus between the ever-increasing array of crises that modern representative democracies face and the widening reliance on an array of undemocratic governance mechanisms and networks to meet and manage these crises needs urgent and in-depth scholarly attention. This book therefore seeks to investigate the ways in which representative democracy might better handle environmental, political, social and economic crises in the twenty-first century by making the mechanisms of governance more democratic. By examining cases such as the global financial crisis, the arab revolutions, Wikileaks and climate change, this volume highlights the tensions between governance and democracy during times of crisis and examines the prospects of democratising governance in the twenty-first century and beyond.

Given similar economic distress indicators, why do some states enter into International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs while others do not? Building on extant studies of IMF program participation that highlight the importance of various economic and political determinants, this article proposes an argument focusing on the political incentives of the IMF and a borrowing country when they engage in IMF program negotiations. Specifically, the study develops a domestic politics argument to highlight the interactions among sovereignty costs, competence costs, economic conditions and domestic regime types, and tests the argument using a cross-national time-series dataset of all IMF agreements between 1970 and 2006. It finds that when the economic crisis is mild, democracies are less likely than non-democracies to enter IMF programs, but that when the economic crisis is severe, democracies are more likely to do so than their autocratic counterparts. The article attributes this tendency to democratic leaders' electoral vulnerability and shows that these patterns become more pronounced as elections draw near. Adapted from the source document.