Suchergebnisse

[Resumen] El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar los factores que llevan a las personas a convertirse en emprendedores por necesidad. Partimos de la teoría de la lógica de la acción emprendedora, según la cual existen condicionantes individuales y contextuales que llevan a ciertas personas a convertirse en emprendedores por necesidad y a otras no. Los datos están tomados del Eurobarómetro. Aplicamos la técnica de las Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM) con Stata. El resultado es que existen diferencias significativas entre la población de la Unión Europea para convertirse en emprendedores por necesidad según factores individuales —espíritu emprendedor, imagen de los empresarios, propensión al riesgo, género, edad, formación, percepción de la situación económica del hogar— y contextuales —porcentaje del desempleo, sistema de relaciones laborales y desarrollo del país donde viven. ; [Abstract] The aim of this study is to analyse the factors that turn individuals into necessity-driven entrepreneurs. The starting point is a theory of the logic of entrepreneurial action, whereby given a number of individual conditioning and contextual factors, only certain people choose entrepreneurship out of necessity, while others do not. The data were taken from the Eurobarometer and the Generalised Structural Equation Modelling (GSEM) methods were employed using Stata. The results show significant differences among the European Union population in terms of necessity-driven entrepreneurship based on a number of individual factors, namely their entrepreneurial spirit, image of entrepreneurs, propensity for risk-taking, gender, age, entrepreneurship education, perception of a household's economic situation; and also, on contextual factors such as unemployment rate, industrial relations system and development levels of their country of residence.

A partir de la concepción performativa dellenguaje y de la retórica como ontologíade lo social, se indaga en el proceso dedemocratización de la comunicación quetuvo lugar en la Argentina (2007-2015)desde la dimensión discursiva de laspolíticas públicas. Dentro de los estudiossobre la democracia radical, en la quese ubican las experiencias nacionalpopulares latinoamericanas del siglo XXI,se profundiza un aspecto teórico sobrepopulismo: la tensión entre la lógica dela contingencia social y la lógica de lanecesidad histórica. ; Since the performative idea of languageand the rhetoric as the ontology ofsociety, it's investigated as an objectof study the process of democratizationof communication in Argentina (2007-2015) from the discursive dimensionof public communication policies. As adimension of radical democracy, in whichLatin American national popularexperiences of XXI century are placed,this paper aims at deepen a theoricalaspect about populism: the tensionbetween the social possibility logic andthe historical necessity logic.

The article analyses the situation derived from the "shooting down airplanes" but which can be extended to other similar cases, which generically could be conceptualize as community of danger. These cases are characterized by the concurrence of a risk to two (or more) legal assets, but both of them cannot be saved and both of them would be affected if nothing were done. The solution given by the majoritarian literature to this issue is insufficient, both from a dogmatic and a political-criminal point of view, creating an uncertainty that is revealed in the different views that political power and jurisprudence/caselaw have on the issue. In summary, this paper aims to overcome this state of uncertainty by providing a solution based on material, non-consequentialist criteria that respect the guarantees of the rule of law. ; En el artículo se analiza la situación derivada de los casos conocidos como "derribo de aviones", pero que puede ser extendida a otros casos semejantes que genéricamente podríamos conceptualizar como de comunidad de peligro, y cuya característica viene dada por la concurrencia de un peligro para dos o más bienes jurídicos que no pueden ser salvados conjuntamente y que si nada se hiciese, todos ellos se verían afectados. El tratamiento que la doctrina mayoritaria ha dado a la cuestión se muestra insuficiente, tanto desde un aspecto dogmático como político-criminal, generando una incertidumbre que se pone de manifiesto en las diferentes miradas que sobre la cuestión tienen el poder político y la jurisprudencia. Aquí se pretende superar ese estado de incertidumbre, aportando una solución con base en criterios materiales, no consecuencialistas, respetuosos de las garantías del Estado de derecho.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused unprecedented and enormous disruption to all spheres of human endeavours including the world education system. It is on record that nearly 1.6 billion learners in more than 190 countries and all conti­nents are seriously affected (United Nations, 2020). The lockdown and school closures preventive policy have affected 94 percent of the students' population globally and caused setbacks for up to 99 percent of students in developing countries (UN, 2020). Thus, the closure of schools has had substantial effects on education, and it will continue to have effects on other sectors apart from education. For instance, the closure of schools has hindered the provision of essen­tial services to households, societies, and the country at large. Children were denied access to quality food; many parents could not go to their workplace; girls and women were exposed to incessant domestic violence.To overcome the disruption of the educational system and ensure that learning continues despite the school closures suddenly becomes a top agendum of every govern­ment throughout the world, many of which turned to e-learning which necessitates teachers to move to online deliv­ery of lectures. The term e-learning stands for electronic learning system in which learning takes place through a computer interface. It is a technology-driven education system. It is the total incorporation of ICT into the learning environment. Before the COVID-19 pandemic and school closures, online learning is web-based e-learning most often used by distance education institutions and higher institutions. It is cheap, saves time, and has wider coverage, and as well promoting team learning and collaboration.Unfortunately, in developing countries, poor electricity supply and technology infrastructure deficit is the major bane to e-learning adoption. Consequently, the implementation of e-learning becomes moribund and ends up as a just pronouncement. Additionally, teachers were largely unpre­pared to support continuous learning through the electronic teaching methodologies while digital liter­acy is at low ebb for the parents and students. In such a case, the human aspect of digitization is holding back the full integration of e-learning into the educational system. While subscription for data is a burden for students in the cities, access to the internet is a serious problem for those in remote areas. Likewise, the objective of e-learning as a new paradigm to serve as a development platform for a present-day society based on knowledge looks like a mirage.It is therefore suggested that every section of the educational system should key into the digital learning process as a way of moving fast in this technological age. It is also imperative to stabilize the power supply and provide adequate technology infrastructure in developing countries, this will have multiply effects on the overall development of the educational sector in the region. E-learning should be all-inclusive to encourage parents' and guardians' participation in their wards' education progress. Implementation of these suggestions by the government, school authorities, and other stakeholders becomes very important at this critical period when global education is in dire need of sustainable educational development. Education is the catalyst of every development and is considered a fundamental human right. It is an enabling right with a direct impact on the realization of all other human rights.

This article intends to interpret the political philosophy and global thought of the Florentine author rightfully, disregarding rapid and simplistic judgments that condemn him hastily, taking him out of his time and ignoring his true intentions and ideas. My objective is neither to pronounce in favour of or against Machiavelli, nor to acclaim, justify or criticise his political position. My objective is to reflect on two of the key concepts of his political thinking and on the philosophy underlying them. I shall also analyze how far Machiavelli truly follows the line of ancient classic thought, verifying that it is precisely the rupture with this ancient classic thought that will shape the best understanding of the significance of his work. ; Este artículo pretende interpretar rectamente la filosofía política y el pensamiento global del autor florentino, desechando juicios rápidos y simplistas que lo condenan precipitadamente desligándolo de su tiempo y descuidando sus verdaderas intenciones e ideas. El objetivo no es pronunciarme a favor o en contra de Maquiavelo ni aplaudir, justificar o criticar su postura política. El objetivo es reflexionar sobre dos de los conceptos clave en sus planteamientos políticos y en la filosofía subyacente a ellos. Asimismo, mi propósito es analizar hasta qué punto Maquiavelo sigue fielmente la línea del pensamiento clásico antiguo, comprobando que es precisamente la ruptura con éste la que va a configurar el justo alcance del significado de su obra.

Objective: The aim of the article is in examining the characteristics of the relevant samples of successful experience of the developed countries in the sphere of combating bioterrorism. Method: The following methods were used by the authors in evaluating the efficiency of the research which involved: historical, analysis as well as bibliographic. Results: The current threats posed by such a phenomenon as bio-terrorism are identified and characterized, as well as successful international examples of its overcoming are analyzed. The level of danger of bio-terrorism has been established, as well as the negative consequences it causes. Cases of real use of biological weapons in different periods of human existence are characterized. It was during this period that various manifestations of bioterrorism around the world became much more active. Emphasis is placed on the fact that combating such a phenomenon as bioterrorism should be based on a comprehensive approach to solving this problem. Among other things, it should be a combination of effective law enforcement, a stable political situation and systematic interaction between the state and the population. Conclusions: The bio-terrorism can be divided into that carried out by criminal organizations, individuals or religious on the one hand, and that carried out by the state on the other. The bioterrorism, together with many of its harmful effects, poses a significant danger to humanity and society. It greatly damages the lives and health of individuals, destroys and destroys nature and the environment, and can create political and economic crises or social upheavals.

Reflecting about the necessity of adopting a constitutional jurisdictional proceeding code is not a whim nor a foolishness, instead it is a compelling need in order to: (i) ensure by a legislative measure a jurisdictional safeguard of the Constitution; (ii) unify the contents of constitutional jurisdictional proceeding law (to gain clarity and coherence in constitutional jurisdictional proceeding statutes); (iii) make constitutional supremacy and human rights to become more effective; (iv) guarantee law certainty to constitutional justice. ; Reflexionar sobre la necesidad de expedir un código procesal constitucional no obedece a un capricho o necedad, sino más bien a la imperiosa necesidad de: (i) asegurar legislativamente la garantía jurisdiccional de la Constitución; (ii) unificar los contenidos del derecho procesal constitucional (se obtiene orden, claridad y coherencia en la legislación procesal constitucional); (iii) dar eficacia a la supremacía constitucional y a los derechos humanos; y, (iv) dotar a la justicia constitucional de seguridad jurídica.

'It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances'.Ralph Waldo Emerson'It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, and declaring "official states of emergency" in order to grab more and more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and prosperity'.United States Supreme Court (Ex Parte Milligan. 1866)IntroductionSince the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the 'War on Terror'. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency's legal -or extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions 'legitimized' by the state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent.This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics and society. The State of ExceptionThe state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the State's existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the 'normal' rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, security and military agencies' powers are enhanced. The debate regarding the state of exception's legal aspect circles around the constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the State's security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights suspension's lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as such; or, either as the transitional step required for -'legitimately'- transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as the State's existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the fabrics of democracy . The Legal Nature of the State of Exception The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars through the creation of an Empire.The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive power whenever the normal functions of the State's institutions are no longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security forces' faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended indefinitely number of times . The debate concerning the state of exception's legal aspect comprises three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The state of emergency's constitutional validity considers under which cases it can be declared. As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the State's breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to in Article I, Section 9 where it states: 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'Therefore, only in the cases of rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even coherent.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State's institutions are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained itself from approaching the issue .The question of the security forces' enhanced powers, during the state of emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been granted to the United States' security forces and agencies. Their faculties were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 'plain' criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the lead. To sum up, the 'normal' rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a criminal one, is still a political issue.Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection between continuing the 'normal' rule of law or enacting the state of exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that necessity is trying to avoid . When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are clearly the greater evil.Depending on the country, the state of emergency or exception is labeled as martial law or state of siege (état de siège or estado de sitio). Both, however, share the same objectives and are justified by necessity. See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 25-28. Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5-6. See, Arendt, Hannah; 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship'; in Responsibility and Judgment; Kohn, Jerome (Ed.); Schocken Books; New York; 2003.Lintott, Andrew; The Constitution of the Roman Republic; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 110.For example, in France l' état de siège can only last for 12 days, although the President is allowed to extend it for more time with the Parliament's confirmation. In the United States, the National Emergency Acts can only last for no more than two years, but the President is entitled to extend it for one more years indefinitely number of times by only notifying Congress of his decision. For the French case see Article 16 of the Constitution, available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/pouvoirs-exceptionnels-du-president.html ; for the American case see the U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 34, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html .See the United States Constitution, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=138See Neely, Mark; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties; Oxford University Press; New York; 1991; pp. 179-184. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/71/2/case.htmlSee, Roche, John; Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative'; Western Political Quarterly; Vol. 5; N. 4; December 1952. See Ex Parte Quirin , 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which declared constitutional the military trials of German saboteurs during the Second World War in U.S. soil, available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=317&invol=1 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which determined constitutional the Japanese Americans internment camps, available athttp://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html ; and, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), where it was decided that all Guantanamo detainees had the right of habeas corpus, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf The national emergency was declared through Proclamation 7463 available athttp://ra.defense.gov/documents/mobil/pdf/proclamation.pdfSee Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 40-44.See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. It is also interesting to consider here Margaret Somers' Arendtian view of political rights versus human rights because the former are recognized and protected by the State. See Somers, Margaret; Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2008.See Dworkin, Ronald; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1996.Only regarding the cases of the restriction of habeas corpus and the setting up of military tribunals has the Supreme Court been able to declare their unconstitutionality and illegality. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); both available athttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-6696&friend andhttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf respectively.For a better and more detailed analysis of the legality or illegality of targeted killings and torture see Banks, William; 'Targeted Killing and Assassination: the U.S. Legal Framework'; University of Richmond Law Review; Vol. 37; N. 667; 2002-2003; Dershowitz, Alan; 'When All Else Fails, Why not Torture?'; American Legion Magazine; July 2002; Blum, Gabriella, and Heymann, Philip; 'Law and Policy of Targeted Killing'; The Harvard National Security Journal; Vol. 2, Issue 2; 2010; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.

The Political and Social Natures of the State of ExceptionThe main questions regarding the political and social natures of the state of emergency concern: the restriction of individual freedoms as an innate power of the State to assure its continued existence –and of its democratic regime- in times of national crisis; the exception as being a transitional phase from democracy to autocracy or dictatorship; and, the legitimization of a permanent state of exception through consensus.Carl Schmitt stated that 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (1). This means that the exception, which he defined as the application of extraordinary measures, is what constitutes the essence of the highest power of the State. Schmitt, following Bodin and Hobbes, emphasized the extralegal nature of the State's sovereign power. The State could not exist without the possibility of exception. In fact, the State was born from the exception and relied on it for its survival (2). Therefore, the state of exception could not be framed within the legal order. Sovereignty cannot be limited; it is an absolute. Laws are created by the State, but the State's sovereign power –the exception- has to remain outside the boundaries of the rule of law. This was the only way that the exception could function as the mechanism that guaranteed the State's survival in moments of grave peril. To Schmitt, there was no point arguing about lesser or greater evils. The State had to prevail always. Order, even a dictatorial one, was preferable to revolution and anarchy. The permanent elimination of individual freedoms was, at all times, more desirable than the extinction of the State. Schmitt was deeply influenced by the 1918-1919 Revolution, following Germany's defeat in World War I, and by the early chaotic years of the Weimer Republic. He considered, taking on Weber in extremis, that the State was the absolute embodiment of the monopoly of the use of violence. Legitimacy did not matter because authority –the sovereign- was the real source of law, not a Rousseaunian state of nature or the people's will (3). The State creates and maintains law through force. When the monopoly is broken, because violence is being used against the State from outside or within, the exception assures its reestablishment. Other authors have considered the survival of the sovereign body at all costs, perceived as a lesser evil when weighted against the greater evil of its possible decease, as the driving force behind the state of emergency's employment in moments of real or perceived national crisis (4). Exception, to them, is a legal tool that restores order by rapidly extricating the threats to the polity's existence. Supporters of this view consider that in times of foreign war or internal strife the State is compelled to undermine individual freedoms. Dictatorships react to crisis in a much effective way than democracies. The very nature of the latter –mainly enacting decisions after deliberation, consensus and the rule of law- may be its own Achilles' heel. In order for modern democracies to survive, they have to recur to non-liberal, but legally framed and provisional, measures (5). After 9/11, the War on Terror has been defined as a national crisis that cannot be overcome within the 'normal' rule of law. The long term peril to democracy, which terrorism poses, is far greater and more permanent than the one that the state of exception causes to democratic liberties in the short term. The suspension and restriction of fundamental freedoms are a small price to pay when a democratic regime is faced with the kind of foe that terrorism is. Even such strong advocates of liberal democracy, like Michael Ignatieff, believe that the state of emergency is a necessary tool to protect society from terrorist attacks (6). To him, the exception in a modern democracy can be effectively restrained from committing the kind of human rights violations and abuses that were present during the French-Algerian War and the Dirty War in Argentina. Ignatieff considers that those cases can be avoided, in the current War on Terror, by setting up contradictory procedures after targeted killing and aggressive interrogation have been implemented(7). Lastly, the provisional characteristic of the state of exception must also be properly defined by introducing a time limit or by setting up attained objectives. The problem with the latter is that it is difficult to discern when terrorism has been actually defeated. Regarding the temporal nature of the exception, it has been the case that governments have continued to extend, indefinitely, the state of emergency (8). In this sense, Charles Tilly was right when he noticed that once the State acquires more power it is extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to go back to the previous situation (9). Ignatieff's notion that the state of exception can be controlled if it is properly framed within the legal order is mistaken. First, following Tilly, the State's behavior is not controllable, particularly within a legal framework. Even if the State seems to be making concessions, it is actually gaining more command. It is in the State's nature to increase its control over society in order to assure its survival(10). Therefore, the state of exception will never be controlled by the legal order. Terrorism overtly defies the essence of the State: its monopoly of the use of violence. To protect itself the State will disregard the rule of law if necessary. Secondly, the exception cannot be legal in any sense because, as said by Giorgio Agamben, it is the negation of law (11). Agamben considers exception as it has been defined by Schmitt: the nature of sovereign power. Consequently, it can never be framed by the rule of law. In fact, when the exception is enacted law ceases to exist. When national crisis occur, a State will make decisions based on necessity, not on lawfulness. Accordingly, if the rule of law is negated and the newly acquired faculties are not relinquished after the crisis has passed, the exception represents the transition of a democratic regime into an authoritarian or autocratic one. There is a divide in literature regarding this issue: some deem that the exception creates a provisional dictatorship but once the crisis is over democracy returns in full force, others see the exception as a one way ticket ride. According to Rossiter when the state of exception is declared, a democratic regime turns into a provisional dictatorship by granting extraordinary authority and powers to the executive (12). Ignatieff, following Rossiter, considers Italy and Germany during the 70s, by naming them 'selective dictatorships', to show how modern democracies used the state of exception to tackle terrorism and returned to the rule of law once the threat had ended (13). However, the provisional and extraordinary measures passed in both countries have never been suspended. They are still in place and sporadically and selectively used. As a result, the provisional feature of the exception never actually materializes. Authors, like Hannah Arendt and Frances Fox Piven, explain how the suspension, restriction and infringement of constitutional rights and individual freedoms by the necessity of the state of exception permanently erode democracies by introducing autocratic measures (14). Arendt wonderfully describes how democracy died in the Weimer Republic when Chancellor Bruning declared the state of emergency in 1930, and not the moment Hitler raised into power in 1933 (15). For Arendt, from the moment the exception was enacted until Hitler took over the Chancellery, the path to dictatorship was irreversibly one. Piven regards the declaration of the state of emergency in the United States in September 2001 as the crucial moment where democratic liberties started to irrevocably fade away in the name of necessity (16). The subsequent restrictions to individual freedoms were accepted as necessary sacrifices to avert a catastrophe. It was not considered that the greater evil was not the one posed by terrorists; but, the permanent damage made to democracy by the State. Democracy is still far from dying in the United States, but its agony may have already started. The state of exception requires another ingredient to remain in effect indefinitely and permanently harm democracy. The State's intentions –if there is such an oxymoron- are not sufficient alone. Legitimacy, as Weber so cleverly insisted upon, is also needed (17). Arendt showcased how the transformation of the Weimar Republic, from a democracy into a totalitarian regime, mainly depended on the masses (18). In modern democracies it is the general public, the citizenship or the masses who always have the final voice on any matter. Governments' actions have to be legitimized by the public in order to be truly effective. They are accepted if they are not broadly contested or if they are enthusiastically received. They are not perceived as legitimate when they produce protests against them (19). The measures taken by the U.S. Government after 9/11 have received its share of criticism, but they have not been openly contested by the public in a massive way. In fact, there has been a strong consensus from the American citizenship. It may have been a tacit consensus between the executive, Congress and the citizens; but, the case remains that the suspension, restrictions and infringement to fundamental liberties have been seen as a necessary sacrifice to assure the security of the nation (20). Even controversial and dangerous measures as targeted assassination or torture have been widely accepted -in an extremely cheerfully way in some cases (21)- by the general public. Perhaps, the public truly considers them appropriate and it is willing to risk democracy for security. However, it would seem that the compliance comes from the perception that they will never be subject to those measures. The majority of the people of the United States do not consider themselves targeted by the restrictions to individual freedoms, and will never feel that way. For them it is easy to make sacrifice a minority's fundamental liberties. It has been the case in every country where the state of exception has been declared for terrorist activities. The idea that 'it will never happen to me' precludes the perception of being on the verge of loosing any kind of freedom. Interestingly, Karl Marx, in the XVIII Brumaire, warned us about the dangers of a massive support for an autocratic State in the name of security (22).ConclusionThe current War on Terror shows how close a stable and mature,democratic regime is to absolutely disregard the rule of law in favor of necessity. History and political theory has demonstrated that many authoritarian governments and dictatorships originate with a declaration of the state of exception. The measures taken by the enactment of the exception are not only immoral, they are unnecessary and illegal. The lesser evil is always less when it is not applied to the majority of the population. No matter how small the amount of individuals affected by the restrictions on their liberties, the damage done to democracy –and to their lives- is permanent and with grave repercussions for the future. Terrorism is a strategy used by a small group of people that pose no vital danger to the State's institutions or to democracy. The real danger to a democratic regime is the State's reaction to terrorism and the public's acceptance of them. Terrorists can be effectively persecuted within the rule of law. No worst case scenario can justify the torture, the indefinite imprisonment and the assassination of an innocent individual. The possible avoidance of a worst case scenario is never the lesser evil when it requires fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed. Finally, it is the public who always has the last word, and who is ultimately responsible for the known actions taken by their government. The choice between the rule of law and necessity, eventually, relies on them.(1) Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5.(2) Ibid; pp. 7-12.(3) Ibid; pp. 35.(4) See Huntington, Samuel; Political Order in Changing Societies; Yale University Press; New Heaven; 2006; and Krasner, Stephen;Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy; Princeton University Press; New York; 1999.(5) See Walzer, Michael; Just and Unjust Wars; Basic Books; New York; pp. 335-360.(6) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 130-143.(7) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 150-156.(8) See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/10/letter-president-continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-certain-te(9) See Tilly, Charles; Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992; Wiley-Blackwell; New York; 1995.(10) See Tilly, Charles; "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," Bringing the State Back In, Eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press, 1985.(11) See Agamben, Giorgio; State of Exception; University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 32-40.(12) See Rossiter, Clinton; Constitutional Dictatorship - Crisis Government In The Modern Democracies; Rossiter Press; New York; 2008. Rossiter takes the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom during the Second World War and analyses the 'dictatorial' powers held by Roosevelt and Churchill to command both countries during the crisis.(13) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 174-178.(14) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341; andSee Piven, Frances Fox;The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(15) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 389-400.(16) See Piven, Frances Fox; The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(17) See Weber, Max; "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, Eds. Gerth and Mills.(18) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341(19) See Piven, Frances Fox; and Cloward, Richard; Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail; Random House; 1979; pp.1-41.(20) See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. (21) Like it was seen immediately after President Obama announced the targeted assassination of Osama Bin Laden.(22) See Marx, Karl; "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx/Engels Reader, Ed. Robert Tucker. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

Angola has had a socio economic development marked by exceptional characteristics linked to its history, being rich in natural resources, they have not been utilized in terms of sustainable and upward development of society, which depends heavily on imports food, this situation has not been outside the cooperative, which has not been a hub for local and national development, in spite of having a significant presence in agriculture.In the article it is presented the history and the present time of the cooperative movement, starting from the different socio-political and economic movements happened in Angola from the years 50 of last century, at the same time, stress is made in the different existent forms of cooperative organization, as well as the analysis of the weaknesses of the cooperative movement that presupposes the necessity of its improvement. ; Angola ha tenido un desarrollo socioeconómico marcado por características excepcionales, vinculadas a su devenir histórico, siendo un país rico en recursos naturales, los mismos no han sido aprovechados en función del desarrollo sostenible y ascendente de la sociedad, que depende en gran medida de la importación de alimentos, a esta situación no ha estado ajeno el cooperativismo, el cual no se ha constituido un eje para el desarrollo local y nacional, a pesar de tener una presencia considerable en la agricultura. En el artículo se presenta la historia y la actualidad del movimiento cooperativo, a partir de los diferentes movimientos socio-políticos y económicos ocurridos en Angola desde los años 50 del siglo pasado, al mismo tiempo, se hace hincapié en las distintas formas de organización cooperativa existentes, así como el análisis de las debilidades del movimiento cooperativo, que presupone la necesidad de su redimensionamiento.

Este trabajo parte de la premisa de que el sistema educativo venezolano, particularmente el universitario, está seriamente deteriorado, y que esto ha conllevado a una crisis de valores en el interior de las universidades, manifestada en un desvío dramático de los objetivos para los cuales fueron concebidas. El Gobierno nacional ha hecho serios esfuerzos para ayudar a generar las transformaciones necesarias y poner al sistema universitario en función del desarrollo de las políticas públicas de la nación. A partir de un breve análisis, este artículo demuestra que las leyes del país se han venido adecuando a las disposiciones en materia universitaria de organismos internacionales como la UNESCO. ; This paper's basic premise is that the Venezuelan educational system, particularly the university system, is seriously deteriorated, and that this has generated a serious crisis in values within universities, seen especially in a dramatic shift from the objectives for which it was conceived. The national government has made serious attempts to help generate necessary transformations and to place the university system in function of the development of the public policies of the country. Beginning with a brief analysis, this article shows that laws have been modified based on dispositions on university education coming from international organizations such as UNESCO. ; Este trabalho nasce da premissa de que o sistema educativo venezuelano, particularmente o universitário, está seriamente deteriorado, e que isto tem acarretado a uma crise de valores no interior das universidades, manifestada num desvio dramático dos objetivos pelos quais foram concebidas. O governo nacional tem feito sérios esforços para ajudar a gerar as transformações necessárias e pôr o sistema universitário em função do desenvolvimento das políticas públicas da nação. Desde uma breve análise, este artigo demonstra que as leis do país vêm se adequando às disposições em matéria universitária de organismos internacionais como a UNESCO. ; 165-175 ; hgomez@ula.ve ; cuatrimestral

Academic activism in health research seeks to promote equity and social justice with participating communities. A bilateral relationship between academia and communities is reached when knowledge is developed from the participants and for the participants. The aim of this article is to discuss strategies to use academic activism in community health research. We propose several strategies: the researchers' reflexivity and positionality; the engagement of stakeholders; the immersion of the researcher in the field; and the development and transfer of knowledge. We focus the discussion on the transformative power of academic activism and its key elements that community researchers can consider. Innovative and contemporary approaches in community health research highlight the need to develop knowledge from a critical and reflective perspective. Community health professionals can take up these strategies to pursue a positive social change in the health of individuals, families, and communities. ; El activismo académico retoma la visión de la investigación en salud como una forma de promoción de equidad y justicia social, se busca la generación de conocimiento científico desde los participantes y para los participantes en sentido de construir una relación bilateral entre la academia y las comunidades. El objetivo es discutir estrategias que permitan desarrollar el activismo académico en la investigación en salud comunitaria. Se discuten diversas estrategias utilizadas en el activismo académico: la reflexividad y posicionamiento de los investigadores; el compromiso de las partes interesadas; la inmersión del investigador en el campo; y la generación y transferencia de conocimientos. Se buscó centrar la discusión en el poder de transformación del activismo académico y en los motivos que convierten a las estrategias expuestas como elementos claves a considerar por el investigador comunitario. Los enfoques innovadores y contemporáneos en la investigación comunitaria en salud resaltan la construcción de conocimiento desde ...

Desde una perspectiva teórica se expone la importancia y necesidad de desarrollar estrategias sistemáticas de evaluación de la investigación en Comunicación Social en Cuba para perfeccionar su gestión. Se aborda brevemente la evaluación de la ciencia haciendo énfasis en las Ciencias Sociales, sirviéndose de las potencialidades de las herramientas métricas para realizar ejercicios evaluativos sistemáticos y profundos. Se alude a las condicionantes y características de la investigación del campo en cuestión dado su "carácter profesionalizante", el escaso valor otorgado a la investigación teórico-histórica, la incipiente existencia de publicaciones nacionales, la nula visibilidad internacional de la producción científica nacional a partir de fuentes propias además de la inexistencia de un modelo de gestión de la investigación y de un sistema de información científica. Se identifican potencialidades para diseñar una sólida batería de indicadores en consonancia con la realidad del dominio en cuestión y la consecución de la evaluación como eje central de una política científica nacional que incentive la investigación en comunicación, bien como su gestión y desarrollo. ; From a theoretical perspective the present contribution concentrates on exposing the importance and necessity of developing systematic strategies of research evaluation to improve management in the Cuban communication field. The evaluation of the topic is briefly addressed by emphasizing Social Sciences. This paper also presents the potentialities of the metric tools which carry out intensive and systematic evaluation exercises. Conditions and characteristic of the research in the field are presented in order to explain its "professional character", scarce value given to the theoretical-historical research, incipient existence of national publications, null international visibility of the national scientific production relying on its own sources, nonexistence of a model of research management and of a scientific information system. Potentialities are identified in order to elaborate a solid group of indicators in total harmony with the reality and characteristic of the issue in question, as well as to conceive the evaluation as the central axis of a national scientific politics that motivates research in communication, its management and development.

This article, in the first instance, raises a historical tour against the armed conflict in Colombia,reaching the understanding of the causes that have generated the violence in the country.Is presented, in the second instance, a fundamental condition for the renewal of theColombian thought democratic mentality open to dialogue and discourse, as ey part of thepolitical culture to be built as an educational and illustrated process, allowing for the adventof a political pedagogy, and conflict resolution.Of the two instances mentioned political-pedagogical project of building democraticmentality as a factor that preserves democracy and jointly perform the construction of thenational state arises.In short, the article is a project proposal of building the democratic mentality in the country. ; El presente artículo, en primera instancia, suscita un recorrido histórico frente al conflictoarmado en Colombia y llega a la comprensión de las causas que han generado la situación deviolencia en el país.Se presenta, en segunda instancia, una mentalidad democrática abierta al diálogo y ladisertación, como pieza clave de la cultura política a construirse como proceso educativoe ilustrado, dando cabida al advenimiento de una pedagogía política, fundamental para larenovación del pensamiento colombiano y la solución de conflictos.De las dos instancias mencionadas surge el proyecto político-pedagógico de la construcciónde la mentalidad democrática como factor que preserve la democracia y realice conjuntamentela construcción del Estado nacional.En definitiva, el artículo es una propuesta del proyecto de construcción de la mentalidaddemocrática en el país.