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The article further describes the ideological, historical, socio-political and economic circumstances, responsible for the specific direction of a new form of the ideology of liberalism - contemporary liberalism (neo-liberalism). The special attention, along with the analysis of the ideas of the founder of original theory of the state intervention in the economic life of the society of John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), is given to "neoliberal" economic constructions of an ideological orientation of Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) and Milton Friedman (1912-2006), defenders of a liberal principle of self-regulation of economy, free from any regalements. The author, on the basis of the analysis of primary sources and examples from a political and social life of some States, shows that in theory the resurgence of liberalism in the form of neo-liberalism personified the idea of the priority of the individual to society and the State, the market - before planning and regulation, the human rights - before the power authority and the team. However in practice this revival was accompanied by displacement of accents and growth of ideological tendencies. Thus, theorists and practitioners of neo-liberalism lined up quite utopian model not only of economic, but also of social relations. Article details the mechanisms by which the theoretical constructions of economists-neoliberals were emasculated by politicians who gradually reduced them to the primitive and convenient theses, justifying any actions of the authorities. Over time, these points have become "undeniable truths", through which neo-liberalism became dogmatic, and its economic credo has got obvious fundamentalist character, having turned to market dogma of totalitarian type. ; В статье детально анализируются идеологические, исторические, социально-политические и экономические обстоятельства, предопределившие специфическое направление развития новой формы идеологии либерализма - современного либерализма (неолиберализма). Особое внимание наряду с анализом идей создателя оригинальной теории государственной интервенции в хозяйственную жизнь общества Джона Мейнарда Кейнса уделяется "неолиберальным" экономическим построениям идеологической направленности Фридриха фон Хайека и Милтона Фридмена, отстаивающим либеральный принцип саморегулирования экономики, свободной от любой регламентации. Автором на базе анализа первоисточников и примеров из политической и социальной жизни ряда государств показано, что в теории возрождение либерализма в форме неолиберализма олицетворяли идеи приоритета индивида перед обществом и государством, рынка - перед планированием и регулированием, прав человека - перед могуществом власти и коллектива. Однако на практике это возрождение сопровождалось смещением акцентов и ростом идеологических тенденций. Тем самым теоретики и практики неолиберализма выстраивали довольно утопичную модель не только экономических, но и социальных отношений. В статье подробно раскрывается механизм, посредством которого теоретические построения экономистов - неолибералов "выхолащивались" политиками, которые постепенно сокращали их до примитивных и удобных тезисов, оправдывающих любые действия властей. Со временем эти тезисы приобрели характер "неопровержимых истин", с помощью которых неолиберализм стал догматическим, а его экономическое кредо приобрело явный фундаменталистский характер, превратившись в рыночную догму тоталитарного типа.

The starting point of the conclusions of politicians and experts was the recognition of the changed nature of threats to the New World Order. In post-Westfalia system of international relations the main actors are not sovereigns, but transnational actors of world politics, including transnational terrorist and criminal networks. In this situation, the support of global security threat serves the underground world – terrorists, shady business structures, failed states. The unconventional nature of the threat to peace and stability of the New World Order requires an equally innovative response which transcends the formal constraints of international law and the traditional doctrine of deterrence. An analysis of the U.S. foreign policy concepts suggests that today's academic and political community has promoted consensus of neoliberals and neoconservatives, supporters of the institutional functionalism and representatives of the school of Realpolitik. This consensus was based on the recognition of the admissibility of pre-emptive strikes on the territory of failed states, sponsoring international terrorism, or the implementation of open interference in the internal affairs of "rogue states" for human rights and democratic freedoms guarantee. ; В статье рассматривается эволюция понимания современного международного правопорядка в зарубежной глобалистике. Делается вывод о том, что утрата эпистемологического и социально-политического оптимизма современных исследователей сопровождается критикой ими линейно-прогрессистских концептов развития системы международного права, открывая дорогу принципам альтернативности, синергетики, транзитивности исторического развития. Неоконсенсус представителей школы Realpolitik (неоконсерваторов) и институционального либерализма (неолибералов) основывается на допущении иной природы международной правосубъектности в условиях возникновения новых угроз национальной и всеобщей безопасности со стороны транснационального терроризма и несостоятельных государств. Практическим воплощением такого нео-неоконсесуса становится легитимация гуманитарных интервенций и превентивного сдерживания «преступных режимов» на периферии мир-системы.

Learning J.M. Keynes' theoretical ideas and a «new course» developed by F. Roosevelt from the viewpoint of their correspondence to the values of liberalism casts doubt on their rightful attribution to the ideology of neo-liberalism in political science. = На основании исследования теоретических воззрений Дж. М. Кейнса и «нового курса» Ф. Рузвельта с точки зрения их соответствия ценностям либерализма ставится под сомнение правомерность их отнесения в политической науке к идеологии неолиберализма.

Раздел "Международные экономические отношения" ; В статье рассматриваются преобладающие на западе неолиберальные представления о преобразованиях в бывших социалистических странах. Из анализа англоязычных источников выводятся общие цели и принципы неолиберальных реформ, дается их критическая оценка. В частности, отмечается, что, несмотря на формальный тезис о главенствующей роли демократизации в ходе преобразований, фактически неолиберализм уделял наибольшее внимание экономическим вопросам. Это могло быть обусловлено обеспокоенностью о формировании социально-экономических устоев того общественного строя, на построение которого были направлены реформы, — капиталистической «демократии». По сути, неолиберализм предполагал полное изменение общественных структур, сложившихся в социалистический период, а именно: снижение роли рабочего класса и иных несобственнических групп и усиление роли собственников. Последние рассматривались в качестве основных «победителей» от преобразований, тогда как работники госпредприятий должны были либо сами стать собственниками, либо быть готовыми к долгосрочному ухудшению своего материального положения. Осознавая, что данная политэкономическая раскладка чревата политическими потрясениями и возможным отказом от реформ, неолиберализм указывал на необходимость формирования особой политической системы — «состязательной демократии», при которой протестные настроения масс можно было бы сдерживать в безопасных для реформ рамках через активный парламентаризм и средства массовой информации. Радикальность реформ также выдвигалась в качестве одного из основных условий их успеха, и многочисленные примеры неудачного воплощения в жизнь неолиберальных рекомендаций объяснялись именно сбоями в их реализации. Тем не менее, имеющиеся данные указывали на то, что более правдоподобной причиной здесь было отсутствие достаточной общественной поддержки и четких внешних стимулов, а также неблагоприятные исходные условия. По всей вероятности, именно эти факторы привели к различным результатам преобразований в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы и Прибалтики, с одной стороны, и странах СНГ, — с другой. В свою очередь, политэкономический выбор Республики Беларусь оказался не только прагматичным с точки зрения исходных условий и внешних стимулов, но и демократичным, так как отказ от неолиберальной «шоковой терапии» в середине 1990-х гг. полностью соответствовал пожеланиям большинства населения страны. = The article discusses neo-liberal views about the post-socialist transformation predominant in the West. General goals and principles of neo-liberal reforms are derived and assessed from the analysis of the English-language sources. In particular, it is noted that despite the formal argument about the supremacy of democratisation during the transformation, in reality neo-liberalism focused on economic issues. This could be determined by concerns about the socio-economic fundamentals of the social order which had to be established through reforms — the capitalist «democracy». In essence, neo-liberalism implied complete overhaul of the social structures institutionalised in the socialist period, notably, reducing the role of the working class and other non-proprietary groups, and boosting the role of proprietors. It was the latter who were considered the main winners from the transformation, whereas state sector workers had either to become proprietors themselves, or to prepare to long-term deterioration of their material situation. Taking into account that such a political economy situation could lead to electoral distress and reform rejection, neo-liberalism pointed at the importance of creating a special political system — «competitive democracy» — which would allow to contain popular protest through active parliamentarism and mass media. Radicalism of reforms was also put forward as one of the most important conditions for their success, and numerous practical failures of neo-liberalism were explained by reform inconsistency. Nevertheless, the available data suggested that a more valid reason here was the absence of sufficient public support and clear external stimuli, as well as unfavourable initial conditions. Most likely, it was these factors which underlay contrasting reform results in countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe and the Baltics on the one hand, and CIS states on the other hand. In turn, the political economy choice of the Belarusian authorities turned out to be not only pragmatic in relation to initial conditions and external stimuli, but also democratic, as rejecting neo-liberal «shock therapy» in the mid-1990s fully met the preferences of most people of the country.

This essay explores the writings of Georgij Chelpanov, who recognized the value of both psychology and philosophy, much to the displeasure of all. Chelpanov only very guardedly expressed his own philosophical views, which stand, I conclude, in stark contrast with the neo-Kantianisms of both the Marburg and the Baden Schools. We see that in his earliest writings on spatial perception, he not so much differs with Kant as saw the matter from a different perspective. Nonetheless, he shares Kant's affirmation that the universality and necessity associated with our representation of space affirms its apriority as a condition of cognition, particularly with respect to mathematics. Chelpanov departs from Kant in rejecting the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, arguing that there is something in noumenal reality that corresponds to our specific representations of an object's temporal and spatial position. Otherwise, there is no way to account for their specificity, for why a perceived object is here and not there. Chelpanov argues this from a psychological viewpoint, but he acknowledges that Kant argues from a logical viewpoint. Turning to the issue of free will, he, in short, argues for a soft determinism that is quite consistent with Kantianism, even though Chelpanov's argument is bereft of the metaphysics and the architectonic of Kant's system. In conclusion, although scholars dispute his allegiance to neo-Kantianism, his philosophical writings demonstrate his subdued advocacy of a neo-Kantianism, albeit one more akin to the transcendental realism of Riehl and Paulsen.

The article is a review of a new monograph by the famous Russian theoretician-economist V.T. Ryazanov, «Modern Political Economy: Prospects for Neo-Marxist Synthesis». The focus is on the possibilities and content of neo-Marxist synthesis in political economy. Its new subject field, reflecting major changes in modern capitalism, is revealed. The scientific potential of classical political economy and the accumulated theoretical developments of heterodox schools that oppose the mainstream in modern economic theory are also shown. All this taken together makes it possible to lay the foundations of neo-Marxist synthesis as a new version of Marxist political economy. The review reveals specific theoretical, methodological and concrete economic problems studied in the monograph, and some critical remarks are made. According to the reviewer, this monograph can be an important step in contributing to the full revival of political economy in the public, scientific and educational space.

The term «Black Swan», which is metaphorically used by the modern American scientist Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his theoretical research, means inexplicable randomness of events, their predictability and unpredictability for the expert, but the consequences of which are of great importance. In other words, these are important accidents that, according to N. Taleb, affect the result of the experiment and the course of history. In the Russian state there were many global events, each of which could be described as a «Black Swan». The article analyzes only two of them, which have occurred in modern history and have led to disastrous consequences for both Russia and the world, through the prism of the methodology of historical development and political discourse. The political and ideological platform of these events were the ideas of liberalism, the embodiment of which caused unforeseen, stochastic consequences, which became the object of this study. The author substantiates the conclusion that the intellectual part of the Russian society in the development of new concepts of political and state structure was guided by speculative theories and implemented mental schemes in the absence of real objective and subjective prerequisites, turning these processes into socio-political experiments. In the field of practical policy, according to the author, special attention should be paid to the factor of personal responsibility of actors in the development of political strategy and tactical decision-making. ; Термин «Черный лебедь», который метафорически используется современным американским ученым Нассимом Николасом Талебом в своих теоретических изысканиях, означает необъяснимую случайность событий, их труднопрогнозируемость и непредсказуемость для эксперта, но последствия которых имеют громадное значение. Другими словами, это важные случайности, которые, по мнению Н. Талеба, влияют на результат эксперимента и ход истории. В российском государстве произошло много глобальных событий, каждый из которых можно было бы охарактеризовать как «Черный лебедь» 1 . В статье проанализированы лишь два из них, которые произошли в новейшей истории и повлекли за собой катастрофические последствия как для России, так и всего мира, через призму методологии проблем исторического развития и политического дискурса. Политической и идеологической платформой указанных событий были идеи либерализма, воплощение в реальность которых вызвало непредвиденные, стохастичные последствия, ставшие объектом данного исследования. Автором обосновывается вывод о том, что интеллектуальная часть российского общества при выработке новых концепций политико-государственного устройства руководствовалась умозрительными теориями и реализовывала ментальные схемы при отсутствии реальных объективных и субъективных предпосылок, превращая эти процессы в социально-политические эксперименты. В области практической политики, по мнению автора, следует уделять особое внимание фактору личностной ответственности акторов при выработке политической стратегии и принятии тактических решений.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States of America has pursued an offensive foreign policy. In the realities of the 2010s and 2020s, marked by mounting resistance to American global dominance, primarily from Russia and China, there are prerequisites for the adjustment of the U.S. foreign policy strategy. The aim of the article is to identify the underlying causes of offensiveness in U.S. foreign policy of the post–bipolar period based on theoretical constructs of offensive realism and liberalism. Research has shown that offensive realism and offensive liberalism can help understand the offensive nature of U.S. foreign policy after 1991 in their own way and make appropriate projections for the future. Based on the tenets of offensive realism, it can be assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism have created an enabling environment for maximizing the power of the United States, which Washington could not but leverage. Witnessing the dwindling U.S. power potential, as well as the strengthening of China and Russia in the 2010s – 2020s, Washington has not stopped acting in the logic of offensive realism, but under the Trump and Biden administrations it has definitely began to move towards defensive realism. As the rivals to the US continue to strengthen their capacities, this trend can only intensify. Following the tenets of offensive liberalism, it is possible to assume that after the Cold War, the power of the United States has turned out to be so great in comparison with other great and major powers that Washington has begun to offensively build an American liberal hegemony, letting power rivalry falls by the wayside. However, due to the weakening of the U.S. power potential, as well as the simultaneous rise of China and Russia, it has been forced to begin a transition to a strategy based on offensive and defensive realism under the Trump and Biden administrations. If its rivals continue to rise, the U.S. may turn away from offense altogether.

Authors interpret the results achieved by analyzing the content of Russian political parties' manifestos that managed to enter the State Duma after 2011 and 2016 elections. Our conceptual framework is based on Immanuel Wallerstein's assumption that only three ideologies—liberalism, conservatism and socialism — were the key ones to 20th century experience and, hence, that any particular ideology might be reduced to that list. Firstly, we build a matrix of content analysis to analyze texts of officially published political parties' programs. As a result we could show that values at the core of any program at any stage were hybrid in nature and that there was increase in liberal rhetoric in 2016. Further we interpret the empirical results by applying both classical (M. Seliger) and modern (J. Schwartzmantel) models of ideology. By using Seliger's conception of ideology we demonstrate that our political parties choose not to defend the coherent value core of their programs in order to fulfill 'technical' task of generating sufficient electoral support. Schwartzmantel's idea that neo-liberalism as a "classical" state-oriented ideology is attacked by a plenty of non-classical, network-organized ideologies nowadays does not fit our reality, because there is no. pronounced opposition between neo-liberal and critical political discourses. Thus, we argue there is no. normative foundation either for conflict or concord among ideological projects and, moreover, that ideological struggle on the Russian political arena has left classical political domain. It requires social sciences to renew its methodological implements for analyzing ideology properly, while philosophy faces with self-description challenge. © 2020 Saint Petersburg State University. All rights reserved.

The article analyzes the values of liberal ideology in the context of modern Russia on the example of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the programs of the parties "United Russia" and "Liberal Democratic Party of Russia". ; В статье проводится разбор положения ценностей либеральной идеологии в контексте современной России на примере Конституции РФ и программ партий «Единая Россия» и «Либерально-демократическая партия России».

В статье проанализированы взгляды видных отечественных исследователей разных эпох относительно места Балкан на геополитической карте Европы и во внешнеполитической стратегии России. В частности, подробно рассмотрены труды ведущих представителей таких научных течений, как славянофильство, неославизм, евразийство, неоевразийство. Автор приходит к выводу, что налицо преемственность этих течений, а сам балканский регион в представлениях рассмотренных исследователей имеет статус критически важного для России геополитического пространства.

For the most part, electoral and party research today is centered on the behavior of voters in two or four major clusters that can be conventionally placed on a scale from left to right. On the same scale, there are smaller groups whose value of separation is often questioned. This paper focuses on one of these groups: we consider a segment of voters united on the basis of their support for right-wing liberal parties and try to identify the most significant determinants of their choice. Based on the existing concepts of voting and data from the European Social Survey, 2016–2018, we generalize possible predictors – party and political selfidentification, ideological stances, social setting and material status – up to three theories ('ideological core', 'defectors' and 'winners'), and test their plausibility using regression tools. Modeling results show that for a number of parameters the separation of new subgroup is justified. First, we reject the hypothesis of a strategic non-voting for right-liberals (on the contrary, respondents often "strategically" vote for them rather than for some personally closer party). Second, we find similar characteristics of the voter profile in different European countries; in particular, people who share the values of non-interference (associated with opposition to income redistribution and cultural restrictions) are more inclined to electorally back the liberal right. On the other hand, for a complete picture it is not enough to indicate ideological or cleavage preferences: the fact of voting is strongly influenced by person's socio-economic background, confirming the earlier remarks about certain "privileges" in this electoral segment.