Suchergebnisse

The characteristic of the ideological crisis of our time is not the indication of the twilight of ideologies as much as the emphasizing of the profound need for a new ideological reference for social action. The situation is particularly interesting: (1) for the emphasis on some important aspects of ideological change, such as the weakening of the old ideologies; (2) for the attempts of new groups to present themselves as interpreters of new needs and to reconstruct new forms of consensus; (3) for the complex forms of what is called the "crisis of the modernity," as a crisis of the model of rationality of our epoch, which is no longer active, but can indefinitely produce the paralysis of social and political presentation. Faced with this situation, neoliberalism seems to represent the great new possibility for social cohesion, particularly by reviving the revolutionary and liberating spirit of the first liberalism.

The election of Kennedy serves to mark nothing less than the end of a neo-conservative decade & the beginning of a neo-liberal one, not only in the US but throughout the Western World. Wars often undermine existing soc structures which create a situation favorable to radical & liberal parties. Immediately after WWII, liberal gov's were formed in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, & GB. In the US, to the surprise of many, the Democrats, with the victory of Truman in 1948, held on to the presidency. During the 40's & 50's the pol'al tide began to flow to the right. Soc Democrats & Labor Parties started losing & in 1952 the US had its first Republican President in 20 yrs. While the Soc Democrats in Sweden, Norway & Israel managed to retain power during this period, the right-wing groups in all of these countries gained support at each election during the decade from the late 40's to the late 50's. A number of forces reversed the postwar upsurge of liberalism: (1) the econ forces - the economy of the West helped by a universal growth in pop, the Marshall Plan, & finally the Korean War produced prosperity. Under the impact of Khrushchev's revelations about the Stalinist Regime, & of the Hungarian Revolution, an endless number of intellectuals abandoned the Communist & left-Socialist Parties all over the Western World. Factor (2) undermining the left was the 'liberalization' of traditionally conservative Parties - in England the Tories preserved most of the soc security & nationalization measures introduced by the Labor Party; in the US, Eisenhower, rather than Taft was chosen to represent the Republicans. It was only in the late 50's that the new liberal wave first began to reveal itself. Perhaps the earliest sign was the Labor Party's return to office in New Zealand in 1957. In the US, the Democrats increased their control of the House & the Senate & also elected a large number of governors, senators & congressmen in traditionally Republican States such as Maine, Vermont, & Connecticut. The liberal trend continued to manifest itself in the `New Nixon,' & finally in the victory of Kennedy. Why is this shift to the left taking place? A series of small recessions have helped to undermine the post-WWII feeling of prosperity. In Europe, with the end of econ reconstruction, unions in Germany, the Netherlands & Austria are resuming their traditional role of pressing for a larger share of industrial income for their members. In the intellectual sphere, the ideological warfare against Communism has subsided. In the US, the declining pressure for conformity has led many ex-radicals & liberals to become vocal once more & pol'ly active. A new set of soc problems is working to make the 60's a decade of neo-liberalism. (a) The prime econ issue is no longer the redistribution of national income among the various SC's; the question now is the proportion in which national income will be parcelled out between public & private expenditure. It seems that leftwing Parties are more likely to come to grips with this issue than those of the right, since the former have traditionally recognized & articulated the need for public control of the economy. The Democrats in the US have gained votes because of their stress on federal aid to educ, res, & public health. (b) Another issue in 1960 was international relations. The left is more likely than the right to respond to the widespread desire for an international settlement of the cold war. Problem (c) concerns the complex issue of upward SM. As soon as newer members of the Mc realize that their econ gains have not been matched by a commensurate gain in SS, they seem to rebel against the parties that speak for the higher echelons of power & prestige. In the US, the Democrats won in part because they were led by a man who could be identified with the more covert desires for increased SM & opportunities felt by labor & the new Mc; in the ambitions & handicaps of a Catholic candidate these groups saw something of their own situation. V. D. Sanua.

COMMENTATORS puzzling over the question of whether the Brazilian insurrection of March-April, 1964, was a revolution or simply a coup d'état have speculated on the role of a faintly mysterious civilian organization called IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas Estudos Sociais) in the rebellion. IPES is one of a large number of organized civilian groups now covering all of Latin America except for Haiti and Cuba, groups which can be generically termed Neoliberal. The Brazilian rebellion is undoubtedly the greatest success the Neoliberals have had so far in their four or five years of existence (only three of the more than forty Neoliberal organizations were founded before 1959), and the only occasion on which they have been directly (though not uniquely) responsible for the overthrow of an incumbent regime. What the future role of IPES and similar groups will be in Brazil, and whether the transformation of the country will be a truly revolutionary one, remains to be seen, but the power mustered by the Neoliberals in half a decade is remarkable, and a factor which will have to be dealt with in the future.

SUMMARYThe Economic Theory of German neoliberalism comprises a certain conglomerate of an absolutely free choice of selecting an economic system on the one hand and a definite determination of the economic policy that results of this choice on the other; this conglomerate prevented the theory of neoliberalism to become a valid theory of economic policy. The former German neoliberalism reduces the categories of aims and means to the choice of the economic system, an unhistorical approach, because such a choice never happened at all. But such an approach enabled the neoliberal authors to reduce any economic policy to only conservate the market system. Even the modern approach of separating qualitative and quantitative policies pursues the same intentions: although indefensible positions vanished under the impression of Keynesian theories, nevertheless the definition of a genuine qualitative policy implicates that the latter has the function of conservating the market system. This distinction of qualitative and quantitative policy has another meaning than in the system of Tinbergen. Since the criteria of separation are ambiguous, even the modern approaches of German neoliberal economic policies remain inadequate compared with the modern theory of economic policy a la Tinbergen.