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From data panic to Moroccan panic: A qualitative analysis of large data collections using codes, code groups and networks in Atlas.ti
Large qualitative data collections can cause 'data panic' among qualitative researchers when reaching the stage of analysis. They often find it difficult to get a grip on such large data sets and to find a method of analysis that is both systematic and pragmatic and that can help them with this. In this article, I describe how I used a deductive and inductive method of analysis to get a grip on a large qualitative data collection (consisting of different formats) and how qualitative data analysis software facilitated this. This data reduction method consists of three stages: (1) deductive and inductive coding in Atlas.ti; (2) pattern coding in code groups and networks in Atlas.ti; and (3) reporting on the findings by transforming the networks into written text. This method is useful for researchers from all disciplines who want to analyze large qualitative data collections systematically, but at the same time do not want to drown in rigid methodological protocols that neutralize the creativity, reflexivity and flexibility of the researcher.

Sport is traditionally governed by international sports organizations (ISOs), which are at the top of self-regulatory networks that extend further over continental and local levels. These organizations attach great importance to their autonomous functioning, making any form of government interference in their activities is studiously avoided. For decades knew the world of sports in this way to enforce his own place in society: the idea of a kind of private government activities that normally are part of the job of a political system, exercises such as the issuing of rules and sanctions and conduct various forms of social policy. This sport largely escaped the normal application of general legal standards as the labor and tax law. In addition to the hierarchical structure of the self-regulatory networks in sport those at the bottom of these networks, ie clubs and players, rarely consulted and almost never actively involved in their policy processes. Adapted from the source document.

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

'It is undeniable that people in our current network and information society empowered and more independent than before. Are combined with the need to reduce the government deficit back, this leads to the classic welfare state slowly but surely turning into a participatory society. From anyone who may be asked to take responsibility for his or her own life and environment. 'Thus King Willem-Alexander in the most discussed part of his first speech from the throne. Prime Minister Rutte characterized the transition from welfare to society participation as a movement from the bottom up by citizens wanted and facilitated by the government. For this installment of the Symposium, we asked experts on the welfare state to reflect the transition indicated by the king. Romke van der Veen puts the development in the Netherlands in a number of major trends and then shows that we are at a crossroads where we can from different sides. Judith van der Veer discusses one of those sides: the transition from welfare to activation city. In the third contribution Flemish politician Mieke Vogels describes (Green, the Flemish green party) how they all late 90s tried to enter the participative society in Belgium and how the movement initiated by her reversed by subsequent ministers. Adapted from the source document.

Interrelations between 124 Dutch business Corp's & financial Co's & instit's are analyzed as they are generated by interlocking manag & supervision boards in 1969. In this graph-theoretical model the most important characteristics of the network of interlocking manag & supervision boards are found to be: (1) The network consists of one large component, in which nearly all big Corp's, financial Co's & instit's are connected by interlockings, & a small number of isolated elements. (2) The center of the network consists largely of financial Co's & instit's. (3) The center of the network of interlocking between the 60 financial Co's & instit's consists of 3 banks, 2 insurance Co's, 1 investment trust, 3 semi-gov'al financial instit's, & 1 mortgage bank. (4) The central financial Co's & instit's are connected by an extremely dense network: 86% of all pairs are directly connected by 1 or more interlockings. (5) The financial Co's & instit's in the center of the network between the 60 financial units also have the largest number of edges with the 64 business Corp's, together with 3 other financial units. (6) The connectivity & density in the network between the 64 business Corp's are also due to persons who are also manager or managing director in financial Co's or instit's. An interlocking constitutes at least a COMM channel between the Corp's. Moreover, managers & managing directors are chosen mainly by cooperation. Therefore the network is interpreted as one of COMM & cooperation. Corp's, Co's, & instit's in the center of the network of interlockings are able to gather & distribute a large amount of information which gives them power: the ability to determine the outcomes of decision making processes, resulting in value allocations. 2 Figures, 9 Tables. Modified HA.