There is a widespread agreement in modern democracies that a state should not force its citizens to lead lives they do not endorse themselves. It is also generally agreed that state acts should not be justified by appealing to the authority of religious books. Such claims are often reformulated as holding that state action should be neutral with respect to the ideals of the good life, or that the justification of state acts should be neutral with respect to basic beliefs. But does the use of the term neutral add anything important to the original wording? Does it point to a common principle - a principle of state neutrality (PSN) - that unites such judgments? If it does, what normative work PSN is supposed to do? What is its basis? What are the things towards which it requires the acts of the relevant type to be neutral? Such questions call for a theory of neutrality. The theory of neutrality has its natural home in the liberal tradition. Liberalism had a neutralist bent since its beginnings. But a systematic account of PSN was not laid out before the 1970s and '80s when John Rawls and others restated the foundations of liberal theory. While particular neutrality judgments are widely accepted, the general conception of liberal neutrality elicited strong critical reactions. Some of the critiques took liberalism's commitment to neutrality as evidence that the liberal view of the individual, society, and politics is deeply flawed. Others attacked liberal neutrality as reflecting a mistaken interpretation of what liberalism really is about. The debate subsided in the last decade or so, without settling, however, on a standard view. State neutrality remains a controversial idea. This article tries to spell out its main tenets and to explain how they hang together. It examines the central objections, and explores revisions that may enhance the theory's defensibility.
There is a widespread agreement in modern democracies that a state should not force its citizens to lead lives they do not endorse themselves. It is also generally agreed that state acts should not be justified by appealing to the authority of religious books. Such claims are often reformulated as holding that state action should be neutral with respect to the ideals of the good life, or that the justification of state acts should be neutral with respect to basic beliefs. But does the use of the term neutral add anything important to the original wording? Does it point to a common principle -a principle of state neutrality (PSN)- that unites such judgments? If it does, what normative work PSN is supposed to do? What is its basis? What are the things towards which it requires the acts of the relevant type to be neutral? Such questions call for a theory of neutrality. The theory of neutrality has its natural home in the liberal tradition. Liberalism had a neutralist bent since its beginnings. But a systematic account of PSN was not laid out before the 1970s and '80s when John Rawls and others restated the foundations of liberal theory. While particular neutrality judgments are widely accepted, the general conception of liberal neutrality elicited strong critical reactions. Some of the critiques took liberalism's commitment to neutrality as evidence that the liberal view of the individual, society, and politics is deeply flawed. Others attacked liberal neutrality as reflecting a mistaken interpretation of what liberalism really is about. The debate subsided in the last decade or so, without settling, however, on a standard view. State neutrality remains a controversial idea. This article tries to spell out its main tenets and to explain how they hang together. It examines the central objections, and explores revisions that may enhance the theory's defensibility.
Most major economies use a value added tax (VAT) which is a derivation of the French 1954 taxe sur la valeur ajoutée. The initial imposition of VAT in France and its spread around the world have been driven by economic reasons. This book focuses on one of these economic triggers: the neutrality of VAT as regards the functioning of the economy. It demonstrates that the reason VAT was chosen in France and why thereafter it spread around the world was because it offered the possibility to collect governmental revenue while allowing the economic forces of the market to interplay without being adversely affected. 0The prerequisite conditions for the existence of VAT neutrality are therefore identified herein along with an overview of the VAT mechanism, demonstrating that the concept of neutrality is built into the VAT system in a manner that allows for the preservation of the natural functioning of the market. After the definition of VAT neutrality is set forth, the elements that comprise VAT neutrality are tested against the realities on the ground and the issues that infringe the neutrality of VAT are identified and analysed. In conclusion, remedies for these issues are being sought by a review of the causes of infringement of VAT neutrality in the perspective of selected proposals for modified VAT systems. These proposals include redesignating the place where VAT is levied and improving VAT collection. Ultimately, the proposed solution has recourse to the roots of VAT together with the most advanced technological tools available to give back to VAT the power to levy revenue while letting the economic forces of the market interplay without instigating any adverse influence
[EN]The Spanish government maintained a benevolent neutrality policy towards the Entente Powers during the First World War. Liberal and Conservative cabinets decided it was the only position consistent with their country's traditionally friendly relations with Great Britain and France. ; Peer reviewed
The growing importance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the global marketplace has given rise to concerns about how to ensure competitive neutrality ? a level playing field ? where public and private entities compete. The book aims to serve as a resource for governments that intend to ensure that public and private businesses compete on equal terms. It provides a catalogue of relevant practices and experiences in OECD and other jurisdictions. The publication is structured around eight ?building blocks? of competitive neutrality including how to ensure debt, tax or regulatory neutrality; ca
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
The aim of this article is to assess the sustainability of neutrality in the early Cold War. This issue is examined through the study of Switzerland's armament policy. The Swiss were able to maintain their status of a permanent neutral after the Second World War, and thus succeeded in upholding a centuries-long policy. Their armed neutrality, however, required modern weaponry. In search of this material Switzerland turned to the West, while refusing to purchase weapons from the East. The paper argues that Switzerland's self-imposed policy of armed neutrality increased Swiss dependence on western armaments, and thereby endangered its neutrality status and policy. Adapted from the source document.
In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich (gegen John Rawls und andere) erstens dafür, dass perfektionistische Gründe gute Gründe für Gesetze sind, die ein Staat erlässt, ohne, zweitens, die These zu teilen, die Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom vertritt, dass nur die Gesetze eines Staates legitim sind, die mit perfektionistischen Gründen gerechtfertigt werden können – weil alle anderen die Autonomie der Bürger notwendig verletzen würden. Im ersten Punkt halte ich den Perfektionismus für die Standardposition, und die gängigen liberalen Argumente für einen neutralen Staat überzeugen nicht, egal ob sie als ökumenische oder nicht-neutrale vertreten werden. Die ökumenischen Argumente, wie sie etwa bei Rawls und Bruce Ackerman zu finden sind, überzeugen nicht, weil sich ihre behauptete Neutralität letztlich als schädlich parteiisch erweist. Die nicht-neutralen Argumente, die unter anderem von Rawls und Charles Larmore angeführt werden, reichen nicht aus, um die Notwendigkeit eines Prinzips der staatlichen Neutralität zu begründen. Und zwar aus verschiedenen Gründen: Einer dieser Gründe ist, dass die Berufung der Konsequenzialisten auf den Wert der Autonomie übersieht, dass der Wert der Autonomie in Wertkonflikten anderen Werten nicht überlegen ist, und ein zweiter Grund wäre, dass Rawls in seinem Appell an die "Bürden des Urteils", etwa in seinem Buch Political Liberalism, eher voraussetzt als zeigt, dass Respekt vor der Autonomie der Bürger die staatliche Förderung des Guten ausschließt. Zu dem zweiten Punkt mache ich geltend, dass es unerheblich ist, ob die These von Raz, dass Autonomie wertlos wird, wenn den Bürgern nicht ausreichend gute Optionen an Lebensformen zur Verfügung stehen, zwischen denen sie wählen können, überzeugend ist oder nicht, weil daraus nicht folgt, dass der Staat das Gute in jedem möglichen politischen System fördern muss. Es ist einfach nicht der Fall, dass die Zahl der den Staatsbürgern offenstehenden wertvollen Lebensformen unter eine Schwelle fällt, die den Wert der Autonomie erst möglich macht, sobald der Staat das Gute nicht fördert. ; I argue, in this dissertation, first, that, contrary to the views of John Rawls and others, governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of perfectionist judgements, but second, that the claim, in particular as it is argued for in Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom, that governments must make policy on a perfectionist basis, failing which the autonomy of citizens will be damaged, cannot be sustained. I argue the first point on the grounds that perfectionism is the default position, and that standard liberal arguments, which I categorise as either ecumenical or non-neutral, for a principle of state neutrality fail. The ecumenical arguments, which I discover in the writings of Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, fail because their purported neutrality turns out to be damagingly partisan. The non-neutral arguments, which I discover in the writings of, amongst others, Rawls and Charles Larmore, fall short of establishing the necessity of a principle of state neutrality for a number of widely-differing reasons, which include, for example, that a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy cannot establish that the good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in all conflicts of goods which might arise, and that Rawls's appeal to the burdens of judgement, founds in his Political Liberalism, assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out state promotion of the good. I argue the second point on the grounds that although Raz is correct in arguing that autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the good in any and every possible political dispensation, as it is simply not the case that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their autonomy to be worth having.