Suchergebnisse

In Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway, the Supreme Court upheld a legislative prayer practice with overwhelmingly Christian prayers in part because the Court concluded that the exclusion of all other religions was unintentional. This requirement-that a religiously disparate impact must be intentional before it amounts to an establishment violation-is new for Establishment Clause doctrine. An intent requirement, however, is not new for equal protection or free exercise claims. This Essay explores the increased symmetry between the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause. It argues that many of the critiques of the intentional discrimination standard made in the equal protection context apply in the establishment context. It also argues that free exercise and establishment jurisprudence still differ substantially despite their superficial symmetry.

The book "Non-discrimination in Turkey" focuses on issue areas within the broader non-discrimination framework in Turkey. It looks domestic change in Turkey regarding non-discrimination across time. The book unpacks the principle of non-discrimination and provides analysis in many issue areas like LGBTI rights, disability rights or age discrimination that rely under the framework of non-discrimination. Adopting a comprehensive approach including many areas within non-discrimination, the book will be useful for the students, scholars and researchers of international relations, political science, Middle East and Turkish studies and those interested in human rights. Gozde Ylmaz is Associate Professor in Atlm University, Turkey. S.

Chapter 1. Introduction: Exploring Non-discrimination in Turkey.-Chapter 2. Non-discrimination of Religious Minorities in Turkey: Is it a fairytale? -- Chapter 3. Combating Discrimination against women in Turkey: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects -- Chapter 4. LGBTI Rights in Turkey in the 2000s: Inertia due to Political Resistance -- Chapter 5. The Invisibles: Seasonal Agricultural Workers of Turkey from a Non-discrimination Perspective -- Chapter 6. Towards inclusion of disabled citizens in Turkey: Harmonisation of the UN and the EU policies -- Chapter 7. Age Discrimination in Employment: The State of Inertia in Turkey -- Chapter 8. Change and Continuity of Migration Policies: Discrimination of People of Concern -- Chapter 9. Non-discrimination and Civil Society in Turkey -- Chapter 10. Conclusion.

Many low-wage workers in the United States are subject to non-compete clauses, which forbid them to work for competitors. Empirical research has found a link between the prevalence of non-compete clauses and minimum wage legislation. To explain this link, we propose a moral hazard model with minimum wages. Non-compete clauses can be used to punish failure. We characterize the optimal contracts with and without the possibility to use a non-compete clause. We find that the principal only uses a non-compete clause if minimum wages are sufficiently high. Non-compete clauses transfer utility from the agent to the principal because they increase the equilibrium effort without increasing the wages. If non-compete clauses can be arbitrarily severe, there is no minimum wage for which the agent gets a rent. If non-compete clauses are bounded, both the principal and the agent might be made better off than without non-compete clauses.