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"This book examines Hezbollah's transition from a domestic into a regional armed non-state actor (ANSA). Taking its point of departure in Hezbollah's historiography on the military and political levels in Lebanon, it focuses on the participation of Hezbollah's troops in Syria's sect-coded civil war. Initially limited, Hezbollah's intervention in the Syrian conflict gradually increased into a full-scale engagement across vast swathes of Syrian territory, with Hezbollah instrumentalizing its sectarian (Shiʻa) identity to justify its engagement. Sect-centric narratives and victimhood were a mere tool for what was a geopolitical confrontation, and Hezbollah's involvement launched it to becoming a regional ANSA. The book outlines that this transition was only plausible because of the interplay between three factors: Hezbollah's sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of its sectarian identity; the shift into a quasi-army combining classical with guerrilla tactics and formations; and its embedding as a partner in the axis which now extends from Beirut to Tehran. It was in 2018 that a set of conditions, impossible to reproduce, allowed Hezbollah to reach its culmination on both the domestic and regional theatres. This book shows that ANSAs are playing prominent roles in the regional order in the Middle East. Meticulously researched, Hezbollah is a comprehensive study ideal for upper-level undergraduates and above with an interest in Middle East studies, Middle East politics and international relations"--

Intro -- Endorsements -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- Questions Addressed -- The Plausibility of Transitions -- A Theoretical Framework: ANSAs and Sectarianism -- Explaining the Terminologies -- Map of the Book -- Notes -- 2. Background, Emergence, and Religious and Political Allegiances -- Historical Background -- The Nexus between Hezbollah and Iran's Islamic Republic: Wilayat al-Faqih -- Debating Hezbollah -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 3. Lebanon: Hezbollah's Den -- First Parliamentary Elections: Infitah Policy -- Post-Syria Withdrawal: Into the Government -- Memorandum of Understanding -- The July War: Toward a New Power Balance? -- The "7 May" Clashes and the Doha Agreement: A Sect-Coded Confrontation -- Aoun's Rise to Power -- En 'Odtom 'Odna: Arsal's Barren Hills -- The 2018 Parliamentary Elections: Hezbollah's Massive Win -- Hezbollah's Response to the 17 October Uprising -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 4. The Geopolitical Contest and Hezbollah's Sect-Centricity -- Palestine: Hezbollah's raison d'être -- Hezbollah in Post-Saddam Iraq -- The Battle for Syria -- From al-Qusayr to Qalamoun: Hezbollah's Sectarian Mobilization -- The Frenzied Hours of the War: Demystifying Hezbollah's Full-Scale Engagement -- Hezbollah in the Saudi Backyard: Yemen -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 5. The Transition: A Regional Armed Non-State Actor -- Syria's Sect-Coded Conflict: The War of Necessity -- Hezbollah's Political Instrumentalization of Sectarian Identity -- The Shift to a Quasi-Army -- From Beirut to Tehran: A Partnership Demystified -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 6. Hezbollah's Paroxysm: What Next? -- Notes -- Index.

This article outlines several categories of Private Military Companies(PMCs) to distinguish between the different military services these organisations provide. In doing so, the article argues that an appropriate category is needed to understand the military operations these companies undertake. The article suggests that the PMCs can be divided into four categories: the Combat Offensive PMC, the Combat Defensive PMC, the Non-Combat Offensive PMC, and finally the Non-Combat Defensive PMC

AbstractAs the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.

Existing research argues that refugee inflows may increase the risk of domestic conflict, particularly civil war that, by definition, involves the state as an actor. However, many of the postulated mechanisms linking refugees to a higher risk of such conflict pertain to tensions with locals, which do not necessarily involve any grievances against government authorities. We contend that it is more likely to identify an association between refugees and non-state actor violence, that is, armed violence between organized non-state groups, neither of which pertains to the state. We also claim that the extent to which refugees are associated with a higher likelihood of non-state conflict depends on the capacity of governments to manage and mitigate risks. We report evidence that refugee populations can be linked to an increased risk of non-state conflict, as well as for a mitigating effect of state capacity on the risk of non-state conflicts in the presence of refugees. We do not find a clear effect of refugee populations on civil war, suggesting that the link depends on existing conflict cleavages relevant to mobilizing refugees or locals. Our research helps to shed light on the relevant security consequences of managing refugee populations. Despite the common arguments portraying refugees as security risks in developed countries, the risk of non-state conflict applies primarily to weak states that have been forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden in hosting refugees.

Abstract
The article considers responses by different categories of actor to the threat of armed non-state actors in the international intervention in Afghanistan 2001-2015. Concepts from the sociology of risk, in particular risk-management and the distinction between operational and reputational risk, are related to field research in Afghanistan during the intervention. The 'risk society' approach of Beck (2009) is critiqued as relatively inapplicable to a discussion of differences in risks to and responses by different categories of actor. The article identifies some convergences of practice across three categories of intervening actor, civil-developmental, counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist, in particular tendencies to risk-transfer and remote-management that draws together theorisation of civil practice by Duffield (2010) and military practice by Shaw (2002). This is problematised relative to difficulties in managing tensions between operational risks to intervening actors and reputational risks vis-à-vis local actors.

Islamist territorially anchored violent non-state actors (ITAVNSAs) seeking to change the status quo of the current international system constitute one of the greatest challenges the international order based on mutual respect of equal sovereign states. These actors in areas without the presence of power states use explicit cross-border violence to achieve their objective in accordance with universal Islamist ideology - the construction of a caliphate. The paper presents in the theoretical and modern historical perspectives methods of reduction of anarchy in the international system - power, economic, legalistic and normative - and highlights the reasons why face to face of these actors, these heretofore functional ways, be it on a regional or system level of analysis, fail.

History is replete with examples of militaries that have used denial and deception to gain victory on the battlefield. Denial withholds accurate information from an adversary, while deception puts forward misleading information that conforms to the expectations of an opponent. Recently, the advent of the information age has allowed small non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations, to engage in denial and deception—with often devastating results. Unfortunately, states have been slow to adjust, which has allowed terrorist groups to carry out their attacks while hiding in plain sight of their targets.

History is replete with examples of militaries that have used denial & deception to gain victory on the battlefield. Denial withholds accurate information from an adversary, while deception puts forward misleading information that conforms to the expectations of an opponent. Recently, the advent of the information age has allowed small non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations, to engage in denial & deception-with often devastating results. Unfortunately, states have been slow to adjust, which has allowed terrorist groups to carry out their attacks while hiding in plain sight of their targets. Adapted from the source document.