Suchergebnisse

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

This article investigates what happens when governmental actors foster the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in treaty ratification and implementation decisions. NSAs, being non-governmental organisations, business groups, citizens, or research institutions among others represent interests that will be ultimately impacted by policy choices. While governments have long consulted them on an ad hoc basis, a "deliberative turn" happened in the 2000s to encourage their involvement, for greater legitimacy and transparency, through among others, the use of public consultations. This proactive turn raises questions about public consultations: are such instruments effective? Do they encourage new thinking? Do they matter for final decisions? This article answers these questions by investigating, using among others lexicometry tools, the public consultation organised by the European Commission in 2011 prior to the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing (ABS) by the European Union in 2014. The results are mixed. While the studied public consultation favoured the expression of small national NSAs the process is still poorly inclusive. NSAs did not propose any fresh ideas on the ABS issue and their final influence on European decision-makers is blurred by the diversity of interests expressed.

Emiliano J. Buis examines the sources of classical Greece to challenge both the state-centeredness of mainstream international legal history and the omnipresence of war and excessive violence in ancient times. Making ample use of epigraphic as well as literary, rhetorical, and historiographical sources, the book offers the first widespread account of the narrative foundations of the (il)legality of warfare in the classical Hellenic world. In a clear yet sophisticated manner, Buis convincingly proves that the traditionally neglected study of the performance of ancient Greek poleis can contribute to a better historical understanding of those principles of international law underlying the practices and applicable rules on the use of force and the conduct of hostilities

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα Ελληνικά. ; En s'appuyant sur un échantillon de manuels scolaires grecs de lecture et d'histoire utilisés dans l'école primaire par excellence, cette étude cherche à suivre les manifestations de fanatisme nationaliste de 1880 à nos jours. Du point de vue analytique on distingue trois étapes: la construction et l'adoption d'une identité nationale; l'ethnocentrisme dogmatique; le chauvinisme fanatique qui se distingue par l'agressivité et le support de la violence envers l'ccautre». On constate que les ennemis de la nation grecque ont été déjà définis avant les guerres balkaniques mais que le fanatisme envers eux dans les manuels scolaires connaît des fluctuations suivant la conjoncture politique (guerre froide, danger communiste et slave etc.). Pendant la dictature des colonels d'ailleurs apparaît dans les manuels le fanatisme contre un ennemi intérieur, l'«autre)> politique et social, les communistes. Après la chute de la dictature cependant, et malgré les survivances d'ethnocentrisme, les manifestations fanatiques disparaissent.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Yiannis Papatheodorou, a The cruel April of 1944»: Fiction, History and Memory in Straus Tsirkas's Drifting Cities Stratis Tsirkas, a distinguished Greek diaspora novelist in Egypt, published his important and controversial trilogy {The Club, Ariagne, The Bat), in the early '60s. The novel is situated in three colonial Mediterranean cities —Jerusalem, Cairo and Alexandria— drifting towards chaos in a war-torn Middle East, during 1942-1944. As far as the plot is concerned, the trilogy is inscribed to the wider context of postwar European literary «master-narratives» elaborating representations of war, Nazism and resistance, and also opening an agenda to the traumatic phenomena of a discontinuous modernity: violence, social repression, exclusion of the Other. This article discusses the politics of history and memory in Stratis Tsirkas's trilogy Drifting Cities in order to show how he problematizes the tropes of historical representation in a dialogical perspective, by focalizing to the Greek military left underground «movement of April 1944». His historical point of view, which clearly can be identified as the «return of the repressed», is related to the questions of an alternative narration about the past, enriched within a critical and deliberating interpretation of the left collective memory.

In Belgium, the idea of 'openness' is a well spread notion in electoral political discourses and the 2012 local election in Wallonia is no exception to this trend. Despite a clear victory, it is indeed very common for local political leaders in Belgium to announce that they will open their majority to other lists. The idea of 'openness' is also part of the local electoral campaign in terms of recruitment: non-partisan candidates – who clearly want to distinguish themselves from the party – are recruited to figure on the lists as 'independent candidates'. They are called 'candidates d'ouverture' as a sign of openness towards the civil society, the opposition, or dissidents from other political parties. Actually, these candidates are recruited for various reasons: there are sometimes used to demonstrate the citizen character of the list, to enhance the fact that the list 'makes politics differently from established political parties', to underline the local roots of the list, and sometimes the 'candidates d'ouverture' are simply used to complete vacancies on a list.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; This paper discusses the politics of historical interpretation as manifested in E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class. The discussion addresses two main areas of interest:a. The structure of the conceptual framework that organises historical narration and grounds historical analysis and interpretation. It is argued that this framework is based on his insistence on the privileged character of historiography as a field of knowledge and as a critical perspective for social and political perspective on the one hand. The conceptual framework also consists of Thompson's conviction that in the process of class formation experience is the sine qua non historical catalyst that intervenes between the social being (modes of production) and class consciousness. These analytical inclinations are explored with reference to Thompson's engagement with the discussion over marxist reductionism on the one hand, and althusserian structuralism on the other.b. Finally, an attempt is made to trace the particularities of the historical context within which Thompson's perspective was shaped, as well as the influence that his work has had on the orientations of social studies during the period of the 1970s and 1980s.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Le texte se rapporte au caractère de la lutte des producteurs du raisin sec du Nord-Est du Péloponnèse et à leurs revendications, quand, à la fin du XIXème siècle ils ont été touchés par la crise du raisin sec. Ce mouvement social sort du cadre d'une lutte des classes. Il ne s'agit pas, comme il a été dit, d'une lutte des agriculteurs contre les grands propriétaires fonciers, contre le capital ou contre l'Etat. La lutte pour sauver le raisin sec et tous ceux qui en vivaient, exprime une protestation globale de toutes les couches sociales touchées par la crise. Les populations touchées remettent leur avenir à l'Etat et à sa politique économique dont dépend leur survie. L'Etat n'est pas pris en compte comme étant l'image d'une classe souveraine, mais comme n'étant pas l'image du «monde» du raisin sec. C'est ainsi que la défense des producteurs du raisin sec du Sud du pays résonne comme une défense d'intérêts locals et communs, ayant comme mandataire direct le Parlement. Les demandes et les revendications des intéressés directs sont mises sur le tapis à travers des manifestations de combat nouvelles pour la société grecque, comme les groupements commerciaux, fonciers et agricoles, les associations, et surtout les grandes mobilisations, les manifestations massives, les décrets et les pétitions au gouvernement, au Parlement et au Roi. Toutes les couches de la société participent à cette lutte qui est menée aussi bien par les citadins que par les campagnards. Les litiges qui fleurissent ne font pas s'affronter les classes sociales, mais les différentes régions qui, selon la qualité du raisin sec qu'elles produisaient, avaient des intérêts opposés. Ces régions s'affrontaient d'une telle manière que les gens de l'époque parlaient d'une «Seconde Guerre du Péloponnèse». On mentionne notamment les positions des députés durant les débats au Parlement sur les solutions à la question du raisin sec. Il est intéressant de noter que les députés du Péloponnèse se montrent en majorité d'accord avec les revendications faites dans leur propre circonscription électorale, et non avec les positions du parti auquel ils appartenaient.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The declaration of the establishment of the «Kingdom of Serbs, Groats and Slovenes» on the 1st of December, 1918 —which in 1929 was renamed to Yugoslavia— fulfilled the long standing desire for the political unification of all South-Slavs. However, the new State which apart from the three old kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia included the entities of the former Hungarian Vojvodina, the former Austrian Slovenia and Dalmatia and the Serbian Macedonia had to tackle certain problems. Its subjects were divided into several ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes —who constituted three quarters of its entire population— and Germans, Hungarians and Albanians as well as other ethnic minorities. The population of the new state was also divided into three religious categories: 47% were Orthodox Christians, 39% Catholics, and 11% Muslims. This paper attempts to analyze five constructive crises which came about in interwar Yugoslavia, and are characteristic of any modern state: 1) The crisis of identity of the state itself and of the various ethnic groups. The ideology of Yugoslavian unification failed to bridge the differences between the ethnic and religious groups; 2) The crisis of legitimacy. This is related with the nature of the regime. From 1918 until the dictatorship of 1929 twenty three governmental crises occured; 3) The crisis of integration, as reflected in the policies and the electoral results of the various political parties which had clear ethnic and geographical limits. During the interwar period none of the existing political parties attained to play this integrating role by securing mass support throughout the country; 4) The crisis of participation of individuals and social groups in controlling the public affairs and manning the state apparatus; 5) The crisis of distribution of goods and services. The ethnic and political contradictions between the Slovenes and Croats in the North and Serbs in the South resulted in the uneven development between these two geographical districts of the state.

Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.