Suchergebnisse

This paper introduces the `noncompensatory principle' of coalition formation. This principle states that in a choice situation, a negative or low score on the political dimension cannot be compensated for with a positive score on other dimensions (see Mintz, 1993; Mintz and Geva, 1994a, b; Mintz et al., 1994). The link between the `noncompensatory principle' and the size of coalitions is then discussed. Based on the `noncompensatory' logic I propose that ceteris paribus, intra-party rivalry is likely to lead to the formation of coalitions larger than necessary to win, whereas inter-party conflict is more likely to lead to the formation of narrow coalitions. The Israeli examples of 1988 and 1990 demonstrate the applicability of this theme to real-world situations.

The concept of policy makers' familiarity with a decision task has received considerable attention in recent years in the literature on decision making by analogy, intuitive decision making, and dynamic versus static decision making. The effect of familiarity on the decision strategy change of high-ranking officers of the U.S. Air Force is tested to see whether and how familiar versus unfamiliar decision tasks affect decision strategy change during the decision-making process. Results support the noncompensatory principle of political decision making and poliheuristic theory: Leaders are sensitive to negative political advice, which is often noncompensatory. They first use dimensions to eliminate noncompensatory alternatives and then evaluate acceptable alternatives. This two-stage process is even more pronounced in unfamiliar decision settings with low or high levels of ambiguity—a situation that characterizes many foreign policy crises.

Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PH postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a "noncompensatory principle" to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the author applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles in this issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statistical, experimental).