Tommie Shelby articulates a nonideal theory of black US ghettos that casts them as consequences of an intolerably unjust institutional structure. I argue that, despite some of its significant merits, Shelby's theory is weakened by his rejection of integration as a principle for reforming disadvantaged ghettos and correcting structural injustices in the US. In particular, I argue that Shelby unwarrantedly downplays the socio-economic efficiency of integrationist policies and fails to consider some of the ways in which integration might count as a duty of (corrective) justice.
Tessman points out a tendency to not acknowledge the difficulties that impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failures create in moral life, and traces this tendency through several different literatures, from scholarship on Holocaust testimony to discussions of ideal and nonideal theory, from theories of supererogation to debates about moral demandingness, and to feminist care ethics
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This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls' theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all.
Implicit in feminist and other critiques of ideal theorizing is a particular view of what normative theory should be like. Although I agree with the rejection of ideal theorizing that oppression theorists (and other theorists of justice) have advocated, the proposed alternative of nonideal theorizing is also problematic. Nonideal theorizing permits one to address oppression by first describing (nonideal) oppressive conditions, and then prescribing the best action that is possible or feasible given the conditions. Borrowing an insight from the "moral dilemmas debate"—namely that moral wrongdoing or failure can be unavoidable—I suggest that offering (only) action-guidance under nonideal conditions obscures the presence and significance of unavoidable moral failure. An adequate normative theory should be able to issue a further, non-action-guiding evaluative claim, namely that the best that is possible under oppressive conditions is not good enough, and may constitute a moral failure. I find exclusively action-guiding nonideal theory to be both insufficiently nonidealizing (because it idealizes the moral agent by falsely characterizing the agent as always able to avoid moral wrongdoing) and meanwhile too strongly adapted to the nonideal (because normative expectations are lowered and detrimentally adapted to options that, while the best possible, are still unacceptable).
The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation. Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one's freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person's level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones. In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom's anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed. Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a 'right to be heard', which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice. ; Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d'égalité. J'y défends l'idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s'articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse. La partie (A) est consacrée à l'élaboration d'une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s'agit de réhabiliter l'intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d'être ce que l'on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu'ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu'une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu'un agent réalisera un phénomène. L'étendue de la liberté d'une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d'une personne s'obtient en multipliant l'étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu'elle préfère authentiquement. Dans la partie (B), je défends l'idée qu'une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l'égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l'égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu'elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu'elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu'elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l'égalité stricte et continue comme critère s'appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d'efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l'égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l'égalité sont des idéaux qui s'opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d'une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d'un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie. Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d'Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l'idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l'idéal. Deuxièmement, j'applique ce modèle à l'idéal d'Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l'importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu'aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d'exemple, j'évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d'un « droit d'être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d'Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d'une théorie de la justice sociale. ; (ISP 3) -- UCL, 2012
The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation. Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one's freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person's level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones. In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom's anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed. Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a 'right to be heard', which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice. ; Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d'égalité. J'y défends l'idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s'articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse. La partie (A) est consacrée à l'élaboration d'une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s'agit de réhabiliter l'intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d'être ce que l'on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu'ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu'une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu'un agent réalisera un phénomène. L'étendue de la liberté d'une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d'une personne s'obtient en multipliant l'étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu'elle préfère authentiquement. Dans la partie (B), je défends l'idée qu'une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l'égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l'égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu'elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu'elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu'elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l'égalité stricte et continue comme critère s'appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d'efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l'égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l'égalité sont des idéaux qui s'opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d'une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d'un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie. Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d'Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l'idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l'idéal. Deuxièmement, j'applique ce modèle à l'idéal d'Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l'importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu'aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d'exemple, j'évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d'un « droit d'être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d'Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d'une théorie de la justice sociale. ; (ISP 3) -- UCL, 2012
This article considers how Margaret Jane Radin's theory of the feminist double bind can bring conceptual clarity to the difficulties feminisms face in engaging with political and legal institutions of global governance. I draw on her theory to reinitiate a conversation on ideal and nonideal theory, in order to answer the call of key proponents in international legal feminism to reevaluate methodologies in critiquing mainstream institutions. By providing an account of how to navigate the double bind, this article brings conceptual clarity to the tension between resistance and compliance that has been argued to lie at the heart of the feminist project in international law. I demonstrate how this theoretical framework can foster greater pluralist perspectives in feminist engagement of ideal theories to temper the deradicalising and conservative risk of navigating feasibility constrained nonideal strategies.
School boosters are tax-exempt organizations that engage in fundraising efforts to provide public schools with supplementary resources. This paper argues that prevailing forms of school boosting are defeasibly unjust. Section 1 shows that inequalities in public education funding in the United States violate John Rawls's two principles of domestic justice. Section 2 argues that prevailing forms of school boosting exacerbate and plausibly perpetuate these injustices. Section 3 then contends that boosting thereby defeasibly violates Rawlsian principles of nonideal theory for rectifying injustice. Thus, boosting should be presumptively either made illegal or substantially reformed. Finally, Section 4 responds to potential objections.
Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund's analysis of 'ability' as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance – that the motivationally deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory – not just nonideal theory – to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.
In: Joel Michael Reynolds," Conditioning Principles: On Bioethics and The Problem of Ableism," in Applying Nonideal Theory to Bioethics: Living and Dying in a Nonideal World, eds. Elizabeth Victor and Laura Guidry-Grimes. Springer: Philosophy & Medicine Series, Forthcoming
Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund's analysis of 'ability' as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance – that the motivationally deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory – not just nonideal theory – to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.
Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund's analysis of 'ability' as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance – that the motivationally deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory – not just nonideal theory – to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.
Political theorists concerned with ways to counteract the oligarchic tendencies of representative government have recently paid more attention to the employment of "class-specific institutions" (CSIs)—that is, political institutions that formally exclude wealthy elites from decision-making power. This article disputes a general objection levelled against the justifiability of CSIs, according to which their democratic credentials are outweighed by their explicit transgression of formal political equality—what I call the political equality objection. I claim that, although CSIs do not satisfy political equality fully, their exclusionary thrust is inter alia justified in virtue of the fact that they unfold against the background of badly ordered, class-divided societies. Parallel to recent arguments in nonideal theory arguing for the priority of the right to resist economic oppression over the protection of private property rights, access to the empowering properties of CSIs should take priority over the full satisfaction of formal political equality. Yet, I also claim that the justification of CSIs depends on their orientation toward overcoming class divisions because, otherwise, we might end up wrongly naturalizing those divisions—a conclusion that needs to be avoided to reply to the political equality objection. The result is, I believe, a convincing egalitarian case for the democratic justifiability of CSIs.
This article argues that rising economic inequality and the decline in political trust across Western countries have systematic normative implications for Western governments' pursuit of climate justice. The article argues that it is an essential but neglected task of nonideal political theory to identify political feasibility constraints on the pursuit of climate justice and reflect on how to overcome them. The article identifies two feasibility constraints in contemporary Western countries, the inequality constraint and the legitimation constraint, as important elements of a nonideal theory of climate justice. It argues that the French Gilets Jaunes (yellow vests) movement arose as a form of bottom-up motivational resistance to President Macron's decarbonization policies, precisely because those policies did not take sufficient heed of the inequality and legitimation constraints. Furthermore, the article sketches elements of a roadmap for a feasible pathway for Western governments to decarbonize and observe their citizens' duties of climate justice and argues that the framework of feasibility constraints offers a coherent, novel and urgent rationale for adopting redistributive measures such as the Carbon Fee and Dividend and participatory-democratic measures such as Citizen Assemblies as component parts of a feasible pathway to a decarbonized economy.