Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the various ways in which nonideal theory responds to noncompliance with ideal principles of justice. Taking Rawls' definition of nonideal theory as my point of departure, I propose an understanding of this concept as comprising two subparts: Complementary nonideal theory responds to deliberate and avoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of civil disobedience, rebellion, and retribution. Substitutive nonideal theory responds to nondeliberate and unavoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of transition and caretaking. I further argue that a special case of substitutive nonideal theory may arise when noncompliance is a result of a lack of motivation among citizens. This situation, I suggest, calls for nonideal theorizing (1) when our aim is to evaluate the political actions undertaken by specific members of a society (in particular the ruling elite) whose set of feasible options is constrained as a result of others' lack of motivation and (2) when a situation of mutually reinforcing distrust and noncooperation—sometimes called a "social trap"—constrains the feasible option set of the entire population. The main advantage of the twofold conceptualization of nonideal theory is that it bridges the theoretical gap between actor-oriented and situation-based accounts of justice: It allows us to preserve the term ideal justice for justice under minimal feasibility constraints, while recognizing that a situation where all agents comply with their duties must in some sense be characterized as just.

Recent revelations of Iran's hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment programs have once again incited western fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons' capability. Their fears seem motivated by more than the concern for compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, they seem strongly connected to the western moral assumptions about what kind of government or people can be trusted with a nuclear arsenal. In this paper, I critically examine the western assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear proliferation from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to give it unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. In contrast to the uses of Kant that were prominent during the Cold War, I advance and apply a sketch of a Kantian nonideal theory that specifies the conditions (althoughstrictconditions) under which nuclear proliferation for states like Iran is morally permissibleeven thoughthe NPT forbids it.

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and
nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A
Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the
importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the
distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the
article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into
ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it
is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of
work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.

Abstract:This essay discusses the relation between ideal theory and two forms of political
moralism identified by Bernard Williams, structural and enactment views. It
argues that ideal theory, at least in the sense Rawls used that term, only makes
sense for structural forms of moralism. These theories see their task as
describing the constraints that properly apply to political agents and
institutions. As a result, they are primarily concerned with norms that govern
action. In contrast, many critiques of ideal theory are structured and motivated
by their commitment to an enactment model of political theorizing. This instead
sees political agents and institutions as instruments for producing or promoting
better states of affairs. Enactment models treat the evaluations that rank
different states of affairs as justificatorily basic, rather than norms
governing action on which structural models focus. This reveals an important
feature of debates about ideal theory. Whether ideal theory is capable of
appropriately guiding action will depend on what the criteria for appropriately
guiding action are, about which different theorists have importantly different
views. For example, some popular strategies for defending ideal theory fail,
while it may be much less clear that some alternatives to ideal theory can
provide action guidance than their advocates claim.

Abstract:This essay discusses and criticizes the claim that normative political theory can be (justifiably and fruitfully) divided into two parts—a part having to do with ideal theory which assumes full compliance and abstracts away from issues having to do with implementation and, contrasting with this, a nonideal part having to do with implementation and with rules and institutions appropriate for conditions of partial compliance. On this conception of ideal theory, empirical facts about human behavior and motivation, connected to issues surrounding compliance and implementation, are irrelevant to ideal theory, although such facts can be relevant to the nonideal part of normative theory. I argue against this conception, holding instead that such empirical facts are relevant to most or all of normative political theory, including "fundamental" normative principles.

Community members seek benefits-sharing planning agreements to advance their own distributive justice goals by directing benefits to communities. Nonideal theory does much to explain the context and possibilities for these agreements. The agreements forged between communities and development interests seek to address, but not completely achieve, distributive justice via consensus about incremental changes in project benefit distribution. However, implementation and outcomes can vary widely. This article develops theory to conceptualize a practical framework for these planning agreements using nonideal justice theories, granted the triple concerns of inaction, tokenism, and rhetorical trickery posed by ineffective implementation. The Crenshaw Light Rail Project in Los Angeles illustrates the issues in play.

Even though social engineering has gained a bad reputation, due to new possibilities in the information age, it may be time to reconsider Karl Popper's conception of "piecemeal social engineering." Piecemeal social engineering is not only an element within Popper's open society. It also connects his political philosophy to his philosophy of science and his evolutionary epistemology. Furthermore, it seems to fit well into the search for implementation strategies for policies and social actions in the context of nonideal theory. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily undermine the need for political ideals and first-order principles, which are inhabitants of "World 3."