Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes to the case when polluters might cooperate. We show that regulation through ambient taxes is severely constrained when the degree of cooperation among polluters is unknown to the regulator. On the other hand, if the regulator can invest in costly monitoring of emissions, then the optimal regulation offers a low ambient tax to cooperative groups and an optimal but costly individual emission tax to non-cooperative groups. This mechanism also has attractive properties when risk-aversion is introduced.

Nonpoint source pollution continues to frustrate the Clean Water Act's (CWA) promise of restoring and maintaining the integrity of our nation's waterways. Although programs exist within the CWA to assist states with abating nonpoint source pollution, these programs have not prevented nonpoint source pollution, or polluted runoff, from contributing an increasing load of pollutants to our rivers, lakes and streams. Recent case law has expanded the power of states, and in certain circumstances, citizens, to use the CWA to place restrictions on certain activities that are likely to damage water quality. However, the legal, social, and political limitations, both exerted on the case law and the CWA generally, will limit the practical further use of the CWA to stop nonpoint source pollution. Thus, another strategy is needed. Massachusetts has instituted a watershed-based resource management plan called the Massachusetts Watershed Initiative (MWI). The MWI promises to redefine environmental resource protection by involving local stakeholders in setting priorities for protecting local resources. By limiting the use of "command and control" regulation, and by focusing on the watershed as the relevant environmental entity, the MWI offers an alternative to traditional statutory attempts to control nonpoint source pollution.

Although the U.S. Clean Water Act does not directly regulate nonpoint source water pollution, it does provide mechanisms that prompt states to address nonpoint source water quality problems within their borders. This prompt, however, merely raises the next question: when, or under what political conditions, will states actually do so? Although individual states within the United States provide many bases for comparison, this Article examines the issue of prompting nonpoint source regulation from an international comparative perspective, focusing on the nascent efforts of the Australian states of Victoria and Queensland to address nonpoint source pollution and the potential lessons from the various U.S. states' histories of nonpoint source regulation. Specifically, this Article's examination of nonpoint source management in various U.S. states suggests: (1) there will be little political will to regulate water quality until water quality problems become obvious to the relevant populace; (2) agricultural sources of nonpoint source pollution generally create the most significant political resistance to regulation; but (3) important countervailing interests in water quality—such as water-based tourism and recreational interests, drinking water quality, and culturally important fisheries—can sometimes overcome at least some political resistance to nonpoint source regulation. Translating these lessons to Australia, open source water supply catchments in Victoria and agriculturally induced water quality impacts to the Great Barrier Reef in Queensland may present the best political opportunities to create regulatory requirements for upstream agricultural nonpoint sources. Still, institutional reform and increased political will at both the Australian state and federal levels are needed. In particular, the Australian Commonwealth Government must become the leader in improving water quality for the Great Barrier Reef.

The Chinese government has made great efforts to improve the scale efficiency of land through various measures during recent years, hoping to realize the coordinated developing goal of promoting agricultural benefits and protecting the environment. Statistics show that China's land scale efficiency has steadily increased, but agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution has also increased, which seems contrary to the expected outcome. Can increasing scale efficiency really curb agricultural NPS pollution? This study uses provincial-level data from China, together with a panel model and spatial econometric model, to investigate the relationship between scale efficiency and agricultural NPS pollution. It is found that the increase of scale efficiency aggravates the agricultural NPS pollution, and the conclusion still holds after considering spatial effect. The results of spatial analysis shows that the agricultural NPS pollution is spatially dependent. Further decomposition of the spatial effect shows that the scale efficiency not only intensifies the local agricultural NPS pollution, but also has a spillover effect (though not statistically significant) on agricultural NPS pollution in the surrounding areas. It is worth noting that financial policy, raising wage income and upgrading industrial structure can effectively curb agricultural NPS pollution in this region and adjacent areas, which also deserves our attention in the control of agricultural NPS pollution. In addition, it is necessary to make financial and fiscal support policies specifically for the governance of agricultural NPS pollution, adjust the distorted prices of input factors such as chemicals and pesticide, and accelerate the transformation of small-sized farmers to family farms, in order to maximize the inhibitory effect of scale efficiency on relieving agricultural NPS pollution.