Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTThis paper compares the administrative lobbying efforts of women's and environmental groups to nudge the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to conform with Congressional mandates. In 1973, Congress mandated that AID involve women in its development programs, and AID responded with the establishment of a small, resource‐poor monitoring office whose leader nurtured a wider constituency for the issue. In contrast, AID ignored its responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act, but once established environmental groups initiated a suit against AID, its General Council joined the environmental monitoring office and other executive branch advocacy units to increase environmentally sound programming. The progress of these two issues is compared, focusing on interest groups, internal AID structure, and the issues themselves.

At times of uncertainty, society has seen women — and women have seen themselves — as exemplifying the 'old' values. They have tried to hang on to what they had — keeping the home fires burning, conserving traditional attitudes, fighting to keep the familiar pattern going, weeping whilst men worked. These have been women's responses to danger and to change. Few women of the past have breasted danger or given change a nudge forward. When they have — and a glance at the short list makes this very clear — their quality has consisted not only in their personal characteristics but in their utilisation of the opportunity life gave them of acquiring the knowledge which was an essential basis for their action. The tragedy for women, and hence for society generally, has been that so few of them had the chance to acquire that knowledge. Without knowledge and the confidence that comes from it no one can plan for the future in such a way as to conserve what is of value in the past, whilst adapting to the challenge of present and making a constructive contribution to the future. So women have hitherto played little part in the evolution of new social, political and economic responses to challenging situations.

Article in Nation's Business (Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ; ROBERT PHILLIPS [photograph credit] The author has been in public life since the early 1920's in state political offices and in important decision-making positions in both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Mr. Hays is now the Arthur Vanderbilt professor of government, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, and continues to serve as a White House consultant of ideas, counting on his advisers and legislative leaders to carry the programs forward. President Johnson prefers to explain and explain, persuade and persuade, and finally convince his former colleagues. He does not hesitate to telephone a member of the House of Representatives or the Senate or confront a member of Congress at the White House with his famous appeal for help, and thus nudge along the decision-making process of Congress. We can assume that the basic style will not change from these tested methods even though it is still early in his presidential career to characterize his style with certainty. It also seems likely that in contacts with the executive department Mr. Johnson will maintain his apparent preference for giving cabinet members considerable latitude and responsibility. There may be a tendency toward greater reliance on cabinet officers and less initiative by the White House staff. This does not mean any lessening of importance of the work of the White House staff, but rather a division of responsibilities between the staff and the Cabinet in line with a traditional understanding of their roles. Our system of decision-making is sometimes criticized for being inefficient. Politics may seem to delay policy-making. But politics is as essential as it is inseparable from the functioning of our government. Certainly Congress often takes months—even years—to act on controversial legislation. Some regulatory agencies process cases for what may seem to the parties involved to be interminable periods. Proponents of the massive income tax reduction proposed by the Kennedy Administration in January 1963 wanted Congress to move ahead without delay. But not only was the legislation extremely technical, it was necessary for many members of Congress and not a few of their constituents to become convinced that it was sound fiscal policy to cut taxes in a period of deficit spending. It is rather remarkable that the tax reduction became law only 13 months after it was proposed. My eight terms as a member of Congress were sandwiched between assignments in the executive agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, Tennessee Valley Authority, Department of State and finally the White House staff, where I have served since 1961. In the 1930's, I was well aware of the irritations growing out of the national government's assumption of new functions. The depression programs were not, of course, administered with perfection. Both the administrators and the techniques were new, and many decision-making procedures were too rigid. I recall that one CCC camp supervisor complained that he couldn't get the lights turned off without Washington approval. The burgeoning of federal bureaus at that time placed a strain on Washington personnel, and perhaps (continued on page 64) NATION'S BUSINESS - JANUARY 1965 41