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Master i International Social Welfare and Health Policy ; Recently there has been growing interest in the use of "nudges" as a policy tool and their potential to solve some of society's biggest problems, such as obesity or climate change. Thaler and Sunstein in their influential book Nudge provide a broad but specific definition of "nudge", with the essence of nudging being changing the "choice architecture" or environment of people to influence behavior in ways that promote human welfare and protect freedom of choice. Nudges have a focus on how to influence behavior through engaging the "automatic system" of the human mind, and in ways that people are not always consciously aware. A major aim of the thesis is to examine what nudges are and how they work. Our approach is to examine the "mechanisms of change" that underlie the process from nudge to changed behavior. We categorise nudges as working through "core" mechanisms of change if they directly enters the "automatic system", harness social influence or appeal to our emotions. We categorise nudges that work through "peripheral" mechanisms of change as those that appeal more to the "reflective system" to influence behaviour change. We show how these mechanisms vary between nudges. In order to find out if nudges actually work and are cost effective, we selected a nudge for special investigation, namely prompted stair use interventions. We referred to systematic reviews and carried out our own small scale secondary evaluation of these interventions. We argued that it is not possible to make categorical statements as to whether this nudge works due to methodological weaknesses in these studies, particularly the lack of control group designs and lack of cost efficiency analyses. We argue the effective implementation of nudges may rely on traditional governance interventions, such as legal restrictions and information provision. Nudge has led to political initiatives in the form of the establishment of departments or committees in the UK, US and Norway to bring the "nudge" concept into policy making. We gathered empirical material, mainly through qualitative interviews, from members of a committee set up to advise and/or implement nudges in Lillehammer, Norway in order to compare to what extent we find similar issues related to what nudges are and how they work in this committee and in the academic literature. Similarities include awareness of nudge as a broad concept, an emphasis on nudges working at a 'semi-conscious' level as well as the importance of cost-effectiveness, generalizability and the value of control groups when evaluating nudges. A key difference was the limited reference to the ethical debate about nudges among committee members, in contrast to academic authors, perhaps because the former view nudges as small-scale interventions that aim to help people make better choices and do not raise serious ethical considerations. In conclusion we question whether "nudges" can in fact be defined as "libertarian" and "paternalistic", we call for public debates about the use of nudges and involvement in overcoming some of the ethical dilemmas nudges raise (particularly for those that work mainly through the automatic system) and enhance legitimacy. Finally we argue for more robust evaluation studies to build evidence base for this relatively new intervention. ; publishedVersion

In areas such as health, environment, and energy consumption, there is a need to do better. A common goal in society is to get people to behave in ways that are sustainable for the environment or support a healthier lifestyle. Nudging is a term known from economics and political theory, for influencing decisions and behavior using suggestions, positive reinforcement, and other non-coercive means. With the extensive use of digital devices, nudging within a digital environment (known as digital nudging) has great potential. We introduce smart nudging, where the guidance of user behavior is presented through digital nudges tailored to be relevant to the current situation of each individual user. The ethics of smart nudging and the transparency of nudging is also discussed. We see a smart nudge as a recommendation to the user, followed by information that both motivates and helps the user choose the suggested behavior. This paper describes such nudgy recommendations, the design of a smart nudge, and an architecture for a smart nudging system. We compare smart nudging to traditional models for recommender systems, and we describe and discuss tools (or approaches) for nudge design. We discuss the challenges of designing personalized smart nudges that evolve and adapt according to the user&rsquo ; s reactions to the previous nudging and possible behavioral change of the user.

Source at https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies7020045 . ; In areas such as health, environment, and energy consumption, there is a need to do better. A common goal in society is to get people to behave in ways that are sustainable for the environment or support a healthier lifestyle. Nudging is a term known from economics and political theory, for influencing decisions and behavior using suggestions, positive reinforcement, and other non-coercive means. With the extensive use of digital devices, nudging within a digital environment (known as digital nudging) has great potential. We introduce smart nudging, where the guidance of user behavior is presented through digital nudges tailored to be relevant to the current situation of each individual user. The ethics of smart nudging and the transparency of nudging is also discussed. We see a smart nudge as a recommendation to the user, followed by information that both motivates and helps the user choose the suggested behavior. This paper describes such nudgy recommendations, the design of a smart nudge, and an architecture for a smart nudging system. We compare smart nudging to traditional models for recommender systems, and we describe and discuss tools (or approaches) for nudge design. We discuss the challenges of designing personalized smart nudges that evolve and adapt according to the user's reactions to the previous nudging and possible behavioral change of the user.

Nudging policies rely on behavioral science to improve people's decisions through small changes in the environments within which people make choices. This article first seeks to rebut a prominent objection to this approach: furnishing governments with the power to nudge leads to relations of alien control, that is, relations in which some people can impose their will on othersa concern which resonates with republican, Kantian, and Rousseauvian theories of freedom and relational theories of autonomy. I respond that alien control can be avoided, if nudging is suitably transparent and democratically controlled. Moreover, such transparency and democratic control are institutionally feasible. Building on this response, I then provide a novel and surprising argument for more nudging: democratically controlled public policy nudging can often contain the power of private companies to nudge in uncontrolled and opaque ways. Therefore, reducing alien control often requires more rather than less nudging in public policy.

Wir diskutieren Ergebnisse einer Studie über die Akzeptanz und Effektivität kognitiver und moralischer Nudges am Beispiel von Standardeinstellungen und sozialer Information. Unsere Studienteilnehmenden ordnen diese beiden Dimensionen von Nudges unterschiedlich ein. Im Fokus des Beitrags stehen neben den Wirkmechanismen der Nudges auch Unterschiede in gesellschaftlichen und persönlichen Zielen, in denen die Nudges angewendet werden sollen. Die Teilnehmenden unserer Studie bevorzugen moralische Nudges fürgesellschaftliche Ziele und kognitive Nudges für persönliche Ziele. Daraus leiten wir wichtige Konsequenzen für die Nutzung von Nudges als Politikmaßnahme ab. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass von unseren Studienteilnehmenden kognitive Nudges als effektiver angesehen werden als moralische Nudges. Die Akzeptanz solcher Nudges unterscheidet sich allerdings je nach Ziel. ; We discuss the results of a study on the acceptance and effectiveness of cognitive and moral nudges using defaults and social information as examples. Our study participants classify these two dimensions of nudges differently. In addition to the choice mechanisms of nudges, this article also focuses on differences in social and personal goals in which nudges are to be applied. Our result is that moral nudges are preferred for social goals, whereas cognitive nudges are preferred for personal goals. From this we derive important consequences for the use of nudges as policy measures. Our results show that cognitive nudges are considered more effective by our study participants than moral nudges. However, the acceptance of such nudges differs according to the goals.

Nudges—policy proposals informed by work in behavioural economics and psychology that are designed to lead to better decision-making or better behaviour—are controversial. Critics allege that they bypass our deliberative capacities, thereby undermining autonomy and responsible agency. In this paper, I identify a kind of nudge I call a nudge to reason, which make us more responsive to genuine evidence. I argue that at least some nudges to reason do not bypass our deliberative capacities. Instead, use of these nudges should be seen as appeals to mechanisms partially constitutive of these capacities, and therefore as benign (so far as autonomy and responsible agency are concerned). I sketch some concrete proposals for nudges to reason which are especially important given the apparent widespread resistance to evidence seen in recent political events.

Nudges—policy proposals informed by work in behavioural economics and psychology that are designed to lead to better decision-making or better behaviour—are controversial. Critics allege that they bypass our deliberative capacities, thereby undermining autonomy and responsible agency. In this paper, I identify a kind of nudge I call a nudge to reason, which make us more responsive to genuine evidence. I argue that at least some nudges to reason do not bypass our deliberative capacities. Instead, use of these nudges should be seen as appeals to mechanisms partially constitutive of these capacities, and therefore as benign (so far as autonomy and responsible agency are concerned). I sketch some concrete proposals for nudges to reason which are especially important given the apparent widespread resistance to evidence seen in recent political events.

S'inspirant des travaux de l'économie comportementale, les auteurs de Nudge s'éloignent des postulats de Milton Friedman et s'emploient à transcender les idées de John Maynard Keynes pour trouver une "véritable Troisième voie" faisant la synthèse entre les deux écoles. Dans la perspective de leur livre, le « nudge » se présente comme une action ou une politique publique bien intentionnée, souvent fondée sur le bon sens et visant à corriger les faiblesses de la nature humaine et les excès de la paresse, pour pousser les individus à prendre par défaut les décisions qui les avantagent le plus, selon les principes de « l'architecture du choix ». Appliquées systématiquement à des pans entiers de la société américaine, ces idées pourraient être la vraie révolution de la présidence Obama ; Inspired by the works lead in the field of behavorial economics, the authors of Nudge distance themselves from the principles of Milton Friedman and try to transcend the ideas of John Maynard Keynes in order to found a "Real Third Way" -- a synthesis of the two economic schools. From their perspective, a "nudge" is presented as an action or a public policy which is well-intentioned and often based on common sense. Its aim is to correct the weaknesses of human nature and the excess of lazyness, in order to "nudge" people to take the decisions that advantage them the most by default. Applied systematically to a variety of sectors in the American society, the authors' ideas could well be the real revolution brought by the Obama presidency.

A common critique of nudges is that they reduce someone's of choices or elicit behavior through means other than rational persuasion. In this paper, I argue against this form of critique. I argue that, if there is anything distinctively worrisome about nudges from the standpoint of morality, it is is their tendency to hide the amount of social control that they embody, undermining democratic governance by making it more difficult for members of a political community to detect the social architect's pulling of the strings. This concern is particularly salient as to choices where it is important for people to directly engage with a certain set of values, "big personal decisions" (to use a simplifying phrase). Many healthcare decisions are exactly these kinds of choices.

Der sogenannte Libertäre Paternalismus, der in den letzten Jahren mit dem Politikinstrument des Nudging hervorgetreten ist, weist in seinen konzeptionellen Grundlagen eine Reihe problematischer Eigenschaften auf. Insbesondere dient der Homo oeconomicus als normatives Rollenmodell, der heuristisch die Richtung weisen soll, in die reale Menschen "gestupst" werden sollen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht diese konzeptionelle Fundierung und diskutiert kritisch ihre Implikationen. Im Anschluss daran skizzieren wir einen alternativen Ansatz, der dazu beitragen kann, Nudging vom Pauschalvorwurf der Manipulation zu befreien. ; Libertarian paternalism is a normative public policy program that has become famous in recent years for the propagation of nudging. However, we think that it suffers from a series of conceptual flaws. Most notably, it takes homo economicus as the normative benchmark which real-world individuals should be nudged towards. This article assesses this theoretical starting point and critically discusses its implications. We sketch an alternative foundation for behavioral policies which might help to free nudging from the standard charge of manipulation.