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AbstractProfessor Sunstein (2017) discusses the possible causes for and policy implications of the failure of nudges, with special attention to defaults. Though he focuses on nudges that fail when they should succeed, Sunstein recognizes that some failures reveal that a nudge should not have been attempted to begin with. 'Nudges that fail', however, does not consider fully the relationship between the outcomes of nudging and their likely welfare effects, most notably neglecting the troubling case of nudges that succeed when they should fail. Hence, after clarifying the boundaries of legitimate nudging within a libertarian-paternalistic approach and noting the fourfold relationship between the efficacy of nudging and its normative desirability, this article evaluates more fully the case of failed nudges and examines the hitherto unaddressed problem of successful yet undesirable nudges. This analysis shows that the failure of nudging bears only limited diagnostic value, while the success of a nudge is even less indicative of its normative status. The article concludes with recommendations for policy-makers who wish to employ nudges that are not only efficacious, but also likely to advance the subjective well-being of the individuals they target.

This paper reviews two contrasting approaches governments use to engage the citizen to promote better public policy outcomes: nudging citizens using the insights of behavioural economics, as summarised by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) or giving citizens the space to think through and debate solutions, as indicated by proponents of deliberative democracy. The paper summarises each approach, giving examples; then it compares and contrast them, illustrating their relative strengths and weaknesses. The paper concludes by suggesting that the approaches share some common features and policy‐makers could useful draw upon both.

AbstractThe aim of this study is to respond to Cass Sunstein's question: 'Why are some nudges ineffective, or at least less effective than choice architects hope and expect?'—particularly in view not only of the rational basis in decision-making but also of the direct influence of emotions on the behavior of those who must choose. In this study, I used findings from psychology surveys, specifically considering the influence of emotions on the fallibility of nudges in social interactions when wealth is compared. Special attention is dedicated to vanity, a combined emotion that leads to emotional choices, which arises in self-presentation and self-comparison when external signs of wealth are displayed. Imagination plays an important role in simulation to the extent that it causes failure in further nudges. In conclusion, I argue that vanity impels people to act differently, as expected of choice architects.

AbstractNudge advocates contend that nudges are liberty preserving, while government regulations are not. We interrogate that assumption by considering negative liberty in the forms suggested by the proponents of nudges. Specifically, we examine three ways of measuring negative liberty – liberty as freedom of choice, liberty as absence of coercion and liberty as absence of interference – applying the measures to a case study relevant to the nudge literature: regulations governing healthy food manufacture. We show that, depending on the liberty measure adopted and the estimated impact on producer and consumer behaviour, some regulations can be liberty reducing, while others are liberty preserving or liberty enhancing. When it comes to comparing nudges and more traditional policies aimed at increasing the health and welfare of citizens, there is no a priori negative liberty ground for preferring nudges.

Let's begin by addressing the most obvious question: given the vast number of books published on political science every year, why would the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS) and its journalPolitics and the Life Sciencesexpend time, energy, and resources publishing a multiple-author analysis of a series of books that contain little (if anything) about the life sciences, Darwin, or evolution? The answer is that Cass R. Sunstein's recent research on "nudge science" provides an excellent opportunity for APLS to expand its commitment to interdisciplinarity, especially its long-standing interest in behavioral economics. Sunstein, a prolific author, has written many books and scholarly articles defending "libertarian paternalism." Libertarian critics have long argued that the conjunction of "libertarian" and "paternalism" is oxymoronic and that the "liberty principle" or the "principle of autonomy" excludes paternalistic intervention on behalf of rational, competent adults. Over the years, with varying degrees of success, Sunstein has addressed many, if not most, lines of criticism emanating from the political left and right. Like many scholars, his views have evolved over time based on that criticism. This introductory essay will focus on some of the more enduring elements of the conceptual framework and issues that underlie nudge science in the larger context of behavioral economics, including choice architecture, political bans and mandates, political nudges, ethics, and paternalistic intervention.

Nudging policies rely on behavioral science to improve people's decisions through small changes in the environments within which people make choices. This article first seeks to rebut a prominent objection to this approach: furnishing governments with the power to nudge leads to relations of alien control, that is, relations in which some people can impose their will on others—a concern which resonates with republican, Kantian, and Rousseauvian theories of freedom and relational theories of autonomy. I respond that alien control can be avoided, if nudging is suitably transparent and democratically controlled. Moreover, such transparency and democratic control are institutionally feasible. Building on this response, I then provide a novel and surprising argument for more nudging: democratically controlled public policy nudging can often contain the power of private companies to nudge in uncontrolled and opaque ways. Therefore, reducing alien control often requires more rather than less nudging in public policy.

AbstractThe last decade has produced a large literature on the public policy implications of behavioural research. Policymakers, in turn, have increasingly relied on 'choice architecture' or 'nudges' to address some of the consequences of individuals' judgment and decision‐making biases documented by that research. However, the possibilities for mitigating the effects of individuals' biases in the realm of collective choice have not yet been exhaustively explored. This article suggests possible applications of behavioural research to mitigate the negative effects of voters' judgment and decision‐making biases on the quality of democratic choice.

AbstractNudging is a popular and influential approach in policymaking. Yet, it has faced substantial criticism from several policy perspectives, with growing concern raised about the efficacy of some nudge interventions. This article offers an evaluative framework for nudging which captures these various perspectives. Our 4S framework highlights the importance of nudges being sufficient, scalable, and subjective, in addition to being statistically significant, to be an effective policy response. We review various nudge interventions, coupled with various methodological critiques, to demonstrate the need for a more expansive evaluative framework. The 4S framework synthesizes these sizeable literatures and numerous critiques to meet this need, serving as an important contribution to behavioral policymakers. We argue that the 4S framework complements existing frameworks for designing behavioral interventions as an evaluative framework. By adopting the 4S framework, policymakers will be better placed to design interventions which are effective in relation to the wider policy environment.

Wir diskutieren Ergebnisse einer Studie über die Akzeptanz und Effektivität kognitiver und moralischer Nudges am Beispiel von Standardeinstellungen und sozialer Information. Unsere Studienteilnehmenden ordnen diese beiden Dimensionen von Nudges unterschiedlich ein. Im Fokus des Beitrags stehen neben den Wirkmechanismen der Nudges auch Unterschiede in gesellschaftlichen und persönlichen Zielen, in denen die Nudges angewendet werden sollen. Die Teilnehmenden unserer Studie bevorzugen moralische Nudges fürgesellschaftliche Ziele und kognitive Nudges für persönliche Ziele. Daraus leiten wir wichtige Konsequenzen für die Nutzung von Nudges als Politikmaßnahme ab. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass von unseren Studienteilnehmenden kognitive Nudges als effektiver angesehen werden als moralische Nudges. Die Akzeptanz solcher Nudges unterscheidet sich allerdings je nach Ziel. ; We discuss the results of a study on the acceptance and effectiveness of cognitive and moral nudges using defaults and social information as examples. Our study participants classify these two dimensions of nudges differently. In addition to the choice mechanisms of nudges, this article also focuses on differences in social and personal goals in which nudges are to be applied. Our result is that moral nudges are preferred for social goals, whereas cognitive nudges are preferred for personal goals. From this we derive important consequences for the use of nudges as policy measures. Our results show that cognitive nudges are considered more effective by our study participants than moral nudges. However, the acceptance of such nudges differs according to the goals.