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In an exploration of the ways that electoral institutions influence party systems, & the extent to which electoral laws mediate the influence of ethnic heterogeneity, data from earlier studies by Douglas Rae (1967) & Arend Lijphart (1990) are reanalyzed to reconsider the role of one institutional parameter -- district magnitude. It is concluded that district magnitude is not merely an important determinant of the number of parties that compete in a political system, but can offset the tendency of parties to multiply in ethnically heterogeneous societies. 5 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single-member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multimember plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Draws on the work of Peter Ordeshook & Olga Shvetsova (1994 [see abstract 9407492]) to examine the influence of electoral laws & preexisting social cleavages in determining the number of parties in a given political system. Statistics from every polity with a free election in the 1980s (54 countries) are examined by multiple regression analysis. Results indicate that the number of parties in a polity is best understood as a multiplicative function of the interaction between electoral laws & social cleavages. It is concluded that bipartisan systems tend to form when there is a strong electoral system or few cleavages, while multipartisanism often results from many cleavages & a permissive electoral system. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 59 References. Adapted from the source document.