The first part of the article deals with the renewal of old and establishement of new associations in Šibenik and its district during the period betwen the two world wars. The associations are astablished by the pro-government elements of the society in order to be able to realize the goals of the state policy as defined by the »Vidovdan« Constitution. The opposition parties of the burgeois society established their own associations intended to reach the goals set by the programe of their political or cultural activities. The oppositional forces and particularly the HSS (Croatian Peasants' Party) developed a great activity in the founding of new associations after 1935. The activity of various associations was forbidden by the dictatorial government of January 6th, 1929, while others were required to engage themselves more intensively in the realization of the unitarian-centralistic conception of state The »Jugoslavenski Sokol«, »Jadranska Straža«, etc.) The second part of the article contains various data referring to associations ordered in the following way; (a) Yugoslav, (b) Croatian, (c) Serbian, (d) Religious, (e) the remaining ones (trade unions, cultural, humanitarian, and sports association. Then follows a general survey of the activity of each of the associations, a description of their activities and the occasions on which they took place. Numerous associations developed their most important annual activity in connection with the celebration of same national, religious and similar holidays. The activities of some associations is illustrated by interesting data (»Kolo«, the Yugoslav workers' Sports Club »Šibenik«, branch organizations of the »Seljačka Sloga«). Some documents and observations are presented in the third part of the article, showing that some of the associations were influenced by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This applies to »Vodička Glazba«, to the »Seljačka Sloga« branch organization at Zaton, the JRSD »Šibenik«, the Jugoslavenski Akademski Klub, as well as to the academic clubs »Matija Gubec«, and »Stjepan Radić«. Taking into account the fact that a maximum number of activists and combatants in the People's Liberation War came from the Šibenik region, the author concludes that the above mentioned associations and similar organizations, particularly on the Adriatic islands, were real hotbeds of ideas and viewpoints of the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and of Croatia.
The lndependent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka) was one of the many political parties of pre-war Yugoslavia. Although it was not a large party as far as number o members was concerned, its role, and especially that of its leader Svetozar Pribićević, in the political life of the Yugoslav stace was very important. ln this paper the author deals with the party's foundation, development and activities, shows the characteristics of its programme, and its social and nacional basis. He restricts his exposition to the period of the Vidovdan Constitution, accunting for this by the fact that ater the institution of the dictatorship the organizational work of the party (and of all other political parties) and its activities in further political development had a special quality. The Independent Democratic Party was formed after a group of 14 delegates, with Svetozar Pribićević at their head had withdrawn from the Democratic Party in March 1924. The leaders of the new party stressed from the beginning that the basis of their policy was unitarism and centralism. Since the ideal of unitarism was expressed most strongly in the Vidovdan Constitution, the Independant Democrats emphasized the importance of the full application of that Constitution. This was the foundacion of their coalition with the Radicals and of the formation of the government of the National Block. When the Radicals saw that their agrement with the Independent Democratic Party and the enforcement of the Obznana against the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka) did nat affect Radić's position, they broke off the alliance with Svetozar Pribićević and came to an understanding with Stjepan Radić. The Independent Democratic Party then became part of the opposition. Svetozar Pribićević started forming a large, general Yugoslav party, whose nucleus was to be the Independent Democratic Party. Thes did nat succeed. A struggle for unitarism and centralism remained the basic substance and prime aim of his political activities. Being in the opposition, however, he became more and more aware of manifestations of great-Serbian predominence. Realizing that centralism was not creating Yugoslav unity, but, on the contrary, was strengthening great-Serbian hegernony and bringing the country to a serious crisis, Svetozar Pribićević approached Stjepan Radić. Thus a political alliance between the Independent Democratic Party and the Croacian Peasant Party was formed, named the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija). The transformation of the Independent Democratic Party's programme started after the formation of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition. At the beginning a consistent enforcement of the Vidovdan Constitution and a respect for the law were demanded, but soon a demand was made for a revision of the Constitution and even its abolishion. This was expressed in particular after the assassinations in the Nacional Assembly. Before the proclamation of the Dictatorship formulations concerning the reorganization of the state had not been concrete enough, and left possibilities for various different interpretations. But after the manifest of January 6, 1929, the Independent Democratic Party explicitly proclaimed itself for federalism. Svetozar Pribićević himself, after emigrating from the country, even worked for a republican state.
The political and social renascence that took place in the latter part of the 19th century made possible the revival of economic, cultural, and artistic activities. This became particularly evident in the building activity spreading, as in the rest of Europe of that period, in the wake of the then fashionable neo-styles that made a somewhat belated appearance at Vis. A Neo-Gothic building, designed to house the premises of the Hrvatski Dom, was built in the central part of the water-front (luka) et the very beginning of the current century, while a Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house was erected for the Tramontana family in 1911. The local school, designed by the native architect Marinković, was built in the Neo-Classicist style in 1910. The building housing the Army Club premises (Dom JNA) and the new fishmarket were also erected in the Neo-Classicist style. Some Neo-Classicist tombs may be seen on the cemetery where the Neo-Renaissance Dojmi Chapel stands out among other monuments. A Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house, belonging to the Mardešić Gariboldi family, was built at Komiža in in the early part of the current century, while the construction of a building in the Secessionist style (The Hum Café) followed shortly. The trend prevailing at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries is evident also in a series of simple, modest houses designed in no definite style at all, but containing elements of various neo-styles or of the Viennese Secession in their facades. Gutters for carrying off rain water, usually sunk in decorative roof cornices supported by consoles; rows of tall windows with simply dressed stone frames that were molded in some cases; standard shop entrances in the ground floor; balconies with wrought-iron balustrades; basement windows protected with iron grating, etc., all these elements were commonplace during that period lasting through the thirties of the current century when the increasing use of concrete almost entirely repleced stone as building material, rendering the facade construction an utterly simple affair. Among the movables dating from the above mentioned period, the Neo-Gothic furniture of the pharmacy (Narodna Apoteka) at Komiža, and the home furniture owned by the Lučić-Roki family at Vis (designed by Dragutin Inkiostri Medenjak, painter and decorator, 1866-1942) are worth mentioning. So are several pieces of furniture, etc., dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries scattered in various houses on the island. Two painters native from Komiža, Vinko Foretić and Miho Marinković, contributed to the development of the modern art in Croatia during the early part of the current century. While the former returned to his native island after years of youthful wanderings, dedicating his ability to landscape painting and portraying of life and people of Komiža, the latter ended his days as a university professor (member of the Faculty of Architecture) in Belgrade. Boasting marvellous scenery and views of the sea, picturesque water-front and interesting fishermen popular even abroad, Komiža has attracted a number of artists for a long period now. One of them was Đuro Tiljak who came to live on the island time and again where he painted considerable number of his canvases. A memorial collection of his works, comprising all his creations involving the island, was opened at Komiža in 1967. The Island of Vis, having played a most important part in the People's Revolution, has a special niche in its history. Owing to its geographical position, lying far from the mainland in the open sea, the island, turned into a wartime garrison by the People's Liberation Army as soon as Italy surrendered to the Allies in 1943, became an impregnable fortress in the Adriatic, successfully resisting the attacks of German forces in the area. That is why a number of localities and structures on the island, reminding us of those eventful years, are significant not only for the history of Dalmatia but of the whole of Yugoslavia. The glorious days of the recent past are re-awakened by memorial tablets or slogans found on old stone-built houses in the island villages and hamlets; by graves of fallen partisans scattered in a number of grave-yards and on the former aerodrome – once a lonely window flung open to the outer world and now a peaceful green vineyard; and also by miscellaneous articles or documents surviving in the silanders' homes. Numerous traces of red – or blue – painted slogans still found on the walls of houses at Vis, Komiža, Podšpilje, Marinje Zemlje, Dračevo Polje, Podstražje, and other villages and hamlets on the island, bear eloquent testimony to the wartime events, particularly to the significant ones in 1944. The cave located to the nort-west of Borovik is no doubt the most important monument belonging to that period as it served as sheltered headquarters for the People's Liberation Army from where its Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, controlled its activities in the field aiming at the liberation of the country. The cave has therefore been named Titova Špilja. Several memorial tablets have been erected in the post-war period, either to mark some historic spots or to honour the victims of the Fascist persecution, fallen partisans, etc., Among the memorial tablets set up at Komiža, the one on the Tower is in memory of the 1940 municipal election victory of the workpeople of Komiža when 18 councilmen were returned, who directed the municipal affairs under the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia; others, set up on various houses at Vis, mark the one-time seats of the District Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia for the central Dalmatian archipelago, and of the Regional Committee of the People's Liberation Movement, etc. A memorial tablet, set up on the Kučić Family house at Komiža, reminds us of the decision made by the local Communist Party Committee in 1941 to start attacking the invader's forces, while the inscription on another tablet erected on the house owned by Luka Borčić (at Žena Glava), records the spot where – from January through October 1944 – the Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia conducted the armed revolt of the people against the Fascist invader. Fallen partisans have been hounoured by memorial tablets set up at Vis, Komiža, Podstražje, Marinje Zemlje, Podšpilje, and on the Island of Biševo. Both native and British airmen, killed in action in the course of the struggle for liberation, have also been honoured, the native flyers at Velo Polje and the British at the Čunkovica crossroads. Monuments remind us of the executed hostages at Vis and Komiža in 1943 while a memorial tablet records the spot where Nikola Marinković – Top was killed. As a part of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the stay on the island (in 1944) of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, and of Marshal Tito himself, several buildings were dedicated in 1964 to the fighters killed in action and to the victims of Fascist cruelty. Among such buildings are the memorial school, designed by the Architect N. Šegvić, and the memorial premises for popular meetings, etc., designed by S. Planić. A memorial well built at Podšpilje bears the inscription of some verses by J. Franičević and of names of the fallen fighters. A large monolith erected at Vis marks the spot where the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the People's Liberation Army, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, reviewed the First Dalmatian Brigade decorating it for bravery with the Order of People's Liberation. A sentence from his speech reading: »Tuđe nećemo – svoje ne damo« (We do not what is not ours but we will not surrender what is ours) has been cut in the monolith. A number of buildings at Vis bear inscriptions recording various wartime events, e. g. the stay there (in 1944) of the presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia, of the People's Committe, of the Vis Island District Committee, etc. Some buildings at Komiža are marked in a similar way, and we learn from the inscriptions which of the houses were occupied by the Military Command, Military Hospital, Refugee Collecting Station, etc. Memorial tablets have also been set up at Borovik Village, in order to mark the houses once occupied by the Centrl Comittee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the 26th Division Headquarters, and the Soviet, British, and American military missions. The Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, the Agitprop, the Slobodna Dalmacija Editorial Office, etc., were housed at Žena Glava Village, while various aerodrome services etc. had their quarters at Marinje Zemlje. The headquarters of the 1st Dalmatian Brigade and 3rd Overseas Brigade were at Podselje. A number of miscellaneous movable articles connected with the People's War of Liberation have been preserved and are now on show at the Museum at Vis as also in some private homes. A significant architectural contribution has been recorded on the island in the field of building construction. The Yugoslav Army Club premises at Komiža and a number of handsome dwelling-houses (all designed by the Architect Vitić) and the large Wine Cellars (designed by the Architect Fabris) are particularly noteworthy.
The idea underlying the politics of the Independent People's Party (Samostalna narodna stranka), emphasized already in the program of 1863, was the principle that Croatia had rights as an independent entity and consonant with this the duty to determine the status of its rights in the Monarchy independently, and not in conjunction with Hungary. In accordance with this principle the Party took as a point of departure its political conceptions of 1848 from which arose the separation of Croatia from Hungary. Although of all parties, the Independent People's Party built least on historical rights, it was prepared to turn to them in order to strengthen the position of Croatia as a state. It differed from the other parties in that the viewpoints of the aristocrats received least expression in its publications, and it favored the democratization of politics, with the involvement of the widest range of social strata in political life. Regarding the central government, the Independent press emphasized that the Croatian Office and the Viennese government did not have the same goals; to verify this assertion they indicated that the programmatic document "Conditionally or Unconditionally?" originated with the sanction of the Office. The demands expressed in this document were certainly not in accord with the centralistic tendencies in the Viennese government. Conditions for entrance into the Emperor's Council were, namely, an independent and autonomous budget, unification with Dalmatia and with a part of Krajina. Besides this it was emphasized that the Croatian Constitution and autonomy could not come into question, nor could the government ministers interfere in the issue of Croatia's autonomy. It was further emphasized that Inasmuch as Hungary obtained a different status as a state, those same rights must also be granted to Croatia. In their writings the Independent politicians sharply differentiated between two freedoms: the political freedom of citizens and the freedom to develop national identity, and they consistently supported the latter. They were convinced that within the Hungarian community of nations, Croatians would not be able to attain conditions conductive to free national development, and hence supported an agreement with Vienna. Aside from this, they hinted that in the event an agreement with Vienna could not be reached, the Croatians still had the opportunity to negotiate with Budapest. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Croatians would first negotiate with Budapest, or rather send their representatives to the Hungarian Assembly, the significance of the Croatian Assembly would be greatly reduced and would become completely dependent on the Hungarian Assembly. In this event there would be no further possibility for Croatia to enter into any other combination of states' rights. They further stressed, quite correctly, that the Hungarians themselves were making agreements with Vienna and that in some transactions they treated the Monarchy as an equal unity. Insofar as negotiations were already under way, the Independents were convinced that it was more advantageous for Croatians to take part in them immediately rather than directly with Hungary. In spite of the fact that the program demanded a lot, the majority of the populists did not support it from distrust that the program was merely a decoy to draw the Croatians into the Emperor's Council. The Independents were convinced that the main reason for this distrust was the widespread conviction that the goals of the Viennese government and the Croatian Office were identical, so they attacked such assertions in their publications. However, despite this, the majority of the populists continued to reject Independent policies and in their resistence joined the Unionists; in this way they strengthened the dualistic trend, which even without this support, became stronger in the political life of the Monarchy.
There are varied institutional forms (formal and informal) in which electoral (political) subjects take part in elections. Elections for assemblies show that the actions of such subjects are differently motivated, and also that their approach during conflict or cooperation in the realization of their wishes is different. Thus conflict situations, »election scandals«, occur sporadically. Such conflicts are an expression and a result of contradictory desires and actions of the participants. The significance and effect of an electoral conflict is conditioned and determined by the (political) significance of the elections themselves, not only in the sense that they are formally one of the basic constitutive elements of the political system, but first and foremost because they are the form in which citizens are active in politics. Following the procedure in election the author has tried to reveal the basic actors in electoral conflicts, the content of their conflict and the form it takes. In the author's opinion it is wrong to pass an a priori judgement of the character and value of electoral »cases« (negative judgements have usually been passed), the foundation of the conflict and the character and orientation of the persons involved, who do not seek for affirmation of their political value in the strength of arguments and objective achievement. We can understand and solve the ambivalent character of such conflicts, and the political behavior of their participants, only after studying the case. There will be a smaller number of »cases« and electoral conflicts, and they will be less complicated, the more consistently we free ourselves from varied formal-legal and political restraints, and the more society takes on the characteristics of self-managing and democratic socialism. Conflicts of this type are not the result of democracy. They are the result of its insufficient development or presence, thus making it subject to misunderstanding, searching and abuse.
Autor u radu kritički ocjenjuje napore poduzete u SAD radi pronalaženja rješenja za problem odlaganja visokoradioaktivnih otpadaka (HLW). Neuspjeh u vezi rješavanja ovog problema najviše je utjecao na nuklearnu industriju. Nezgoda koja se dogodila na Three Mile Island nuklearnoj elektrani usredotočila je pažnju javnosti na odnos između cijene koštanja i sigurnosti nuklearnih elektrana. Inflacija je, poticana umnogome i porastom cijene energiji, pogoršala financijsko stanje mnogih službi pri postrojenjima. Nakon naglog širenja, nuklearna industrija je pretrpjela osjetnu štednju i sve je više planiranih postrojenja otkazivano. Konačno, sumnjičavost javnosti u pogledu prirode i veličine jedne energetske krize je ublažena tvrdnjom o neophodnosti nuklearne energije za energetsku sigurnost Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Potreba da se uvaže takvi problemi je otežala nedavne napore za rješavanje problema s nuklearnim otpacima, dok neuspjeh da se ostvari solucija odlaganja i nadalje podriva javnu podršku nuklearnoj energiji. ; Nuclear technology has been used in the United States for the generation of electric power, the production of weapons, and in a variety of medical, research and industrial applications. The failure to solve the problem of nuclear waste disposal has, thus far, impacted most strongly on the nuclear power industry. The absence of a solution has interacted with and compounded the basic problems of the nuclear power industry. The nuclear power industry has suffered a number of set backs in recent years in the United States. The accident at Three Mile Island focused public concerns on the cost and safety of nuclear power. A decade of inflation, driven largely by sharp increases in energy costs, has severely strained the financial condition of many utilities. After a period of rapid expansion, the nuclear power industry has experienced a substantial retrenchment as more and more planned capacity is canceled. Finally, public skepticism about the nature and extent of an »energy crisis« has undercut the claim that nuclear power is essential to the future energy security of the United States. The need to address these problems has complicated recent efforts to resolve the nuclear waste problem, while the failure to achieve a disposal solution further undermines public support for nuclear power.
In this paper an attempt is made by the author to assess whether the Self-management Industrial Relations System defined institutionally as a non-conflict pattern has the potentiality to regulate the industrial conflict undoubtedly existing in Yugoslav enterprises; and whether it is in its potentiality for conflict management matched to the American system of industrial relations based on the collective bargaining. Comparative theoretical analysis of the two systems on a number of major dimensions leads to the conclusion that the self-management system is inferior in regard to the potentialities for conflict management than Collective bargaining. This conclusion is even more valid if the great discrepancies between the real self-management organizations and the self-management pattern are taken into consideration. But, the available evidence on strikes in Yugoslavia during the last decade lends no support to such theoretical expectations. It is evident that some forms of conflict management do exist, although the institutional pattern has no built-in mechanisms of regulations at the level of manifest functions. In an attempt to explain the variance between the real course of the industrial conflicts and the theoretical expectations, the author formulates the main hypothesis: the self-management institutional pattern regulates the conflict on the level of latent functions. This central hypothesis is further elaborated into six particular hypotheses issuing form the specific properties of the self-management institutional pattern. These properties are: lack of legitimacy of managerial power and insecurity of managers' status, »political management«, insufficient revindicative orientation of syndicate, co-option of the potential worker leaders into management and the horizontal principle of organization. Examining the efficiency of conflict management at the level of latent functions the author points out some important qualifications: (1) possibility of the omission of catharsis effects after the strike, (2) such a "type of regulation does not lead to the systematic resolving of problems which are at the root of the conflict, (3) conflict management at the level of latent functions does not involve conflict resolving directly at the Working places. In accordance with these qualifications the author does not perceive such a type of regulation of conflict as a possible alternative to the institutionalization of conflict in modern industrial society. Nevertheless it has a great significance for the stability and survival of the global social system such as the one existing in Yugoslavia.
Among the many factors that determine the development of a political democracy, political culture should be stressed. Research by Almond and Verba, and later similar research in Yugoslavia, show that there exists a rather strong connection between political culture and the stability of a democratic political system. As large and ever larger groups of people have access to television, this mass medium plays more and more prominent role in shaping political culture. When the population attains (as in many societies now) a certain basic level of education, the majority of programmes can be understood by everybody. With this, there is lessening of the discrimination as to the political information, at least in principle. Television is an especially potent medium for introducing people into subject areas for which they have shown little or no interest previously. In spite of selective processes, a good measure of such material reaches the viewer and causes changes in his mind. People, in short, become conscious of political processes, which means enhancing of political culture. After the advent of TV, the political process has been transformed into real life, that can be seen, heard and almost touched. With this, the politician and politics itself loses their mystique and moves into the area of the secular things. The politician's image on the TV screen in not only physically diminished, but also psychologically deflated: now everybody can measure and criticize him by use of common yardsticks. In that way ordinary citizens gain certain strength, of the psychological nature, that becomes a part of their new political culture. Furthermore, television acts as an integrator and affirmer of small, isolated opposition groups. This is especially important for political systems in which political life has been integrated around two or three great political parties, and everything outside, remains unnoticed and ineffective. When such a small political group gets a portion of TV time (as it must, because it il »news« by definition), it immediately draws the support of all similar element in society and by that the chance to influence the broader political process. Naturally, television does not have only positive effects on political culture and political process. We not forget that television, with rare exceptions, is under direct and strong monopolistic control of varied political and other elites. The television viewer is to a large extent a victim of manipulation. Furthermore, there are some authors that consider television detrimental for political action, because it purportedly passivizes the public. But our conclusion is still on the positive side. The suppression of news and information in general, cannot go too far except in countries that are cut off the rest of the world in a seal-tight fashion. If people get information and that during long periods, (throughout years and decades), they cannot but form their attitudes, and become readier for political action, »spectoritis« or not. The whole problem of television influence on viewer should be always discussed in a broad time perspective, and not, as in some of the current research, in an artificially isolated moment. And so, to conclude, television does build the basic psycho-cultural prerequisites for better political participation, and by that, for a more democratic world.
