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This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

Altres ajuts: COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice ; This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

Political science knows a fair amount about the variables explaining party systems fragmentation or the constant in the equation of the number of parties. But we know much less about changes in the number of parties over time within countries or the slope in the equation of the number of parties. This paper fills this gap explaining the entry of new viable competitors in party systems after the founding election. Using empirical evidence from Spain, we show that when there is an electoral market failure and the higher the number of perfectly elastic voters, the higher the probability of new viable entrants. ; La ciencia política tiene un conocimiento bastante extenso de las variables que explican el sistema de fragmentación de partidos o de la constante en la ecuación del número de partidos. Pero, en cambio, se sabe mucho menos sobre los cambios en el número de partidos en el tiempo en los países o la pendiente de la ecuación en el número de los partidos. Este trabajo viene a cubrir esta carencia al explicar la entrada de los nuevos competidores viables en el sistema de partidos después de la elección fundacional. Utilizando la evidencia empírica de España, mostramos que cuando hay un fallo del mercado electoral y cuanto mayor es el número de votantes perfectamente elásticos, mayor es la probabilidad de nuevas entradas viables.

Political science knows a fair amount about the variables explaining party systems fragmentation or the constant in the equation of the number of parties. But we know much less about changes in the number of parties over time within countries or the slope in the equation of the number of parties. This paper fills this gap explaining the entry of new viable competitors in party systems after the founding election. Using empirical evidence from Spain, we show that when there is an electoral market failure and the higher the number of perfectly elastic voters, the higher the probability of new viable entrants. ; La ciencia política tiene un conocimiento bastante extenso de las variables que explican el sistema de fragmentación de partidos o de la constante en la ecuación del número de partidos. Pero, en cambio, se sabe mucho menos sobre los cambios en el número de partidos en el tiempo en los países o la pendiente de la ecuación en el número de los partidos. Este trabajo viene a cubrir esta carencia al explicar la entrada de los nuevos competidores viables en el sistema de partidos después de la elección fundacional. Utilizando la evidencia empírica de España, mostramos que cuando hay un fallo del mercado electoral y cuanto mayor es el número de votantes perfectamente elásticos, mayor es la probabilidad de nuevas entradas viables.

We illustrate the power of "logical models" (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. © 2013 © 2013 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties.

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties (N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions (I) and effective magnitude (M) of electoral system: N= I.6M.15 + 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

This article examines the forces shaping changes in the number of parties between consecutive elections. We argue that the transaction costs in electoral coordination depend on the turnout level in the previous election. The greater the number of peripheral voters entering the electorate, the less likely a substantial change in the distribution of partisan support in the subsequent election. The argument is tested using data for 313 parliamentary elections in 63 countries from 1990 to 2011, and two cases studies of countries using compulsory voting (the Netherlands and Australia). ; We acknowledge support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [Grant number CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER], ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme, and the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant number DP190101978].

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation used in comparative politics is the "Effective Number of Parties", designed in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of "relevant"parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sartori's definition of relevance, without requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construction. We thus advocate for the use of our "Effective Number of Relevant Parties"in future comparative research.

There is a common perception in the political economy literature that a larger number of parties makes it more difficult and more expensive - in terms of pork barrel programs - to implement policy-changes in a legislature. This paper proves that this perception is not necessarily true. The driving idea behind this result is that the number of parties should matter for legislative outcomes only to the extent that the ideological polarization between them is high. The model developed in this paper shows that it can be cheaper - in terms of pork barrel programs-, and also more likely, for a government party to negotiate its preferred public policy with several parties that are less polarized than with a few parties that are strongly polarized. ; Este artículo estudia si un partido de gobierno siempre prefiere negociar con un solo partido compacto en lugar de negociar con más de un partido en una legislatura. Nuestro punto central es que la interacción entre polarización ideológica y número de partidos juega un papel central en esta decisión. En el artículo se modelan dos tipos de legislaturas: La legislatura con 2-partidos, en la cual el partido de gobierno negocia con otro partido compacto; y la legislatura con m+1-partidos, en la cual éste negocia con m>2 partidos. En nuestro modelo, los partidos negocian sobre dos políticas: Una política pública (ideológica) y una política distributiva (privada). Nuestro principal resultado muestra que un partido de gobierno no siempre prefiere negociar en una situación bilateral. Si el nivel de polarización ideológica en la legislatura con 2-partidos es suficientemente grande, este preferiría negociar con m partidos menos polarizados. Nuestros resultados también muestran que, si el partido de gobierno decidiera entre dos legislaturas con el mismo número de partidos pero con diferente nivel de polarización ideológica, este preferiría negociar en la legislatura menos polarizada.

Despite its conceptual centrality to research in comparative politics and the fact that a single measure—the Laakso-Taagepera index (LT)—is nearly universally employed in empirical research, the question of what is the best way to "count" parties is still an open one. Among other alleged shortcomings, LT has been criticized for over-weighting small parties, especially in the case of a one-party majority. Using seat-shares data from over 300 elections, I have calculated LT as well as an alternative measure (BZ) which employs normalized Banzhaf scores rather than simple party seat shares, as weights. The Banzhaf index is a voting power index which calculates a party's voting power as a function of its coalitional potential. Though the two measures are highly correlated, I identify three particular party constellations in which the differences between LT and BZ are systematic and statistically significant. In all of these cases, and especially in the case of a one-party majority, I argue that BZ is a more accurate representation of the actual party system, after any given election, while LT is perhaps better interpreted as a measure of the shape of the party system more generally. These findings have many implications, including with respect to the categorization of party systems and the empirical validity of Duverger's Law.

Despite secularisation, there is growing recognition that some religious parties continue to influence elections and the formation of policy in several countries. But what explains why religious parties persist in some countries but not others? This study tests an argument holding that religious diversification promotes political cooperation and therefore reduces the number of religious parties. Using a data set of religious parties across advanced industrial democracies between 1945 and 2011, this paper analyses this argument and finds that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties over time.

Arguing that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation, recent research questions the assumption that religious diversity leads to more fragmented party systems and finds a negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of vote shares. Before this revisionist perspective can be believed, however, we need to observe the causal processes linking religious diversity and party system fragmentation. One of these is that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections. Using data counting the number of religious parties in elections around the world between 2011 and 2015, the analysis shows that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties. In line with the revisionist perspective, these results suggest that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation that lead elites to cooperate across religious group lines in support of parties representing their shared political interests.

The number of political parties continues to increase from time to time. Ironically, the establishment of a political party is not based on the desire to carry out the functions of political education, political recruitment, and political regeneration. It is only to fulfill the desire for the power of a group of political elites. This research aims to analyze the need to simplify the number of political parties and determine the ideal simplification design of political parties This research used normative juridical research with statutory, historical, and conceptual approaches. The results indicated that political party simplification is needed for creating effectiveness and efficiency, minimizing segmentation or the emergence of friction among Indonesian citizens, preventing voter confusion, and maintaining political stability. Meanwhile, the ideal design to simplify political parties that can be executed is through submitting the dissolution of political parties to the Constitutional Court (Indonesian: Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK)) by expanding the criteria for those who can propose for dissolution (legal standing), imposing strict sanctions, implementing a moratorium on permits for the establishment of new parties, and extending the authority of the government to unilaterally dissolve political parties, such as the power to dissolve banned community organizations.