Suchergebnisse

Nowadays, the optimal usage of exhausting natural resources is a serious economic, social and political question. For this reason, in this paper we examine how the optimal sustainable use and allocation of these resources can be achieved in a sustainable way using different game theoretic models. As the proper solution needs the cooperation of national economies, the optimization driven by own interest should be completely changed. In this examination, we use the tools of cooperative game theory to describe ecomomies' strategic behaviour and their interactions. Moreover, we describe different well-known game theoretic solution concepts (e.g. Core, Shaply-value, Nucleolus) with special focus on their required fairness properties. The fairness properties, detailed in this paper, can ensure stable and acceptable allocations for the player at individual and coalitional level as well. Besides the theoretical descriptions, we give some practical example related to games defined on different water supply management problems (e. g. urban water management, irrigation problems, hydro power licensing etc.).

In this study, we analyse the manner of developing a particular system of coordination of European affairs at national level, as well as its efficiency, the aim being to provide suggestions for improving it. The introductory section highlights the need for such a study, given the current political and institutional context of Romania, and it states the objectives of the study. Special attention is given to presenting the theoretical approach (expressing, on the one hand, the authors' vision that European affairs - distinctly from foreign affairs - are part of the complex governance process specific for the European Union (EU) and, on the other hand, operationalizing the idea of efficiency within a national system for coordinating European affairs, etc.) and the research methodology (reasons for choosing a comparative research design to support the presented arguments, as well as the qualitative research performed). In the first part, the paper also provides information on the legislative and institutional configuration of the EU, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, because the novelties and reforms brought by this regulatory framework (supperior to the one of the Nice Treaty, but inferior to the proposals stipulated within the Constitutional Treaty) have a direct impact on designing the structure for coordinating European affairs in the Member States. Given that in Romania the European affairs coordination system was initially inspired by the French model, while later suffering a series of institutional changes (some inspired by models from other EU states), an important part of the study addresses the need to know, from a comparative perspective, the best practices in European affairs coordination and cooperation mechanisms in other EU Member States. [.]