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We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behaviour (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

The author analyses the goals and instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), discusses approaches which theorise its functioning, examines its policy content and develops a framework for its evaluation

Büchs analyses the goals and instruments of the Open Method of Coordination, discusses approaches which theorize its functioning, examines its policy content and develops a framework for its evaluation. Through the examination of a case study the author demonstrates how policy actors apply the OMC in employment in Germany and the United Kingdom

One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which member state governments and non-governmental actors try to have an impact on the definition of the OMC objectives and, subsequently, strategically and selectively use the OMC in national policy-making processes. This, however, entails problems in terms of the transparency of policy-making processes and the accountability of national governments.

One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which member state governments and non-governmental actors try to have an impact on the definition of the OMC objectives and, subsequently, strategically and selectively use the OMC in national policy-making processes. This, however, entails problems in terms of the transparency of policy-making processes and the accountability of national governments. Adapted from the source document.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a new governance method applied in the European Union to policy fields where the main competences still rest with the member states. The OMC should help to foster mutual learning about successful policies and promote policy transfer by identifying best practices and recommending them. By confronting this approach with the economic concept of laboratory federalism its potential for the innovation and diffusion of policies in a multi-level governance system is analysed. Both concepts use the basic idea of decentralised experimentation and mutual learning from experiences with implemented policies. Whereas the OMC organizes this learning process to a greater extent 'top-down', laboratory federalism is much more a 'bottom-up' concept. Their advantages and shortcomings in evaluating, finding and transferring best policies are discussed and the underlying insufficiencies in setting adequate incentives for adopting better policies are analysed. It is shown that under certain conditions both concepts can supplement each other.