De NAVO tegen Gaddafi: Operation Unified Protector
In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 182, Heft 5, S. 220-236
ISSN: 0026-3869
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In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 182, Heft 5, S. 220-236
ISSN: 0026-3869
World Affairs Online
In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 181, Heft 3, S. 107-132
ISSN: 0026-3869
In: Proceedings
Eekelen, W. F. van: The historical record. - S. 1-8 Coelmont, J.; Howorth, J.; Osinga, F.: The capacities at Europe's disposal. - S. 9-40 Doel, T. van den; Heusgen, C.; Duke, S.: Deciding factors for successful operations. - S. 41-62 Grauls, J.: Closing. - S. 63-66
World Affairs Online
In: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/343770
Between 1949 and 1962 the Netherlands renounced its sovereignty over most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) stood by its point of view that it had a global task to fulfil. This military-naval deployment, outside the NATO treaty area during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to the structural global ambitions of the Royal Netherlands Navy's leadership, is the central theme of this study. This theme is analysed on the basis of theories and an understanding of multinational fleet operations after 1945 and Dutch policy regarding naval operations outside the NATO treaty area, but above all through regional case studies (Korean War 1950-1955, operations around the Arabian peninsula 1984-2000, and in the Adriatic Sea and Montenegrin waters 1992-2001). These case studies were examined by addressing the following central questions: to what extent did these missions involve a traditional approach to Dutch foreign policy? To what extent did the Navy's leadership influence the political-strategic decision-making on these out-of-area operations? To what extent were Dutch tasks and operations different from those of coalition partners, specifically those of the British Royal Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy considered to be its 'sister navy'? To what extent did the existing national and international perceptions of the RNLN influence Dutch decision-making on these missions, and how much did the participation in multinational fleet operations subsequently contribute to the objectives the Dutch government had in mind? In all the three case studies, the national and international perception of the Netherlands as a maritime nation and the ability to deploy high-quality navy units were taken into account in the Dutch government's decision-making regarding the RNLN participation in multinational fleet operations. The missions always received international, and especially British and American, appreciation and respect. The fact that ...
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Leurdijk, D.: CIMIC: a priority policy issue. - S. 1-9. Schoups, J.: Experiences and lessons learned from previous operations. The United Nation's administration of Eastern Slavonia. - S. 11-19. Montravel, G.: Disaster Relief Branch Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Geneva. - S. 21-31. Krasznai, J.: How to optimize the co-ordination between peace keeping forces and civilian actors during the preparation, planning and conduct of peace-keeping and/or humanitarian operations. - S. 33-36. Viriot, J.-M.: Le point de vue de l'UEO sur la cooperation civilo-militaire. - S. 37-44. Rollins, ...: NATO (SHAPE) CIMIC. - S. 45-52. Geleyn, M.: Crisisbeheer. - S. 53-57
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.
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In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 178, Heft 9
ISSN: 0026-3869
In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 178, Heft 6, S. 340-349
ISSN: 0026-3869