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An Analytical Model of Overlapping Consensus
In: Shakaigaku hyōron: Japanese sociological review, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 132-147
ISSN: 1884-2755
Two Concepts of Overlapping Consensus
In: Human Rights, S. 71-94
The Role of an Overlapping Consensus
In: Liberalism without Perfection, S. 161-191
The Prospects for an Overlapping Consensus
In: Exploitation and Economic Justice in the Liberal Capitalist State, S. 273-304
Public Reason, Coercion, and Overlapping Consensus
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 0, Heft 0
ISSN: 2194-5624
Abstract
The idea of public reason involves a standard of legitimacy that requires that laws and institutions be acceptable to all reasonable people, regardless of their conceptions of the good. Many philosophers have argued that public reason should be understood as an answer to the question of how to justify state coercion. However, some authors have criticized this traditional account because it overlooks noncoercive state actions that seem appropriate topics of public reason. More recently, some philosophers have defended the traditional account against that objection. In this paper, I argue that these approaches cannot effectively deal with that objection and offer a different version of the traditional account that can do so. This version rests on the ideas of overlapping consensus and stability. According to this version, the point of public reason is preserving an overlapping consensus on a coercive system of laws and institutions and achieving a stable society.
JOHN RAWLS: OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS AND PUBLIC REASON
John Rawls Rawls's political thought has been chosen for study because he has been very influential and his philosophy can be used in interpreting modern constitution. Rawls' later works had focused on the question of stability; how a society ordered by the two principles of justice endures? His answer to this question is contained in a collection of lectures titled Political Liberation. In these lectures, Rawls introduced the 'idea of an overlapping consensus' – or agreement of justice as fairness between citizens who hold different religious and philosophical views. Political liberalism also introduced the idea of Public reason – the common reason of all citizens. This work attempts to explained and interrogate John Rawls idea of "Overlapping Consensus and Public Reason". This paper submits that Rawls Political Liberalism is a rich and suggestive account of how to justify a scheme of principles for ordering the basic structure of society. This work further argues that Rawls's theory leaves us with same pressing problems. One of the problems that Rawls must answer is that of providing a critic and justification. By calling justice as fairness a political conception Rawls has abandoned the attempt to provide such a critical justification. But in doing so, one has to wonder what reasons one would have to ultimately accept the political conception, other than merely pragmatic ones. Another problem that Rawls's theory presents is that it is not clear that justice as fairness would be able to achieve an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive views.
BASE
Public Institutions, Overlapping Consensus and Trust
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 559-572
ISSN: 1743-8772
Public Institutions, Overlapping Consensus and Trust
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 559-572
ISSN: 1369-8230
Christian Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus
In: 46 Brigham Young University Law Review 1245 (2021)
SSRN
SYMPOSIUM: Overlapping Consensus and Critical Justification
In: Politeia. Notizie di Politeia, Band 17, Heft 64, S. 61-70
ISSN: 1128-2401
An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of Two Approaches
In: The review of politics, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 257-284
ISSN: 1748-6858
This essay examines various intellectual challenges posed by John Rawls's conception of an overlapping consensus, both in terms of his own approach and also that of Charles Taylor. Two questions are entertained: (1) whether various criticisms of Rawls's view are indeed justified and (2) if they are, whether Taylor puts them to rest. Though the latter question is answered somewhat in the negative, Taylor's version of overlapping consensus is interestingly different from that of Rawls in that Taylor introduces an important distinction between a tradition on the one hand and what Rawls terms a "comprehensive doctrine" on the other. The advantage of this distinction, among other things, is that it clarifies what is at stake in moving to any sort of overlapping consensus.
An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of Two Approaches
In: The review of politics, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 257-284
ISSN: 0034-6705
Decisoes estrategicas e "overlapping consensus" na America Latina
In: Brazilian journal of political economy: Revista de economia política, Band 21, Heft 84, S. 3-29
ISSN: 0101-3157
This paper, first, summarizes Latin American structuralism, and offers reasons why it was so influential and durable in the region. Second, it points out why structuralism was unable to keep pace with historical new facts, particularly with the industrial revolution or take-off, that made Latin American economies intermediary, still developing, but fully capitalist. Third, it lists the overlapping consensus that today exists on economic development. Forth, it opposes "official orthodoxy" to "developmental populism", the former deriving from neoclassical economics, the latter from structuralism, and offers, in relation to six strategic issues, a development alternative. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)
World Affairs Online
Legal Theory Lexicon: Overlapping Consensus & Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Blog: Legal Theory Blog
Introduction As law students become more sophisticated, they begin to notice that certain debates seem to repeat themselves over and over again. Disagreements about disparate subjects--in procedure, criminal law, torts, property, and constitutional law--frequently seem to turn on the really...