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Proceedings of the first conference, November 1917, were never published. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Die wachsende Bedeutung institutioneller Investoren führt zu einer zunehmenden Verflechtung von konkurrierenden Unternehmen über Minderheitsbeteiligungen ihrer Anteilseigner. Diese Verflechtungsstrukturen und ihre möglichen negativen Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb werden seit Kurzem unter dem Schlagwort "Common Ownership" diskutiert. Die Arbeit bietet einen Gesamtüberblick über die wettbewerbsrechtlichen Aspekte von Common Ownership. Ausgehend vom Stand der ökonomischen Forschung werden zunächst mögliche wettbewerbsbeeinträchtigende Wirkmechanismen untersucht. Anschließend werden die Verflechtungsstrukturen anhand des deutschen und europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts beurteilt sowie Regulierungsvorschläge und weitere Lösungsansätze analysiert.

What role do or should US unions play in democratic or worker-owned enterprises? The three major types of US industrial democrats-those favoring collective bargaining, those favoring nonunion, management-run participation, and those favoring setting up alternative organizations-disagree and/or are hostile to each other on this question. This study presents two cases: (1) a set of long-unionized worker-owned companies; and (2) a community-owned economic development organization with unionized workers and union representatives on its board of directors. Qualitative observational and interview data are combined with statistical analysis of attitudinal data. The findings indicate that union presence is problematic for itself and the enterprise. Moreover, the union tends to play a traditional conservative role, emphasizing protection of workers from management abuses, which stem from the imperfect nature of worker/community ownership arrangements and the imperfect nature of democratic management.

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy

This article proposes a way of looking at ownership in which the central conceptual feature is the agreement that brings ownership into existence. On this understanding, ownership is a social fact, and as such derives its legitimacy from the extent to which people living under it give it their uncoerced consent. While any particular system's substantive features can certainly be judged according to independent moral considerations, these considerations would necessarily be secondary to the facts surrounding the agreement. In rooting legitimacy to consent, the argument runs parallel to both contractualist moral philosophy and 'externalist' rights claims, but, as is demonstrated in this article, differs from both in its emphasis on the conceptual centrality of agreement. The latter half of the article explores how this understanding of ownership shifts the grounds for what counts as a legitimate right of property, and then offers a few substantive conclusions regarding particular property rights and the nature of the moral obligations that systems of ownership (so conceived) both create and nullify.

Intro -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- Contents -- Preface -- Characteristics of Minority Business and Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the 2002 Survey of Business Owners -- Executive Summary -- Implications -- Introduction -- Life Cycle of Minority Firms -- Survival Rates of Firms -- Characteristics of Businesses with High Survival Rates -- Data and Methodology -- Minority-Owned Firms -- Non-Minority-Owned Firms -- American Indian and Alaska Native -- Comparability of 2002 Characteristics of Business and Business Owners and 1992 Characteristics of Business Owners -- Relative Standard Errors -- Business Characteristics -- Employer Firms -- Employee Productivity -- Sources of Capital to Start or Acquire Business -- Sources of Capital Used by Size of Firm and Employment -- Sources of Capital Used by Industry -- Sources of Capital Used for Expansion or Capital Improvements -- Sources of Capital Used by Size of Firm and Employment -- Sources of Capital Used by Industry -- Business Ownership and Structure: Home-Based, One Owner, and Franchised -- Business Ownership and Structure by Size of Firm and Employment -- Business Ownership and Structure by Industry -- Customer Categories -- Customer Categories by Size of Firm and Employment -- Household Consumers/Individuals -- Other Businesses/Organizations -- Federal government -- Export Sales -- Customer Categories by Industry -- Owner's Education -- Owner's Age -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Appendix: Glossary of Terms -- Appendix: Additional Tables -- References -- End Notes -- Increasing MBE Competitiveness through Strategic Alliances -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- Introduction -- The MBE's Role in the Value Chain -- The Logic for Outsourcing in the Value Chain -- The MBE's Chosen Customers -- The MBE'S Growth Strategy -- Strategic Business Relationships